Issue No. 674

Published 24 Apr 2024

The 'Lightning' Brigade and lessons for the SNA

Published on 24 Apr 2024 14:39 min

The 'Lightning' Brigade and lessons for the SNA
 

On 9 April 2024, the 10th intake of the Danab graduated from their basic training at the Baledogle military airfield, about 90 kilometres northwest of Mogadishu. The ceremony was a typical affair, with senior military officials present at their graduation, including Somalia's Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur. Since 2014, Baledogle has served as the central base for the US-trained Somali special forces known as 'Lightning'-- the best-equipped and trained troops that serve as the 16th brigade of the Somali National Army (SNA). Divided into 5 operational units, the Danab are spread across key cities in Somalia, including Kismaayo, Dhusamareb, and Jowhar, with the 5th, the Danab Mechanised Unit, based out of Mogadishu.

The first Danab intake of 150 recruits began in October 2013. Today, the estimated number of special forces has swelled to between 3,000 and 4,000 soldiers. There is no confirmation of how many more Danab the US plans to train, but the US and Somalia signed a USD 100 million Memorandum of Understanding in February 2024 for the US to construct 5 bases for Danab units. Over several years, the Danab have remained largely immured from the perennial corruption, leadership challenges, and successive collapses of the SNA. In the string of stop-start offensive operations in central Somalia since August 2022, as well as the BADBAADO campaign in Lower Shabelle that started in 2019, the Danab have played a central role in clearing Al-Shabaab from long-held territory. Though operations are currently stalled, and Al-Shabaab has retaken the military momentum, the Danab remains one of the principal weapons in the SNA's arsenal. 

One of the central strengths of the Danab is the robust recruitment and training process that the US government contracts to the private military firm Bancroft. The company actively seeks out a cross-section of the best and brightest from the SNA and local communities where the Danab are deployed. A robust screening process, both physical and counter-intelligence, is further used to prevent Al-Shabaab infiltration of the kind witnessed at the General Gordon attack in February 2024. Once Danab recruits have completed their basic training, they undergo further rounds of specialised training akin to a Western military. This ranges from intelligence training, land navigation, leadership courses for prospective officers, and maintenance for military vehicles, which is particularly important considering their high attrition rate. Above all, though, Danab units benefit from continued support once recruits have graduated and are deployed onto the battlefield. Here, too, Danab enjoys prioritised assistance from the federal government regarding weapons, fuel, and food. And because of their operations' offensive and high-risk nature, casualty evacuation is again more organised and guaranteed.

Unlike the Turkish-trained Gorgor and UAE-trained SNA brigades, the Danab can further rely on real-time strategic and operational mentorship from US forces and Bancroft contractors. While the special forces now routinely conduct missions without foreign personnel on the ground, units still receive support from their partners back at base. This typically includes drones that can provide a Danab commander with a real-time image of the battlefield and intelligence support. And when units embark on a mission, the system is organised so that they can rely on ATMIS or SNA backup.

Moreover, the regional alignment, though not perfect, also works in favour of the Danab. Being clan-inclusive and politically savvy in the Danab's respective Area of Responsibility has been pivotal to the success of the units' operations. Regional alignment allows Danab battalion leaders to have intimate knowledge of local terrain, persistent contacts with local political and security leaders, and expertise in specific enemy networks, allowing Danab to operate far more effectively. This is not the case for the Gorgor, for instance, whose units are based out of Mogadishu but then deployed to any region of the country. 

While the Danab is a crucial ingredient for the SNA's success, it cannot be the only element of kinetic operations. Indeed, they only work as the lead element of operations when they can mobilise other SNA forces and ma'awiisley alongside them. This cohesive element proved particularly pivotal in the early successes of the offensive in eastern Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle in 2022. The smaller Danab units take significant offensive risks but are not designed to hold ground alone, in large part due to their lack of heavy military equipment and pure unit numbers. Today, due to the funding and morale crises facing the UAE-trained brigades and the Gorgor, there is a risk that Danab could be misused as a 'holding force,' far from the smaller, 'lightning' operations for which they were trained. 

And like every armed group in Somalia, Danab remains at risk of politicisation. In October 2021, former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo ordered the 163rd Danab to fight the moderate Sufi armed movement in Galmudug, the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a. The blatant misuse of the battalion led to a temporary pause of US assistance, but the unit was subsequently reorganised and retrained, allowing it to take a leading role in central Somalia today. There are also broader questions of sustainability, such as at what point the Danab could conceivably transition into the SNA without being corrupted by the issues that plague the army. Moreover, if the US has a sunset clause or ceiling on building these special forces, then it necessitates that there will be an 'end' to the Danab at some point.

Other questions are swirling around the future of the Danab, including surrounding the US decision to build 5 more bases for the Danab in locales including Kismaayo and Mogadishu, which have an already outsized military and Danab presence. Investing more military resources into these cities will do little to protect vulnerable rural areas that are coming under increasing pressure from Al-Shabaab. Nor does it solve the dilemma facing the 162nd Danab in Kismaayo, who are still influenced by the politics of Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe. Adding an additional company to this contingent that could recruit Marehan fighters in Gedo would perhaps make more strategic sense moving forward. In a decade's time, say, if Al-Shabaab is successfully displaced from southern Somalia, and that is an immensely tall ask, the Danab would ideally be placed in urban centres such as Jilib, from which they can quickly project force and secure territory.

All of this provides plenty of lessons for Turkey and the Gorgor programme, as well as the broader SNA. The importance of excellent training is obvious, but the ongoing mentorship and real-time support distinguish the Danab from other brigades. Still, replicating the successes of these special forces is no small feat, though establishing multi-clan units and continual training and monitoring of troops would go far. In the short term, though, with Somalia's security auguries so poor, it is crucial that these competent forces are not hurriedly misused to stem contracting territorial control in the coming months.
 

By the Somali Wire Team

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