Al-Shabaab and the Drone Age
In a recent incident in the Bakool region, Somali government forces intercepted a drone seemingly deployed by Al-Shabaab to conduct reconnaissance activities over government military bases. After being spotted hovering suspiciously near the installations, the soldiers successfully shot down the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Similarly, in Dhobley, residents reported an unidentified object flying over an African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) base before disappearing into the sky after being fired upon.
The list could go on. Al-Shabaab has repeatedly employed drones to survey the bases and convoys of ATMIS and the Somali National Army, as well as to monitor the movements of foreign dignitaries and humanitarian workers within the country. While Al-Shabaab's weaponisation of drones remains unconfirmed, the regional trend is rather worrying. The militant group's drone usage, fuelled by the acquisition of modern surveillance drones deployed to gather military intelligence and film propaganda, could conceivably motivate the militant group to accelerate their efforts to weaponise their drones.
The Islamist militants in Somalia are clearly not the only ones to realise the power of drones in both combat and surveillance operations. Drone technology is continuing to progress rapidly and shape contemporary battlefields from Ukraine to Sudan to Myanmar. Governments, rebel groups, and extremist militias are all increasingly seeking to wield drones in various ways. Not all drones are made equal, however. These drones range from the cheap, off-the-shelf UAVs that can be bought for less than USD 30, which may have a rudimentary camera and limited range, to the USD 30 million cost of the US Reaper drone that can travel as far as 1,850 kilometres from their base. Others, particularly Turkey's Bayraktar TB2 drones, have become popular with a range of governments, including Azerbaijan and Ethiopia. The combat drones supplied by Turkey and the United Arab Emirates played a central role during the Tigray war in Ethiopia, where they helped tip the balance in favour of government forces under pressure from advancing Tigrayan troops in mid-2021.
The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has further revealed the possibilities of UAV weaponisation. Grenades and other munitions have been strapped to cheap drones before being flown into USD multi-million tanks and equipment. Ukrainian and Russian UAVs continuously hover over trenches to provide real-time intelligence to steer artillery and assaults. And those with infrared technology can allow their operator to see in the dark, enabling night operations.
The use of UAVs is not unknown to global jihadist networks either. Al-Qaeda and ISIS have shared technical knowledge with their African branches and affiliates about drone use. As of today, the terrorist use of drones has been overwhelmingly passive-defensive, used for intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance and propaganda purposes. The commercial drones' small profile often makes them difficult to shoot down. However, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda branch in the Maghreb and West Africa, recently reported successful drone weaponisation, which makes it one of the first jihadist groups in Africa to successfully utilise armed drones in operations. Considering the existing knowledge exchange among Al-Qaeda affiliates, the risk of drone weaponisation appearing soon in Somalia in the hands of Al-Shabaab is increasing. Some indications have already emerged; for instance, Mogadishu Airport security recently seized military-grade drone components.
Al-Shabaab clearly understands the possible strategic advantages of wielding drones. A United Nations Counter-Terror report in 2022 highlighted a "prolific use" of UAVs, including mini-drones, by Al-Shabaab. Gathering accurate intelligence on enemy positions and troop numbers is pivotal for the militant group's asymmetrical warfare tactics, particularly as they often outnumber and overrun government and ATMIS Forward Operating Bases. Operating drones can provide Al-Shabaab with a tactical advantage, enabling them to plan and execute operations more precisely while minimising their own risk.
As of now, gathering intelligence on enemy movements, positions of security forces, and potential targets remains the principal way in which Al-Shabaab uses drones. In January 2020, Al-Shabaab used drones to record and possibly even coordinate the much-publicised attack on a US military base in Manda Bay, Kenya, which resulted in the deaths of three Americans. Moreover, in July 2023, Kenyan security forces brought down a drone that Al-Shabaab fighters used to gather intelligence ahead of a planned attack on a Kenyan military outpost at Sirari, Lamu East. The incident at Sirari confirmed that the jihadists have also incorporated ready-made UAVs into their operations not only in Somalia but also across the Kenya-Somalia border. The militant group has further utilised drones as a tool for propaganda, releasing videos purportedly showcasing footage captured by their drones.
Notably, there has been no clear evidence that Al-Shabaab has successfully militarised its drones. This seems to be mainly because the group uses commercial quadcopters that tend to be too small to deliver explosives or other weaponry. Nonetheless, lessons from outside Somalia show that it could only be a matter of time before the extremist group finds a way. Al-Shabaab has repeatedly demonstrated a keen willingness to adapt to evolving technologies and tactics to further its objectives.
The deployment of drones by Al-Shabaab, let alone their potential weaponisation, could yet present a major challenge for Somalia's government troops and ATMIS forces. While it is already too late to stop Al-Shabaab's procurement of small UAVs, efforts should concentrate on preventing the militant group's ability to weaponise them. Should Al-Shabaab succeed in that, the consequences would surely be dire.
By the Somali Wire Team
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