Issue No. 673

Published 22 Apr 2024

Al-Shabaab and the Drone Age

Published on 22 Apr 2024 13:25 min

Al-Shabaab and the Drone Age
 

In a recent incident in the Bakool region, Somali government forces intercepted a drone seemingly deployed by Al-Shabaab to conduct reconnaissance activities over government military bases. After being spotted hovering suspiciously near the installations, the soldiers successfully shot down the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Similarly, in Dhobley, residents reported an unidentified object flying over an African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) base before disappearing into the sky after being fired upon.
 
The list could go on. Al-Shabaab has repeatedly employed drones to survey the bases and convoys of ATMIS and the Somali National Army, as well as to monitor the movements of foreign dignitaries and humanitarian workers within the country. While Al-Shabaab's weaponisation of drones remains unconfirmed, the regional trend is rather worrying. The militant group's drone usage, fuelled by the acquisition of modern surveillance drones deployed to gather military intelligence and film propaganda, could conceivably motivate the militant group to accelerate their efforts to weaponise their drones.
 
The Islamist militants in Somalia are clearly not the only ones to realise the power of drones in both combat and surveillance operations. Drone technology is continuing to progress rapidly and shape contemporary battlefields from Ukraine to Sudan to Myanmar. Governments, rebel groups, and extremist militias are all increasingly seeking to wield drones in various ways. Not all drones are made equal, however. These drones range from the cheap, off-the-shelf UAVs that can be bought for less than USD 30, which may have a rudimentary camera and limited range, to the USD 30 million cost of the US Reaper drone that can travel as far as 1,850 kilometres from their base. Others, particularly Turkey's Bayraktar TB2 drones, have become popular with a range of governments, including Azerbaijan and Ethiopia. The combat drones supplied by Turkey and the United Arab Emirates played a central role during the Tigray war in Ethiopia, where they helped tip the balance in favour of government forces under pressure from advancing Tigrayan troops in mid-2021.
 
The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has further revealed the possibilities of UAV weaponisation. Grenades and other munitions have been strapped to cheap drones before being flown into USD multi-million tanks and equipment. Ukrainian and Russian UAVs continuously hover over trenches to provide real-time intelligence to steer artillery and assaults. And those with infrared technology can allow their operator to see in the dark, enabling night operations.
 
The use of UAVs is not unknown to global jihadist networks either. Al-Qaeda and ISIS have shared technical knowledge with their African branches and affiliates about drone use. As of today, the terrorist use of drones has been overwhelmingly passive-defensive, used for intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance and propaganda purposes. The commercial drones' small profile often makes them difficult to shoot down. However, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda branch in the Maghreb and West Africa, recently reported successful drone weaponisation, which makes it one of the first jihadist groups in Africa to successfully utilise armed drones in operations. Considering the existing knowledge exchange among Al-Qaeda affiliates, the risk of drone weaponisation appearing soon in Somalia in the hands of Al-Shabaab is increasing. Some indications have already emerged; for instance, Mogadishu Airport security recently seized military-grade drone components.
 
Al-Shabaab clearly understands the possible strategic advantages of wielding drones. A United Nations Counter-Terror report in 2022 highlighted a "prolific use" of UAVs, including mini-drones, by Al-Shabaab. Gathering accurate intelligence on enemy positions and troop numbers is pivotal for the militant group's asymmetrical warfare tactics, particularly as they often outnumber and overrun government and ATMIS Forward Operating Bases. Operating drones can provide Al-Shabaab with a tactical advantage, enabling them to plan and execute operations more precisely while minimising their own risk.
 
As of now, gathering intelligence on enemy movements, positions of security forces, and potential targets remains the principal way in which Al-Shabaab uses drones. In January 2020, Al-Shabaab used drones to record and possibly even coordinate the much-publicised attack on a US military base in Manda Bay, Kenya, which resulted in the deaths of three Americans. Moreover, in July 2023, Kenyan security forces brought down a drone that Al-Shabaab fighters used to gather intelligence ahead of a planned attack on a Kenyan military outpost at Sirari, Lamu East. The incident at Sirari confirmed that the jihadists have also incorporated ready-made UAVs into their operations not only in Somalia but also across the Kenya-Somalia border. The militant group has further utilised drones as a tool for propaganda, releasing videos purportedly showcasing footage captured by their drones.
 
Notably, there has been no clear evidence that Al-Shabaab has successfully militarised its drones. This seems to be mainly because the group uses commercial quadcopters that tend to be too small to deliver explosives or other weaponry. Nonetheless, lessons from outside Somalia show that it could only be a matter of time before the extremist group finds a way. Al-Shabaab has repeatedly demonstrated a keen willingness to adapt to evolving technologies and tactics to further its objectives.
 
The deployment of drones by Al-Shabaab, let alone their potential weaponisation, could yet present a major challenge for Somalia's government troops and ATMIS forces. While it is already too late to stop Al-Shabaab's procurement of small UAVs, efforts should concentrate on preventing the militant group's ability to weaponise them. Should Al-Shabaab succeed in that, the consequences would surely be dire.

By the Somali Wire Team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 985
The Hiiraan Insurrection – A Crisis Foretold
The Somali Wire

Months of simmering tensions in the Hiiraan region and escalating political rifts with Mogadishu have morphed into a full-blown armed insurrection this week. This development compounds the widening revolt across Somalia's periphery against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) administration, deepening its political isolation.


28:17 min read 18 Nov
Issue No. 983
Hassan Sheikh Runs Out of Road
The Somali Wire

In a landmark ruling last week, five senior judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court declared incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) May 2026 term extension unlawful and held that Parliament’s mandate had expired in April 2026, thereby rendering Villa Somalia’s "one-person, one-vote" (OPOV) electoral process illegal and its outcome invalid. Consequently, the judges directed all Somali political parties to agree on a new electoral framework within 30 days and conduct a credible poll within 90 days.


25:51 min read 11 Nov
Issue No. 982
Loo Joojin Maayo – Somalia’s Runaway Train
The Somali Wire

Every political system generates its own distinctive catchphrases, slogans, and metaphors, and Somalia is no exception. Indeed, the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has proven to be one of the country's most prolific creators of political branding. Among the most notable was the aspirational slogan "Soomali heshiis ah dunida naheshiis la ah" (Somalia at peace with itself and with the world). Always more ideal than reality, the phrase now rings hollow at a time when the nation remains deeply fractured internally and relations with regional neighbours have grown increasingly frosty. Similarly, the Simón Bolívar-style moniker "Dal xoreeye" (The Liberator) feels intensely contradicted by reality as significant swathes of the country risk reverting to Al-Shabaab control. Other slogans, such as "Birmade" and "Dan Qaran", have likewise been quietly discarded.


26:10 min read 04 Nov
Issue No. 130
The Elephant on the Summit: Ethiopia’s War Cannot Be Won the Old Way
The Horn Edition

Ethiopia’s leaders are fighting a new war with an old conviction: that military victory can permanently settle the question of who owns the state. But the coalition that encircled Tigray in 2020 has fractured, the regional balance has shifted, and drone capabilities are spreading to the government’s opponents. The battlefield looks familiar, but the strategic conditions are profoundly different. The danger lies in mistaking the temporary capture of territory for the resolution of deep-seated conflict, a ruinous road Ethiopia has travelled before; its towns bear the scars, and its people carry the losses.


9:36 min read 28 Oct
Issue No. 981
The Desperation Conundrum: How HSM Is Unravelling Somalia
The Somali Wire

In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.


0 min read 23 Oct
Issue No. 980
Somalia’s Volatile Calendar – The October Jinx
The Somali Wire

Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.


26:19 min read 21 Oct
Issue No. 979
Using Force Against Sheikh Sharif a Bad Idea
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.


11:59 min read 14 Oct
Issue No. 978
Setbacks on Three Fronts Signal Big Risks for Somalia’s Federal Government
The Somali Wire

It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.


9:18 min read 09 Oct
Issue No. 977
The Politics of 'Hiiraan State': The Hawaadle Discontent
The Somali Wire

Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.


23:44 min read 30 Sep
Scroll