Crunch Time: The Looming Confrontation over HSM's 'Reforms'
Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) is facing growing pressure to suspend the highly controversial amendments to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution. The end of Ramadan has heralded the return of several Federal Member State (FMS) leaders to Somalia, and with their arrival, the crisis arising from the rushed constitutional 'review' process is coming home to roost. While Villa Somalia has remained staunchly opposed to negotiations with its public critics, it is becoming increasingly apparent that it may be forced to make concessions and open up the process to genuine, broader consultations if it wants to retain any kind of support within the FMS administrations.
Last week, HSM flew to Nairobi to meet the titular head of the Somali opposition, former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. By most accounts, the closed-door meeting did not go well. Sharif doubled down on his position, faulting both the manner of HSM's attitude to the opposition and the Federal Government of Somalia's (FGS) whole approach to constitution-making.
In a public statement following the meeting, the former president said he and HSM failed to see eye-to-eye on all the three issues on the agenda-- the constitutional amendments, the current trajectory of the Somali state and the FGS-Puntland dispute. Sheikh Sharif, looking visibly glum in pictures circulated on social media, appeared especially irked by the optics. For some, the spectacle of two Abgaal/Hawiye leaders discussing weighty national issues has stuck in the craw, with other Somali leaders and clans with legitimate interests and stakes excluded. Indeed, Sharif was further quoted by a close aide as telling HSM that "these are not clan issues; they are national issues that must be addressed in a coherent fashion and inclusively, involving all the stakeholders." Disappointed with the outcome, the Somali president left for Mogadishu without the political prize he was seeking.
Regional leaders, who initially endorsed elements of HSM's changes in May 2023 through the National Consultative Council (NCC), have since privately rallied around Sharif's core message – a pause of the review process, a halt in the implementation of the changes and the establishment of a genuinely inclusive national dialogue. A disaffected opposition is now closing ranks and working to formulate a unified response. South West State leader Abdiaziz Laftagareen is in Nairobi and is expected to join Sharif and other leaders in the coming days to unveil a joint platform and possible alternative routes.
Meanwhile, according to media reports, President Said Abdullahi Deni of Puntland and President Ahmed Islaan Madoobe of Jubaland met this week in the UAE, the first encounter between the two former allies in a year. Details of their meeting are still unknown, and it remains unclear whether the meeting came at the behest of the Emiratis, who enjoy close relations with both men, or whether the Somali politicians initiated it. If the meeting was focused on reconciling Madoobe to Deni's steadfast opposition, then it is sure to have significant ramifications for HSM's constitutional reform agenda.
Since his return to office in May 2022, Villa Somalia has heavily relied on Jubaland to counter the narratives that its policies are alienating the Darood. A tentative thaw in recent frosty relations between Puntland and Jubaland is certain to complicate matters for Villa Somalia, especially if Madoobe joins Deni and Sharif to publicly demand a more inclusive electoral, political and legal reform process. There remains significant public sympathy for Puntland in Jubaland, with the two regions making up the heartland of the Darood clan family as well as being strong proponents of federalism. A protracted crisis that drives Puntland further from the Somali federation and the perception that Villa Somalia's reform is re-centralising the Somali state, consolidating Hawiye 'hegemony' and marginalising the Darood will further increase pressure on Madoobe to ditch Villa Somalia in favour of the burgeoning Deni-Sharif-led opposition camp.
Witnessing the opposition coalescing, on Tuesday, 16 April, Villa Somalia called regional leaders to a two-day meeting in Mogadishu, 20-21 April, to discuss the stalled military campaign against Al-Shabaab and the constitutional review process. Despite Puntland's recent withdrawal of recognition of the legitimacy of Mogadishu's authority and continued absence from the NCC, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni is the first name on the formal letter of invitation. At the time of writing, no FMS leader has responded to the letter. The attempt to pre-empt the massing coalition may be too late, however, amid growing reports that a joint statement by regional leaders is in the offing. This will likely include a disavowal of the recently adopted amendments to the first four chapters of the provisional constitution.
Instead of a genuinely inclusive national debate on proposed changes, Villa Somalia has opted for a narrow, highly controlled and rushed exercise. Worse still, the federal parliament, intended to be a critical check on the executive, was strong-armed and bribed into endorsing the massive, unimplementable changes. So far, the amendments have not been published in the official gazette – a legal requirement to realise them as the new law of the land. This may well be deliberate, a signal that HSM is offering room for dialogue and possible negotiation. But again, this is itself a problematic proposition and a contravention of how the Provisional Constitution should have been ratified.
A broader point is worth restating. Bull-dozing change and reform by executive fiat is a risky gamble in Somalia, where consensus is a rare yet critical prerequisite for the country's development. That the amendments are now being robustly challenged by a diverse array of Somalia's political constituents is no bad thing, hoping, of course, Villa Somalia has woken up to the reality that it cannot continue on its current course.
By the Somali Wire Team
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