Issue No. 670

Political neglect adds to crises in South West State

In the past two months alone, at least 8 of the 18 districts in South West State (SWS) have witnessed some form of armed clashes between various clan militias as well as regional and federal forces. The roots and triggers of the violence are diverse, but all speak to the enduring fragility of SWS and the ongoing difference of the regional administration led by President Abdiaziz Laftagareen. Many of the clan and sub-clan conflicts are further threatening to re-open old wounds and offer space for Al-Shabaab to exploit at a critical moment for Somalia's stability.
 
In the weeks preceding the start of Ramadan on 11 March, Eel Berde, Berdale, and Qansahdhere all saw intra or sub-clan violence, and from the beginning of the Holy Month to date, Dinsoor, Bukhakaba, Walaweyne, Qoryoley, and Baraawe have also experienced clashes. Some have been related to district council administrative control, others are tied to long-standing clan tensions, and a few are related to control of economic resources, including khat. In Dinsoor, for instance, violence erupted between two clan militias following the execution of an alleged murderer in Baidoa. Rather than allowing for a process which involved the communities in Dinsoor, the suspect was instead hurriedly taken from the town by SWS forces and executed there after a hasty-arranged trial.
 
In another instance in Baraawe last week, SWS forces and Somali National Army soldiers clashed over profits from market traders selling khat. While this dispute that left three soldiers dead was predominantly economic in nature, it also fell along clan lines, with the SNA units mostly made up of Habar Gedir and SWS forces coming from the Rahanweyne. The widespread clashes are also a broader symptom of the absence of attention from the SWS and federal governments. In several places, clan elders have sought to mediate between the armed militias but have found minimal success without the support of the regional administration.
 
Violence between clan militias in Eel Berde and Berdale is of particular concern in the context of the faltered military operations in southern Somalia. As is the case elsewhere in central and southern Somalia, while clan militias in these towns have previously fought Al-Shabaab, they still lack the effective leadership, stipend, and logistical support to engage them in sustained operations. The longer these tensions simmer, the higher the chances that these militias will refuse to fight in any possible future operations in SWS– which are still highly unlikely at this point. Al-Shabaab may well be stoking the violence in various districts to undermine any possibility of reconciliation. This may not worry Laftagareen, however, who has previously relied on the instability stemming from Al-Shabaab in SWS to control regional elections.
 
Absent for a month in Saudi Arabia during Ramadan, Laftagareen is expected to travel to Nairobi today before his return to Somalia. The myriad crises facing his districts have not yet elicited a response from the regional president, who remains focused on cementing his position in office and stifling political opposition. While the rationale for his removal of several district commissioners has not been publicly announced, it is likely part of Laftagareen's broader engineering of the political space ahead of the unscheduled regional presidential elections. The replacement of the district commissioners and councils without input from their communities is proving to be a destabilising factor, however. These hastily appointed officials have little legitimacy, in large part due to communities enduring frustrations with the regional government's refusal to hold timely and fair elections.
 
In February 2024, the co-opted SWS parliament amended the regional constitution to hand Laftagareen a host of new powers, including the ability to declare martial law on a summary basis. The passage of these amendments has proven controversial, particularly considering that the SWS Parliament has been without a speaker since May 2022, when the incumbent was elected as a federal lawmaker.
 
The federal government appears unwilling or unable to pressure the SWS administration to tackle these problems or pressure Laftagareen to hold long overdue elections. With Laftagareen remaining doggedly silent and biding his time on the controversial passage of Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution, Villa Somalia may be reluctant to burn political capital with him. This may prove to be a flawed calculation, though, as SWS is not the only Federal Member State to see sub-clan and intra-district clashes more frequently in 2024. In March, Hawaadle militia loyal to the federal ma'awiisley co-ordinator Ali Osman Jeyte violently displaced Hirshabelle State forces from Beledweyne.
 
Easy access to weapons, deep and unreconciled grievances between clans and communities, and the indifference of federal and regional governments continue to sustain the combustible political atmosphere at the district level in SWS and elsewhere. With the third phase of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia draw-down expected to particularly impact SWS and Jubaland, we can expect these district-level clashes to increase in number and ferocity if Al-Shabaab advances in the coming months. With Laftagareen anticipated to return to Somalia in the next few days, he should leave aside the elite-level politicking to focus on the sporadic violence that is erupting across communities in SWS.

By the Somali Wire Team