The Unhappy Union
"A nation's existence is a daily plebiscite." Ernest Renan, 1882
Meanwhile, Villa Somalia has doubled down. Following a meeting between Puntland and Ethiopian officials in Addis, the federal government ordered the expulsion of Ethiopia's Ambassador to Somalia and the closure of the Ethiopian consulates in Puntland and Somaliland. How the federal government can close consulates in areas where it has no administrative control is dubious. Still, Mogadishu's dramatic response indicates more than its year-long tussle between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Puntland leader Said Deni; it is a chauvinistic throwback to the 1990s when clans were pitted against clans, and region against region.
Buoyed by the passage of four chapters of constitutional amendments in parliament, the federal government apparently feels it can once again escalate its rhetoric against Ethiopia while boxing in Puntland. Rather than seeking reconciliation with Garowe, Mogadishu has decided to reignite the simmering dispute over the January 2024 Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding. It prefers to access nationalist rhetoric rather than the language of consent and compromise.
In 1882, the famous French scholar Ernest Renan gave a lecture at the Sorbonne, one of France's oldest universities, entitled "What is a Nation?" In his speech, Renan outlined his idealised vision of a nation-state. Many of Renan's views remain controversial today, particularly those on race, but his vision of the nation and nationalism has echoed through the ages. He influenced theory about the 'social contract' between the state and its population, inclusive and democratic state-building, and ideas on self-governance and decentralisation, all of which remain relevant to Somalia and the Horn of Africa today.
Part of Renan's speech reads: "A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarised, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation never has any real interest in annexing or holding on to a country against its will."
Referencing Renan in the Somali context may seem odd, but some of his ideas underpin Somalia's attempts at liberal state-building and the federal project. His assertions that diversity is healthy and forced unity harmful, communities will aspire to self-government, and nation-states must create frameworks for self-determination all feel particularly relevant this week. It has long been clear that rebuilding the Somali state is impossible without large-scale social cohesion and a level of solidarity absent for most of the country's history. Any legitimate nation-state in Somalia will require that both clans and political administrations share power and resources equitably. Such a social and political bond can only be meaningful when it comes from a voluntary association, not coercion or force. Some Somalis see an Islamist state as the unifying factor to supersede entrenched clan divisions, while much of the international community has laid stock in liberal democracy.
Mogadishu's current pursuit of re-centralisation is the opposite of rare consensus that has at times allowed Somalia to progress. Indeed, the term 'consensus' appears in many of the most critical Somali state-building texts since the year 2000. And in their language of grievance against Mogadishu, both Puntland and Somaliland routinely invoke the potent ideas of self-determination and consensus that Renan put forward nearly 150 years ago.
There are many drivers of the current crisis in Somalia; the country is currently embarking on a course that ought to be cause for alarm. Constitutional gerrymandering, re-centralisation of the Somali state and union, creeping radical Islamisation, evisceration of the federal project, and the weaponisation of juridical sovereignty to browbeat Federal Member States and Somaliland into compliance are all signs of a single looming threat. The self-interest of the Mogadishu elite is once again threatening decades of slow, halting, and incremental state-building. Villa Somalia is further refusing to heed advice from its allies, both domestic and international, to seek political consensus. And despite the celebrations of lawmakers, no good can come from ramming through the recent changes to the first chapters of the Provisional Constitution. Those in Villa Somalia would do well to revisit Renan's Sorbonne speech and remind themselves of the fundamental principles of the nation-state.
By the Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.