The Unhappy Union
"A nation's existence is a daily plebiscite." Ernest Renan, 1882
Meanwhile, Villa Somalia has doubled down. Following a meeting between Puntland and Ethiopian officials in Addis, the federal government ordered the expulsion of Ethiopia's Ambassador to Somalia and the closure of the Ethiopian consulates in Puntland and Somaliland. How the federal government can close consulates in areas where it has no administrative control is dubious. Still, Mogadishu's dramatic response indicates more than its year-long tussle between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Puntland leader Said Deni; it is a chauvinistic throwback to the 1990s when clans were pitted against clans, and region against region.
Buoyed by the passage of four chapters of constitutional amendments in parliament, the federal government apparently feels it can once again escalate its rhetoric against Ethiopia while boxing in Puntland. Rather than seeking reconciliation with Garowe, Mogadishu has decided to reignite the simmering dispute over the January 2024 Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding. It prefers to access nationalist rhetoric rather than the language of consent and compromise.
In 1882, the famous French scholar Ernest Renan gave a lecture at the Sorbonne, one of France's oldest universities, entitled "What is a Nation?" In his speech, Renan outlined his idealised vision of a nation-state. Many of Renan's views remain controversial today, particularly those on race, but his vision of the nation and nationalism has echoed through the ages. He influenced theory about the 'social contract' between the state and its population, inclusive and democratic state-building, and ideas on self-governance and decentralisation, all of which remain relevant to Somalia and the Horn of Africa today.
Part of Renan's speech reads: "A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarised, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation never has any real interest in annexing or holding on to a country against its will."
Referencing Renan in the Somali context may seem odd, but some of his ideas underpin Somalia's attempts at liberal state-building and the federal project. His assertions that diversity is healthy and forced unity harmful, communities will aspire to self-government, and nation-states must create frameworks for self-determination all feel particularly relevant this week. It has long been clear that rebuilding the Somali state is impossible without large-scale social cohesion and a level of solidarity absent for most of the country's history. Any legitimate nation-state in Somalia will require that both clans and political administrations share power and resources equitably. Such a social and political bond can only be meaningful when it comes from a voluntary association, not coercion or force. Some Somalis see an Islamist state as the unifying factor to supersede entrenched clan divisions, while much of the international community has laid stock in liberal democracy.
Mogadishu's current pursuit of re-centralisation is the opposite of rare consensus that has at times allowed Somalia to progress. Indeed, the term 'consensus' appears in many of the most critical Somali state-building texts since the year 2000. And in their language of grievance against Mogadishu, both Puntland and Somaliland routinely invoke the potent ideas of self-determination and consensus that Renan put forward nearly 150 years ago.
There are many drivers of the current crisis in Somalia; the country is currently embarking on a course that ought to be cause for alarm. Constitutional gerrymandering, re-centralisation of the Somali state and union, creeping radical Islamisation, evisceration of the federal project, and the weaponisation of juridical sovereignty to browbeat Federal Member States and Somaliland into compliance are all signs of a single looming threat. The self-interest of the Mogadishu elite is once again threatening decades of slow, halting, and incremental state-building. Villa Somalia is further refusing to heed advice from its allies, both domestic and international, to seek political consensus. And despite the celebrations of lawmakers, no good can come from ramming through the recent changes to the first chapters of the Provisional Constitution. Those in Villa Somalia would do well to revisit Renan's Sorbonne speech and remind themselves of the fundamental principles of the nation-state.
By the Somali Wire Team
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