Issue No. 667

Published 03 Apr 2024

A Historic Day for All the Wrong Reasons

Published on 03 Apr 2024 15:38 min

A Historic Day for All the Wrong Reasons
 

On 30 March, Somalia's Federal Parliament unanimously passed revised Chapters 1-4 of the country's Provisional Constitution before being signed and approved by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. While some have celebrated the passage of the first four chapters as long overdue, the hijacking of the 'constitutional review process' to essentially recreate the chapters of a new supreme document has been short-sighted and deeply flawed. Somalia's piecemeal democratic state-building trajectory has for years been proceeding with rare deliberation and consensus; the mere 45 days it has taken to push radical proposed changes through parliament has been a lesson in the opposite. From May 2023, when the National Consultative Council (NCC) first outlined sweeping controversial and contradictory electoral changes, to March 2024, Villa Somalia has acted unilaterally and in its own interests.
 
Just hours after the passage of Chapters 1-4, Puntland's regional administration announced it was withdrawing all cooperation with Somalia's federal government and would no longer recognise it as legitimate. What this means in practice is yet to be seen, but relations between the most influential Federal Member State (FMS) and Villa Somalia have plunged to new lows. Puntland Interior Minister Farah Juha lambasted Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on Facebook, writing that he had broken "the agreement that kept Somalia together after the civil war in 1991" and "lost the legitimacy and credibility of his office."
 
In fact, months of Puntland's absence from the NCC and other aspects of Somalia's federal system should have at least delayed the constitutional review process. Not all FMS are equally important to Somalia's stability, and Puntland continues to play an outsized role as the most stable, wealthiest, and largest state. Puntland's position vis-a-vis Mogadishu significantly impacts security cooperation in tackling Al-Shabaab and resurgent piracy, financial collaboration on post-debt relief economic reform, and a coherent, unified foreign policy.
 
As former Puntland President Abdiweli Gaas once said, "Somalia is not Mogadishu, and Mogadishu is not Somalia." The federal government has fallen into the age-old trap of believing it has a population-wide mandate and that it speaks for diverse communities across the country. The current federal government has received not a single vote from any member of the public, yet it is acting as if it wields a sweeping majority with which to ram through its controversial constitutional and security agendas. With swathes of southern and central Somalia held by an advancing Al-Shabaab, Somaliland seeking recognition, and Puntland considering autonomy, it is essential to ask who this amended Provisional Constitution will impact, as well as if and when it can even be implemented.
 
Accusations of bribery, dubious votes, and unpublished changes have further rendered the process illegitimate in the eyes of many, both domestically and internationally. No one has made a compelling case to Somalia's public or international partners for many of the revisions. At no point has it been explained why the current parliamentary model does not work or why Somalia should return to more centralised governance. And what explains the need to insert the words' in accordance with Sharia law' before large swathes of revised text? The need to finalise the Provisional Constitution has been repeated ad infinitum by vocal supporters of the federal government for months on end, but is this sufficient reason for amending dozens of seemingly inoffensive articles?
 
Still, after weeks of recalcitrance, Villa Somalia was forced to backtrack at the 11th hour on a few of the more controversial elements of the proposed revisions, including some minor amendments to massive changes in Chapter 4. Voting on four provisions under Articles 13, 16, 28 and 29 has been postponed; these cover the right to life, religion, and age of maturity. The last came under particular scrutiny from human rights organisations over concerns that this would lower the age of marriage and consent to just 15.
 
In addition, in Chapter 4, the limit of two political parties may have shifted to three, but this does not alleviate the inherent contradictions of limiting parties in a system of proportional representation. Nor does it change the reality that an intra-elite pact will be needed for near-future elections, ensuring one-person, one-vote elections (OPOV) remain a distant reality. Passing a few lines of text that necessitate OPOV elections will not make them happen. Further, the right of the president to dismiss his prime minister or vice president remains a terrible idea. It was just three years ago that Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble prevented Somalia from descending into total chaos during the tenure of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo.
 
Somalia's parliamentary leaders, seemingly in the pocket of Villa Somalia, have overseen an opaque process that has, at best, paid lip service to its legal obligations, including under the January 2024 procedures. On 28 March, a 600-page document that incorporated the suggestions of many Members of Parliament was circulated among them all. This was to provide the opportunity for greater reflection and comment by civil society and lawmakers, among others, according to the much-abrogated January procedures. But on 30 March, according to opposition MP Abdirahman Abdishakur on X, formerly Twitter, a final version of the Provisional Constitution was voted on by MPs without most of them having seen it. 
 
The corruption of the most recent piece of the constitutional review process has been eye-watering. Reports of dozens of lawmakers being paid thousands of USD to turn up and vote for approval abound. Villa Somalia also distributed plane tickets for MPs to return to the capital to participate in the final vote to ensure a quorum, which may not have even occurred. There have also been reports of journalists being remunerated in exchange for their support for the revised chapters. Little imagination is needed to see why some Somalis who had been vocally critical of the NCC proposals suddenly embraced the changes.
 
The Federal Government of Somalia is not the first government in history to amend a constitution in its own interests, and it will not be the last. It is, however, arguably the first to amend and pass a Provisional Constitution piece by piece in the view to implement it before the entire document is finalised. The final document is still many months away, though, with the constitutional review process far from over. There are over 10 more chapters to be drafted, revised, debated, and approved; even though the federal government has shown callous disregard for parliamentary and constitutional procedure to date, this remains a lengthy endeavour, even before a requisite referendum can be carried out. In the meantime, another crisis of its own making has badly damaged Villa Somalia's credibility. We anxiously await their next steps.

By the Somali Wire team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Issue No. 958
Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu
The Somali Wire

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.


8:08 min read 03 Jun
Issue No. 128
The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma
The Horn Edition

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.


34:56 min read 29 May
Issue No. 957
How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
The Somali Wire

On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.


17:12 min read 27 May
Issue No. 956
The Perils of a Grey Transition
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.


0 min read 20 May
Issue No. 955
Averting Disorder: The Case for External Mediation in Somalia
The Somali Wire

Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.


0 min read 14 May
Issue No. 127
Total War in the Horn of Africa
The Horn Edition

'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.


27:16 min read 30 Apr
Issue No. 954
The Malian Mirror
The Somali Wire

A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.


10:18 min read 29 Apr
Issue No. 329
Washington eyes Asmara
The Ethiopian Cable

Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.


0 min read 28 Apr
Scroll