Issue No. 667

A Historic Day for All the Wrong Reasons
 

On 30 March, Somalia's Federal Parliament unanimously passed revised Chapters 1-4 of the country's Provisional Constitution before being signed and approved by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. While some have celebrated the passage of the first four chapters as long overdue, the hijacking of the 'constitutional review process' to essentially recreate the chapters of a new supreme document has been short-sighted and deeply flawed. Somalia's piecemeal democratic state-building trajectory has for years been proceeding with rare deliberation and consensus; the mere 45 days it has taken to push radical proposed changes through parliament has been a lesson in the opposite. From May 2023, when the National Consultative Council (NCC) first outlined sweeping controversial and contradictory electoral changes, to March 2024, Villa Somalia has acted unilaterally and in its own interests.
 
Just hours after the passage of Chapters 1-4, Puntland's regional administration announced it was withdrawing all cooperation with Somalia's federal government and would no longer recognise it as legitimate. What this means in practice is yet to be seen, but relations between the most influential Federal Member State (FMS) and Villa Somalia have plunged to new lows. Puntland Interior Minister Farah Juha lambasted Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on Facebook, writing that he had broken "the agreement that kept Somalia together after the civil war in 1991" and "lost the legitimacy and credibility of his office."
 
In fact, months of Puntland's absence from the NCC and other aspects of Somalia's federal system should have at least delayed the constitutional review process. Not all FMS are equally important to Somalia's stability, and Puntland continues to play an outsized role as the most stable, wealthiest, and largest state. Puntland's position vis-a-vis Mogadishu significantly impacts security cooperation in tackling Al-Shabaab and resurgent piracy, financial collaboration on post-debt relief economic reform, and a coherent, unified foreign policy.
 
As former Puntland President Abdiweli Gaas once said, "Somalia is not Mogadishu, and Mogadishu is not Somalia." The federal government has fallen into the age-old trap of believing it has a population-wide mandate and that it speaks for diverse communities across the country. The current federal government has received not a single vote from any member of the public, yet it is acting as if it wields a sweeping majority with which to ram through its controversial constitutional and security agendas. With swathes of southern and central Somalia held by an advancing Al-Shabaab, Somaliland seeking recognition, and Puntland considering autonomy, it is essential to ask who this amended Provisional Constitution will impact, as well as if and when it can even be implemented.
 
Accusations of bribery, dubious votes, and unpublished changes have further rendered the process illegitimate in the eyes of many, both domestically and internationally. No one has made a compelling case to Somalia's public or international partners for many of the revisions. At no point has it been explained why the current parliamentary model does not work or why Somalia should return to more centralised governance. And what explains the need to insert the words' in accordance with Sharia law' before large swathes of revised text? The need to finalise the Provisional Constitution has been repeated ad infinitum by vocal supporters of the federal government for months on end, but is this sufficient reason for amending dozens of seemingly inoffensive articles?
 
Still, after weeks of recalcitrance, Villa Somalia was forced to backtrack at the 11th hour on a few of the more controversial elements of the proposed revisions, including some minor amendments to massive changes in Chapter 4. Voting on four provisions under Articles 13, 16, 28 and 29 has been postponed; these cover the right to life, religion, and age of maturity. The last came under particular scrutiny from human rights organisations over concerns that this would lower the age of marriage and consent to just 15.
 
In addition, in Chapter 4, the limit of two political parties may have shifted to three, but this does not alleviate the inherent contradictions of limiting parties in a system of proportional representation. Nor does it change the reality that an intra-elite pact will be needed for near-future elections, ensuring one-person, one-vote elections (OPOV) remain a distant reality. Passing a few lines of text that necessitate OPOV elections will not make them happen. Further, the right of the president to dismiss his prime minister or vice president remains a terrible idea. It was just three years ago that Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble prevented Somalia from descending into total chaos during the tenure of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo.
 
Somalia's parliamentary leaders, seemingly in the pocket of Villa Somalia, have overseen an opaque process that has, at best, paid lip service to its legal obligations, including under the January 2024 procedures. On 28 March, a 600-page document that incorporated the suggestions of many Members of Parliament was circulated among them all. This was to provide the opportunity for greater reflection and comment by civil society and lawmakers, among others, according to the much-abrogated January procedures. But on 30 March, according to opposition MP Abdirahman Abdishakur on X, formerly Twitter, a final version of the Provisional Constitution was voted on by MPs without most of them having seen it. 
 
The corruption of the most recent piece of the constitutional review process has been eye-watering. Reports of dozens of lawmakers being paid thousands of USD to turn up and vote for approval abound. Villa Somalia also distributed plane tickets for MPs to return to the capital to participate in the final vote to ensure a quorum, which may not have even occurred. There have also been reports of journalists being remunerated in exchange for their support for the revised chapters. Little imagination is needed to see why some Somalis who had been vocally critical of the NCC proposals suddenly embraced the changes.
 
The Federal Government of Somalia is not the first government in history to amend a constitution in its own interests, and it will not be the last. It is, however, arguably the first to amend and pass a Provisional Constitution piece by piece in the view to implement it before the entire document is finalised. The final document is still many months away, though, with the constitutional review process far from over. There are over 10 more chapters to be drafted, revised, debated, and approved; even though the federal government has shown callous disregard for parliamentary and constitutional procedure to date, this remains a lengthy endeavour, even before a requisite referendum can be carried out. In the meantime, another crisis of its own making has badly damaged Villa Somalia's credibility. We anxiously await their next steps.

By the Somali Wire team