Al-Shabaab resurgence continues
Al-Shabaab's spree of attacks during Ramadan continues. Since 11 March, military bases in Sanguni, Hinlabi and near Baraawe have all been hit, in addition to the SYL Hotel raid in Mogadishu. Just yesterday, jihadists launched an early morning raid on government forces in Daru-Nim'a village in Middle Shabelle and clashed on the outskirts of Harardheere in Mudug. Details are scarce, but there are reports of a number of Somali National Army (SNA) casualties in both locations. The attack on Daru-Nim'a was the third in the past 12 months by the militant group, while Harardheere, a former hotbed of piracy, was previously liberated by the SNA in January 2023. Al-Shabaab is seizing territory, weapons and military vehicles at an alarming rate across Somalia, with the country's army on the back foot and little hope for relief.
Somalia's senior military leaders, meanwhile, are still promoting the impression that it is business as usual. Few statements have been issued on Al-Shabaab's string of attacks, and those that have appeared are filled with misleading or inaccurate information. Talk of a 'new offensive' and preparations for 'Phase II' has receded, with the federal government largely focused on attempts to push major constitutional revisions through parliament. Still, on 22 March, SNA Chief Major General Ibrahim Sheikh Muhydin travelled to the Haradheere district to instruct government forces to prepare for a fresh offensive against Al-Shabaab. The fact that this coastal town was under attack just last night speaks volumes about the gulf between military rhetoric and battlefield reality. For months, the SNA and the federal government have celebrated dubious body counts and minor victories as if the defeat of Al-Shabaab was imminent.
It is not only the number of Al-Shabaab attacks that are causing alarm but also their geographic reach. For the militant group, central Somalia is just one theatre of operations among many, with Mogadishu and its environs alone having seen three notable attacks by Al-Shabaab since the beginning of 2024. The first, in the General Gordon military camp in the capital, was committed by a supposed 'defector' to the SNA, who targeted visiting Emirati military officials on 10 February. This was a worrying indication of the degree to which Al-Shabaab has remained embedded in the defector's programme that was corrupted under Fahad Yasin. On 14 March, jihadists detonated a powerful car bomb at the gates of the popular SYL Hotel on the doorstep of the Presidential Palace and killed several civilians. It was a potent example that Al-Shabaab's ability to strike at the heart of the capital remains unabated, whatever the protestations of the federal government. And on the morning of 23 March, Al-Shabaab fighters overran a military base in Busley, just south of Mogadishu, inflicting significant casualties on soldiers, military police and special forces stationed there. Among those killed was SNA Military Police Battalion Commander Major Liban Mohamed Adbullae 'Gol'ad.'
One clear signal that Al-Shabaab was never hugely concerned with the scale of the government offensive was that its senior leaders never travelled to the frontlines in central Somalia. While the Hawaadle uprising in Hiiraan that began in August 2022 elicited some Al-Shabaab response, Mahad Karate and other leaders never rallied their forces at a level one might expect if they were worried about subsequent government operations. In part, that might have stemmed from their reluctance to navigate possible choke points along the Hiiraan road, but it also reflected that the militants' strategic interests lie in many places.
Al-Shabaab propaganda points to the scope of its ambitions beyond the borders of Somalia. While much has been made of the shutting down of the occasional Al-Shabaab-affiliated website, these often re-emerge within days with a new .com ending. On one Al-Shabaab-affiliated website, a recent video rails against Ethiopia, depicting it as an imperial power that oppresses Muslims across the Horn. The narrator launches into a tirade against the treatment of Oromo and Muslims by Ethiopia's federal government and exposes a recent attack on an Ethiopian military convoy in Somalia, with gruesome images of slain soldiers along with captured equipment.
While it is important not to read too deeply into such extremist content, this demonstrates that Al-Shabaab has not abandoned its aspirations to kill Ethiopians and expand its presence in Ethiopia. Nor has Al-Shabaab ceased its interest in Kenya. After a series of deadly IED attacks in mid-2023, there was a relative decline in attacks towards the end of last year. But on 25 March, three people were killed, including two police reservists, in a bombing at a hotel in Mandera town believed to have been planted by Al-Shabaab.
Threats like these will only grow as we enter the next critical stage of the withdrawal of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces. Before the end of June 2024, a further 3,000 ATMIS soldiers are expected to withdraw, and several more Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) will be shuttered or handed over to the SNA. Military collapse is edging nearer, and with it, a possible return to pre-2021 dynamics in which Somali government forces were siloed in major cities. This time, the country won't have ATMIS to fall back on.
By the Somali Wire team
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