Chapters passed, Farmaajo returns
Somalia continues to edge closer to a full-blown political crisis following another week of federal politicians riding roughshod over parliamentary and constitutional procedures. Despite growing political resistance, and speculation that Ramadan might slow the controversial process, on 23 March, Somalia's bicameral parliament concluded its debate on the first four chapters of the Provisional Constitution– just 39 days after they were initially tabled on 12 February. The pace and manner in which these were presented, 'debated,' and now approved by Lower House of Parliament Speaker Adan Madobe has thrown Somalia's politics into deeper turmoil, with no likely end in sight.
Meanwhile, political opposition against Villa Somalia's constitutional ambitions continues to coalesce. Former political adversaries Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and ex-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo met in Garowe on 21 March, along with former President Sheikh Sherif Ahmed, to secure their new alliance. The trip was Farmaajo's first to Puntland since he lost his re-election bid in May 2022, in large part due to Deni's principled opposition to his candidacy. Still, he was warmly welcomed to the state capital, with Puntland's Interior Minister Farah Juha posting on X (formerly Twitter), "Mr President welcome home. Let the bygones be bygones." Aligned political interests appear to have superseded mistrust between Deni and Farmaajo, at least for the time being.
Following their highly publicised meeting in Garowe, Sheikh Sharif, and Farmaajo released a joint statement that denounced the federal government on several fronts. Hinting at the crisis facing the Somali National Army (SNA) amid Al-Shabaab advances in central Somalia, they criticised President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) for unilaterally seeking deep and divisive constitutional revisions. The former presidents supported the prospect of a national meeting of politicians in Garowe, which Deni has touted since winning a convincing re-election as regional president of Puntland on 8 January 2024. Initially, such a meeting was hoped to kick-start tentative reconciliation between Deni and HSM after the latter had attended Deni's inauguration. But following the tabling of the constitutional revisions in parliament, despite Puntland's continued absence from the National Consultative Council process, it appears more likely that any such meeting will become a tool to publicly oppose the federal government and seek to pry Federal Member State leaders from support for a revised Provisional Constitution. The deepening of nascent ties between Farmaajo and Deni is, in fact, partly the result of Villa Somalia's continuous refusal to slow or moderate the constitutional process.
Somalia's febrile political climate could become even more heated as Farmaajo gears up his next presidential campaign towards Somalia's next federal elections. Fresh from Garowe, Farmaajo has now pledged to visit Laas Aanood in the Sool region of Somaliland, the prior site of many months of violence between the SSC-Khaatumo militia and Somaliland government forces. There should also be no doubt that Farmaajo's fierce opposition to the emerging revised Provisional Constitution is in his self-interest; the man has displayed no ideology, just an agenda to reclaim and retain power through whatever means necessary.
And Farmaajo is not alone in his criticisms of the constitutional revisions. Seventy-one (71) MPs, largely from South West State, recently penned an open letter rejecting and calling for a boycott of 'the so-called constitutional review process.' Among key signatories were Sheikh Sharif, as well as Wadajir party leader Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, both long-standing critics of the National Consultative Council (NCC) proposals and the subsequent constitutional process that has incorporated them into the revised text. With dozens of MPs now boycotting the process, the prospect of reaching a quorum, let alone passing revised language, should have made the passage of chapters 1-4 revisions much steeper-- if parliamentary leadership was abiding by its own rules.
But Speaker Madobe, rather than serving as a bulwark against an overzealous executive, has acquiesced to bury parliamentary and constitutional procedures. So the process in parliament has been a farce, revealing near-total disregard for important procedures, including the 2/3 quorum from both chambers required for votes on revisions to the Provisional Constitution. Videos posted on social media have shown a largely empty parliamentary chamber, with mere dozens of MPs, as the most consequential deliberations in years were meant to be ongoing. According to MP Abdishakur on X, there have been "fewer than 50 MPs in attendance" during certain debates and votes. Growing reports of lawmakers offered jobs and other perks by Villa Somalia have added another layer of distrust to the whole endeavour. The entire process is far from a national coming together to finalise the Provisional Constitution.
On 22 March, President Hassan Sheikh rebuffed his critics in a speech at the presidential mosque, while in a separate address, Prime Minister Barre said that the constitutional process is in "safe hands." Madobe and others may see the potential 'finalisation' of the Provisional Constitution as a crowning glory, but radical revisions being forced through Parliament without adequate consultations further threaten Somalia's stability. Politicians and commentators alike are making increasing reference to the violence that shook Mogadishu in April 2021 when former President Farmaajo sought to lengthen his term by signing a two-year presidential extension into law. While HSM claimed on 22 March that he is not seeking to extend his own term as President, the proposed revisions could see an additional 10 months on his term, currently scheduled to end in May 2026, as they simultaneously mark a comprehensive attempt to re-centralise power.
In a country where political progress is often glacial and faltering, Somalia's Parliament has reviewed and passed the first four chapters of its supreme document in less than 40 days. Some have taken the passage of these chapters as the beginning of the completion of years of work on the Provisional Constitution; in reality, this could just be the beginning of renewed political tumult, and the possibility of related violence should not be discounted as things stand.
Still, while some of the most contentious changes regarding elections and governance have already been incorporated into chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution, there could be many months before its finalisation. The possibility of finding a negotiated path through an important but currently highly questionable process is quickly diminishing, but those with influence in Villa Somalia should nevertheless seek compromise, and adherence to the law.
By the Somali Wire team
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