A bunkered government and a country adrift
Unilateral decision-making, micro-management, and swerving attention have paralysed the 'normal' functioning of the Federal Government of Somalia. Key ministerial posts remain unfilled, including that of the Foreign Minister and Minister of Internal Security, while military operations face total collapse in central Somalia. The first four chapters of the revised Provisional Constitution may have been 'debated' by some in parliament, but dozens of lawmakers are now protesting the scope and speed with which they have been tabled. Meanwhile, Villa Somalia's attention is reported to be veering from one crisis to another, seemingly unable to deal with multiple pressing challenges simultaneously.
When President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) returned to his second term as President of Somalia in May 2022, he presented a clear and ambitious agenda intended to return decency and professionalism to the country's politics. The damaging presidency of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo had taken a heavy toll on Somalia, with his Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N) administration seeking to corrupt federal institutions at every turn, including the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). The return of HSM to Villa Somalia was therefore met with relief among many, with the expectation that HSM's previous experience between 2012 and 2017 would help him navigate away from the remnants of the N&N government. Tearing Somalia from the grip of Qatar and Eritrea, restoring constitutional rule, tackling entrenched corruption, and defeating Al-Shabaab were all high on the agenda.
But stroke by stroke, these ambitions either fall by the wayside or are reversed. Of particular concern is the current military leadership in the Ministry of Defence and the Somali National Army (SNA), which has repeatedly shown to be woefully inadequate. Mistake after mistake has gone uncorrected, while incompetent military officials have remained in place, allowed to accrue greater influence and wealth. More broadly, the story on the frontlines, which has been repeated over the last 12 months, is that SNA units advance without proper logistical support or command. They make limited advances in an uncoordinated fashion. Then, they are overrun.
The refusal or inability to bring on competent and experienced military officials has been calamitous for Somalia, undermining the initial successes of the Ma'awisley and SNA in mid-2022. Repeated talk of recriminations and reshuffles following the frontline collapse at Osweyne in August 2023 and Aad in January 2024 have gone nowhere. Villa Somalia's inability to effectively delegate to trusted and competent officials has ground the proper order of most government business to a virtual halt.
In any case, the FGS's refusal to confront the realities of a collapsing offensive cannot last forever. Repeated promises that Al-Shabaab would be 'defeated' in central Somalia by this time have come and gone. The president and other senior federal officials repeatedly visited the frontlines, even decamping in Dhusamareb and donning military uniforms. Admitting that the offensive has fundamentally collapsed and that Al-Shabaab now wields the military advantage would be tantamount to admitting failure, so the pretence that somehow Al-Shabaab is on the back foot continues.
The culture of decision-making in the federal government has become unilateral in some situations and nearly absent in others. A seemingly routine National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting in May 2023 produced the most radical proposals for changes to the country's governance and electoral systems in more than a decade. Without consulting with key members of Somalia's political elite and opposition in the Federal Member States (FMS) demanding fair elections, term extensions for the regional presidents were central to the NCC proposals. Rather than easing tensions that had been brewing in the first half of 2023, these proposals have accelerated and intensified electoral crises, including in South West State and Galmudug.
For months, repeated calls for clarification of the proposals and intra-elite discussions fell on deaf ears; the NCC proposals are now being included in the revisions of the constitutional review process, unedited, despite their contentious and often contradictory nature. Just this week, several women MPs held a press conference opposing the removal of the 30% quota for women's participation in parliament from the revised constitution. Over 70 MPs, mostly allied to Farmaajo and hailing from South West State, also protested the constitutional revisions, arguing that the ongoing process is akin to creating a new constitution. Another constitutional crisis appears to be fast approaching, expected soon after Ramadan, as the federal government continues to eschew compromise.
Unfortunately, there is one individual's counsel that Somalia's President has repeatedly sought since returning to office in 2022-- Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. On 17 March, President Hassan Sheikh departed for Asmara for his fourth visit in less than two years– an astonishing number, particularly considering that HSM's campaigned for president promising to bring thousands of Somali recruits home from Eritrea. The notion that Asmara has Somalia's best interests at heart is frankly laughable; Isaias remains a Machiavellian operator seeking to spread Eritrea's malign influence across the Horn. Qatar, too, has returned to the picture, and Doha's ambitions to bring Al-Shabaab to a power-sharing agreement appear unabated. The return of Doha and Asmara to the heart of Villa Somalia should be of serious concern to all.
It has become clear that the Federal Government of Somalia is in crisis, beset by challenges on all sides, some of its own making. This is partly the result of a focus on optics over realities, with international and domestic perceptions taking precedence over sober effective leadership. Villa Somalia's continued refusal to effectively delegate to its own appointed officials is driving the crises that Somalia can ill afford. Steering Villa Somalia back towards the promise of HSM's early days, where he mended bridges and sought unity, should be the priority with those who still hold sway over Mogadishu. Lending legitimacy to the ongoing constitutional process and narratives of successful military operations has only emboldened the unilateral culture that has taken root in Villa Somalia.
By the Somali Wire team
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