Issue No. 662

Crises in the Clans Threaten Central Somalia
 

The stalled military offensive in central Somalia is now teetering on the edge of collapse. A year of stop-start operations has badly eroded the Somali National Army's (SNA) capacity and morale, creating a litany of problems that the military is poorly placed to tackle. Perhaps most concerning among them is the crises facing the use of government-allied clan militia—signalled by both intra-Hawaadle militia clashes in Hiiraan and the recent withdrawal of the SNA from key locales, including Aamara and Ba'adweyne. Political divisions at the national and Federal Member State (FMS) levels are proving corrosive for the offensive, with divisions among the national elite bleeding into clan support in Galmudug and Hirshabelle. With the withdrawal of thousands of African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) soldiers ongoing, the stage is set for Al-Shabaab to retake swathes of vulnerable territory in southern and central Somalia.
 
The SNA military leadership is now reaping the failure of essentially sidelining the clan militias in the offensive. Rather than capitalising on the successes of the Hawaadle uprising in Hiiraan in August 2022, there has been a general disinterest in comprehensively engaging with clan elders and elite to bring them into the offensive. Since operational responsibilities were flipped on their head and the SNA leadership relegated clan militia to the holding force role, territorial gains have been unsustainable and limited. Yet no government body is seriously negotiating the vital inter-clan agreements needed to stabilise territory, nor listening to the concerns of the political elite of these clans, including the Abgaal and the Murasaade. In turn, many clan businesspeople and politicians who have paid for their militia's deployment are exasperated that logistical and stipend support has remained so wanting and are increasingly distracted by regional and national politicking.
 
In central Mudug, the sudden withdrawal of clan militia from the frontlines in early March forced the SNA into a hasty retreat from territory clawed from Al-Shabaab in the past year. The clan militia pullback has been linked to strains between Villa Somalia and Galmudug President Ahmed Abdi 'QoorQoor,' which have been sowing discontent and distraction in the FMS. The regional president believes that Mogadishu is grooming the current NISA Director-General, Mahad Salad, for his position and appears more reticent to back the federal offensive with support not forthcoming. But with these withdrawals in Mudug, communities that have resisted Al-Shabaab for over a year have now been exposed to retributive killings by the advancing militants.
 
Meanwhile, in the Lamagalay camp area of Hiiraan on 13 March, deadly clashes erupted between Hawaadle militia loyal to Hirshabelle President Ali Abdullahi Hussein Guudlawe and more local Hawaadle forces tied to former Hiiraan Governor Ali Osman Jeyte. The precise trigger of the violence that left 6 people dead has been contested. Still, it is likely related to Guudlawe's forces seeking to exert influence following the withdrawal of some Djiboutian forces under ATMIS from the area. Guudlawe has been seemingly emboldened by elements of the Abgaal political elite, such as Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, throwing their support behind him in frustration with the ongoing constitutional review process. With the federal government bunkered down to calls for compromise, the Abgaal elite has instead turned to their influence over clan militia to pressure Mogadishu.
 
While the SNA has shown a concerning inability to learn even the most straightforward military lessons in the past 18 months, the reverse is true for Al-Shabaab. The militant group was caught by surprise by the organic Hawaadle uprising in 2022 but has since sought to restore its relationships while threatening and undermining intra-clan and inter-clan dynamics for its own benefit. One way it has sought to do this has been by convincing individuals to commit tit-for-tat targeted clan killings, which have degraded inter-clan cooperation and trust. All these issues have cascaded into a situation where Al-Shabaab does place concerted pressure on a village or town, neither clan militia nor the SNA has the capacity or the willingness to put up concerted resistance.
 
In the final months of the ATMIS draw-down and with limited offensive momentum, further tensions and recriminations will surface. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in central Somalia that perhaps made sense to be withdrawn months ago now look vulnerable, while in Jubaland and South West State, the SNA will surely be unable to assume ATMIS FOBs there. There is a growing sense that Somalia's security dynamic could return to a pre-2022 scenario where the SNA is siloed to a handful of urban centres and FOBs on their outskirts. With rural areas returning to Al-Shabaab control, towns and cities will also come under increasing pressure. Main supply routes may be blockaded or ambushed, a growing concern with the likelihood that the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) air resupply will be folded following the ATMIS exit. Moreover, the militant group will be able to exert more significant influence on cities like Jowhar again, be it through influencing clan politics in the town or increasing forcible recruitment or taxation.
 
Still, in the immediate months, there are several policies the federal government and military leadership could pursue to ameliorate the impact of the ATMIS withdrawal. First is resolving the political path towards the regional presidential election in Galmudug, which is widely expected to occur before the federally proposed November 2024 date. In Hirshabelle, bringing Jeyte and Guudlawe together is also critical to stem the political crisis there. This would likely necessitate compromise, which Villa Somalia has shown little interest in doing. Since the New Year, the Memorandum of Understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia and its constitutional agenda has consumed its interest and sidelined the military offensive. Villa Somalia has yet to appoint a new Minister of Internal Security since the reassignment of Mohamed Doodishe as Ambassador to Qatar in November 2023.
 
More fundamentally, though, is the need to return to the more organic operational model where multi-clan forces work in tandem with the SNA in clearing Al-Shabaab from their territory with support from the Danab, air strikes from the US, and locally appropriate holding forces. In the same vein, military and political officials need to actively engage with elders, businesspeople, and politicians to provide concrete aid through stipends and casualty support. This is what brought the successes in 2022—not the haphazard plans that have been drawn up in Mogadishu that are never implemented.

By the Somali Wire team