Issue No. 661

Published 15 Mar 2024

Al-Shabaab: A Ramadan Rebound

Published on 15 Mar 2024 16:08 min

Al-Shabaab: A Ramadan Rebound

Yesterday evening, Al-Shabaab (AS) mounted a complex attack on the SYL Hotel in Mogadishu, located just a stone's throw from Villa Somalia. The attack, which began after isha evening prayers and following the fast-breaking iftar dinner, signals the militant group's return to its old pattern of violently capitalising on the holy month of Ramadan. With religious fervour at its most intense, AS has historically taken the opportunity to incite its younger radicalised combatants to mount martyrdom operations. Al-Shabaab, like most neo-Salafi jihadist groups, teaches its fighters that acts of valour and sacrifice during the month of Ramadan attract greater spiritual rewards (thawab) and open the door to salvation and paradise. For many years, Ramadan has been a blood-soaked month in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia, and the SYL raid may be a grim herald of a new wave of violence in the coming weeks.
 
Details of the attack are scarce, with local Somali outlets largely avoiding covering the incident in detail so far. What is known is that AS conducted a typical 'complex' raid, using a powerful car bomb to breach the perimeter wall and gate before an unknown number of gunmen stormed the building. A secondary blast was also reported, possibly involving a suicide bomber wearing an explosive belt. The first explosion was so powerful that it was heard by people at the Aden Adde International Airport-- some 5 kilometres away.
 
Reports have indicated that the siege began around 10 pm and was still ongoing at daybreak today, 15 March. Paramilitary Harama'ad forces have led the government's security response to the raid, with multiple security teams still battling the assailants at the time of writing. While some guests at the hotel have been rescued, there are also reports of several fatalities. AS affiliated media has further claimed, without evidence, that four members of Somalia's parliament have been wounded in the attack, with its fighters targeting "workers and officers of the... government."
 
While the SYL hotel is in Mogadishu's supposedly highly secure green zone, AS also previously targeted it in 2019. Its proximity to Villa Somalia and popularity with government officials make it an attractive target for the jihadists. The latest raid, the second large-scale attack since the start of 2024, demonstrates that the militant group's will, capacity, and reach are far from diminished-- despite government claims to the contrary.
 
In February, a former Al-Shabaab 'defector' turned army recruit killed 19 soldiers at a mosque in General Gordon Camp, a Mogadishu military facility used by Emirati military advisors to conduct training for the Somali army. Among those killed were four Emirati military advisors and a Bahraini trainer in one of the deadliest infiltrator attacks by AS in recent years. The incident highlighted the depth and scale of AS infiltration in Somalia's military and security agencies. It is almost inconceivable to imagine AS managed to attack a hotel in the most secure part of the capital without some kind of insider assistance.
 
The return of large-scale attacks on hotels in Mogadishu is bad news for residents and marks a categorical end to the lull in attacks in the capital. It also coincides with multiple setbacks for the government in central Mudug, where AS is claiming recent territorial successes. The Somali National Army (SNA) has experienced several chastening defeats and setbacks in recent weeks following heavy personnel losses at Aad in late January. The latest reports indicate that sections of the local Ma'awiisley forces have withdrawn from critical 'holding' positions and the frontlines, which has forced the accompanying SNA units to fall back, including from key towns such as Ba’adweyne.
 
The precise cause for the current disarray in central Mudug is not clear. Disputes over stipends have been cited as one major factor by some sources. Another aspect may be the volatile sub-clan rivalries and power struggle within the Habar Gedir clan family. It has been alleged that the bulk of the retreating clan militia belongs to the Sa'ad sub-clan of Habar Gedir, who are predominantly loyal to their kinsman and Galmudug President Abdi Kariye 'QoorQoor.' The regional president has a complex and, at times, fraught relationship with Mogadishu and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, which has recently deteriorated due to QoorQoor's belief that Villa Somalia is grooming Mahad Salad (Habar Gedir/ Ayr), the director-general of the National Intelligence and Security Agency, to replace him.
 
What is clear is that the counter-insurgency operations in central Somalia are continuing to unravel piecemeal. The latest setback in Mudug and renewed attacks in Mogadishu are symptomatic of a wider malaise that has gone unchecked. The SNA remains poorly led and riven by factionalism, with morale increasingly low following weeks of high attrition. Promising Ma'awiisley potential has been undermined by poor logistical and political support from the government. There have even been reports of a deadly revolt by clan militia in Hiiraan against Hirshabelle forces on 13 March with the apparent backing of federal Ma'awiisley coordinator and former Hiiraan Governor Ali Osman Jeyte. Hawaadle clan militias were central to the much-touted offensive against AS in late 2022; the fact they now appear to be in open rebellion suggests that the government's strategy is in disarray. All the while, Somalia's political elite have continued to be divided and self-interested, stymieing the potential for a coherent and concerted response against AS.
 
It is now dawning on the federal government and its international backers that Somalia will be unable to take full charge of its own security by December 2024, when the last African Union peacekeepers are scheduled to withdraw. Mogadishu has signalled that it is planning for a new multinational force of between 3,000 and 8,000 soldiers to step in after the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) 's mandate concludes. But these numbers are still a sharp drop from the height of nearly 20,000 ATMIS soldiers stationed in Somalia in March 2023. Moreover, the new multinational forces' mission appears to be far more limited than ATMIS's and will be confined to protecting key urban infrastructure and the Halane compound. However, as yesterday's SYL attack has shown, even this may be a steep task.

The founding of the federal military offensive combined with the replacement of ATMIS with a much-diminished 'guard force' would appear to leave Villa Somalia with few alternatives to negotiations with AS. The renewal of mass casualty attacks by the militant group in Somalia's capital may indicate that an emboldened AS is either seeking to enhance its bargaining power ahead of possible talks-- or perhaps even signal that its appetite for negotiations has collapsed altogether.


By the Somali Wire team

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