Squaring the circle: A two-party system and proportional representation
Parliamentary debates on the Fourth Chapter of the Provisional Constitution began on 11 March. The critical chapter, 'Representation of the People,' covers Somalia's electoral and governance systems, with the published draft incorporating the controversial National Consultative Council (NCC) agreement from May 2023. While the wider process has been dubbed a 'review' of the constitution, the sweeping modifications to this chapter essentially render it entirely new. Nearly 10 months have passed since the NCC agreement, yet much of the content integrated into the Provisional Constitution remains vague and inconsistent. One of the most alarming elements is the contradictions inherent between the proposed 'proportional representation (PR) closed-list system' and the designated 'two parties' that will be allowed to contest future federal elections.
A 'proportional' system is supposed to be precisely that– directly and accurately reflecting the vote of the people. PR has been previously touted as a potentially transformative electoral model for Somalia, and a possible alternative to the first-past-the-post (FPTP) model used in the 4.5 clan formula. A closed-list PR model is also supposed to be relatively straightforward to implement and allow for greater representation of marginalised communities. However, the notion of 'proportionality' can be entirely disregarded if only two parties are allowed to compete in future federal and regional presidential elections. While PR is meant to expand choice and representation, prescribing a two-party system does the exact opposite. Multi-party coalitions in countries that use PR, like Germany, would not occur in Somalia; instead, a single party would assume power.
Previous attempts by former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo to introduce PR from 2017 onwards ran into significant political headwinds for reasons that remain relevant today. The proposed 'single constituency' that would elect the president and parliament, rather than multiple smaller districts, was seen as certain to upset the current power distribution among the clans. Politicians from more marginal sub-clans protested that their influence would be diminished as the more influential and populous clans would take their parliamentary seats. If a two-party system is adopted, marginal voices and communities will also likely be squeezed from Somalia's political space. A handful of party bosses would replace the role of traditional elders in elections when picking parliamentary candidates.
While a "multi-party political system" is mentioned in the constitution's first four chapters, just two "political organisations" will be allowed to compete in federal elections. The stipulations for these new political parties are briefly outlined, but the language remains open for interpretation. According to the proposed changes, each party must "protect, apply, strengthen and promote the unity of the Republic" as well as support human rights, democratic principles, and "good governance." More ambiguous are the lines that each party "must ensure an inclusive public representation and give special priority to minorities… in membership and leadership." Similar language is used to describe these parties' obligations to the role of women– but gone is the 30% quota. Whether this means that there would be some equivalent quota for fielding candidates remains to be seen.
As long as they abide by the new provisions, local council elections will then decide Somalia's two major 'political organisations.' These two new political parties will be allowed to compete in all national polls, including for both chambers of the federal parliament and the presidency. Regional elections will be impacted too; again, only two parties will be allowed to compete for every Federal Member State (FMS) presidency. It is further unclear whether other parties could usurp the two established national organisations at subsequent local elections.
This element of the Fourth Chapter is hugely concerning and, if implemented, could have wide-reaching repercussions for the future of Somalia's federal model. It appears that every FMS president will be expected to join these political parties if they want to run in any future regional presidential elections– including possibly the delayed polls scheduled for November 2024. Forcing every FMS president to come under a centralised party office in Mogadishu will surely face significant opposition. It is highly unlikely that the more independent FMS leaders, including Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni, will simply leave their political futures to others, who could theoretically pick other candidates to run for their seats.
Limiting the country to just two electoral choices raises several other issues, not least that it contradicts the principles of a free and fair democracy that Somali politicians like to espouse. It will prevent the organic rise of smaller parties on a national level that could campaign on particular issues, such as the rights of Somalia's vast displaced population. Moreover, without a clear left-right split in Somalia's politics, the two emerging parties would likely be varying forms of Islamist, including one likely centred on President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's ruling Damul Jadiid faction.
The Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC), which has the responsibility, along with the Oversight Committee (OC), for converting the Provisional Constitution into a workable document, is seemingly aware that these contradictions between a two-party and PR exist. The ICRIC has laid out a brief rationale beside every change made to the draft of the constitution. Article 50 of Chapter Four, titled 'Electoral System,' reads that the "electoral system of the Federal Republic of Somalia is based on one person one vote and is defined by a law enacted by the Federal Parliament of Somalia." Yet the only comment by ICRIC alongside this change is that a bill will be passed by the federal parliament at an undetermined date to "define the details of a system of representation of the closed list."
One of the problems is that the ongoing constitutional 'review' process is essentially kicking the can down the road on several critical issues. Without a clear arbiter of the contradictions within the constitution, it appears likely that another set of ad hoc resolutions will need to be found. It has also become increasingly apparent that no one-person, one-vote (OPOV) polls will occur in any immediate regional or national elections. However, if the 4.5 system is torn up, several indirect negotiated votes will also need to occur, effectively contradicting the newly amended Provisional Constitution.
With the parliament soon expected to shut for the remainder of Ramadan and the debates rattling along at breakneck speed, the opportunities for incisive debate and input on Somalia's electoral system have been deeply limited. Still, there will have to be some sort of future reckoning and amendment process to delineate how a two-party system can function alongside PR. Whether this can be resolved by the federal parliament or a constitutional court is yet to be seen, but the willingness to introduce fresh contradiction into Somalia's supreme document is highly alarming. This process could have been a nationwide consultative and collaborative project, not the rushed and opaque process we see today.
By the Somali Wire team
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