Issue No. 659

Published 11 Mar 2024

Jubaland offensive against Al-Shabaab

Published on 11 Mar 2024 14:59 min

Jubaland offensive against Al-Shabaab
 

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has recently intensified its offensive against Al-Shabaab (AS). Despite this effort, Al-Shabaab has managed to resist Somalia National Army (SNA) operations in Central Somalia since the liberation of Xarardheere in early 2023. However, the FGS maintains that it retains the upper hand in its mission to degrade Al-Shabaab's capabilities. Following his re-election to a second non-consecutive term as FGS President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared a 'total war' against Al-Shabaab, which had long controlled a significant portion of the country and perpetrated deadly attacks on the government and civilian population. In March 2024, Somali National Army (SNA) forces, in collaboration with Jubaland state forces, recommenced operations against the Al-Qaeda-affiliated militants.
 
In February 2024, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to construct military bases for US-trained Danab elite forces, aimed at enhancing Somalia's counterterrorism efforts. Concurrently, a new security cooperation agreement between Turkey and Somalia was established, reflecting a broader international commitment to bolstering Somalia's security infrastructure. Additionally, discussions between Somalia's Interior Minister and an Indian delegation underscored ongoing efforts to strengthen security cooperation and implement development projects. However, these developments are unfolding against the backdrop of a diplomatic dispute with Ethiopia over the status of Somaliland and the ongoing draw-down of ATMIS forces, expected to be completed by the end of 2024. Operational challenges persist, including ineffective command-and-control and logistical limitations, hindering the success of FGS-led operations against Al-Shabaab. Moreover, scepticism surrounds the effectiveness of the Jubaland offensive, given historical shortcomings in coordination and execution.
 
On the other hand, the Deputy FGS Information Minister reports that the offensive in Lower Juba indicates progress. Since the beginning of 2024, Jubaland state forces, alongside Somali National Army (SNA) and Sector 6 ATMIS forces, have been conducting operations against Al-Shabaab (AS) militia in the outskirts of Kismayo and along the Juba River. These efforts have advanced toward Jamaame town, which remains under Al-Shabaab control. Despite these joint efforts, independent sources indicate that successive offensive operations targeting villages surrounding Baar Sanguuni have been met with resistance.
 
The joint forces also conducted multiple offensive operations targeting the villages of Muuse Haji, Malaaylaay, Turdho, and Baxarsaafka. From late February through the first week of March, Jubaland forces launched continuous offensives to retake areas lost due to El Nino floods in 2023, including Baar Sanguni, Kamasuuma, and villages around the Jamame district of Lower Juba. It's noteworthy that these efforts primarily focus on reclaiming territory rather than mounting a major offensive against Al-Shabaab hubs in the Jubas.
 
According to the Kismayo administration, this operation followed up on Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe’s large-scale push in 2022, which temporarily seized AS-held towns of Xagar and Walmart on the west side of the Juba River. General Bogmadow, the Commander of SNA Sector 43, speaking from the frontline, stated that the objective of the new offensive was to clear Al-Shabaab from the hinterland of Jamaame, Kamasuuma, and Baarsanguni. The joint forces of Jubaland and SNA claim to have eliminated approximately 50 AS fighters and captured 17 others, with the captured individuals presented to local media.
 
However, it's worth noting that Jubaland forces have conducted similar offensives in the past around these villages south of Kismayo. It remains uncertain whether these recent operations will result in a significant victory, such as reclaiming Jamaame and Jilib. Local security analysts are sceptical that this effort will differ from previous ones, as they doubt that the current Jubaland and Sector 43 SNA forces stationed in Kismayo have the necessary personnel and capacity to extend their offensive to Jilib and Bu'aale in Middle Juba, where Al-Shabaab maintains strongholds and headquarters.
 
To achieve the capture of major cities like Jilib, Bu'aale, and Sakow in Middle Juba, which have been under Al-Shabaab control for over 15 years, multiple battlefronts and coordinated offensives are necessary. This coordinated effort should extend from areas in Lower Shabelle, such as Afmadow and Sabaale-Kuntunwarey, to the Baardheere region in Gedo. Additionally, a parallel offensive from South West State, neighbouring Jubaland, is crucial to stretching Al-Shabaab's capacity and achieving significant gains in the regional state. However, the success of such operations depends on a well-coordinated effort among various security forces and sustained support from international partners.


By the Somali Wire team

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