Issue No. 657

Peace at what cost? Negotiations with Al-Shabaab
 

The prospect of negotiations between Al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is looming again. In and of itself, talks may be no bad thing-- particularly if they can end this protracted and brutal conflict. The major problem is that the FGS is in no position to draw critical concessions from Al-Shabaab if they do enter into negotiations in the near future. Nor does it appear that the FGS is particularly interested in drawing necessary concessions; 'peace' alone would now be enough, no matter what demands Al-Shabaab lays out. And these demands are sure to be substantial.

The militant group has been gaining ground against a bleak security backdrop for the federal government and its allies. While the concentrated military materiel and security personnel in Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and a handful of other cities are likely too much for the jihadist group to overcome, we can assume that swathes of rural southern Somalia will return to the grip of Al-Shabaab in the coming months as African Union forces withdraw.

If the FGS decides to negotiate with Al-Shabaab in the coming months, it will be doing so from a weakened political and military position. Moreover, given the likelihood of Qatar orchestrating such talks, a pre-determined outcome of power-sharing with Al-Shabaab appears likely. It is also important to note that Al-Shabaab may not be undertaking the negotiations alone. Al-I'tisaam, its ideological competitor and Qatar-connected affiliate, could well play a role as a key silent partner or power broker that would tip the balance of negotiations towards Al-Shabaab.

First on the table would likely be Somalia's security dynamics, with the possible disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of Al-Shabaab combatants, as previously touted by federal officials. The notion that Al-Shabaab will happily lay down its arms or could somehow be compelled to do so fundamentally misunderstands the current power imbalance. While Al-Shabaab is smaller in simple fighting numbers than the mismatched coalition of federal, regional, and local forces under the nominal command of Mogadishu, its forces are greater than the sum of their parts. It is therefore likely that thousands of jihadist fighters would somehow have to be integrated into Somalia's security architecture.

If this is the case, Somalia's entire security architecture would be corrupted. The command structure of the Somali National Army (SNA) would be radically altered to align with Al-Shabaab's extremist military structure. The Amniyaat, Al-Shabaab's feared secret service, could end up replacing the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), an aspiration of its neo-Salafist former Director Fahad Yasin.

Comparisons are perhaps too often made between Afghanistan and Somalia. But Somalia in 2024 and pre-2021 Afghanistan do share several similarities, including decades of protracted Islamist extremist insurgencies, a fatigued international presence, and withdrawing multinational peacekeeping forces, as well as a corrupt domestic elite. Still, it is important to note the differences between the two countries as well; perhaps the most important among these is that Al-Shabaab wields strong currents of Somali irredentism. Unlike the Taliban, overwhelmingly focused on Afghanistan, Al-Shabaab continues to violently project itself into Kenya and Ethiopia. What would happen to Jaysh al-Ayman, Al-Shabaab's Kenyan wing, if negotiations occur? Does it simply pull back from bases in the Boni forest, or does it continue infiltration of Somali border communities in Mandera and elsewhere?

Leaving aside the structure of any possible talks, it is essential to try to envisage the kind of 'jihadist' state Al-Shabaab might seek to establish. The extreme edicts it currently imposes indicate what Al-Shabaab could seek to replicate across Somalia if given the keys of power. The few remaining secular elements of Somali society could well be rolled back. In the field of education, already deeply limited education for girls could be further curtailed with the introduction of a widespread hard-line neo-Salafist curriculum. The full niqab could be made mandatory, and Arabic, not Somali, could possibly become the primary language of instruction. Dancing, music, and other 'foreign' influences could also be targeted.

While armed conflict might subside, Somalia's grim humanitarian situation would likely deteriorate further. With over 6 million people internally displaced -- mostly around major urban centres like Baidoa and Mogadishu-- critical relief could evaporate with independent humanitarian operations curtailed. Hundreds of millions in USD for humanitarian and climate projects would disappear, leaving one of the world's most climate-vulnerable countries even less prepared for intensifying natural disasters. Without the technical expertise and funding offered to the Somali Disaster Management Agency by international donors, destructive flooding, as in October and November 2023, would become far more devastating.

The international community was much more heavily invested in Afghanistan than in Somalia by a degree of many magnitudes. But it has essentially washed its hands of the country with the Taliban at the helm. Somalia's elite has long been adept at playing off and exploiting international funding, but this, too, barring Qatari engagement, could vanish overnight.

The security situation in Somalia might stabilise to a degree, but that should not be mistaken for 'positive peace.' Like the Taliban, Al-Shabaab fighters could also endanger parts of Somalia's current security and political class. Some political elites might escape to Nairobi, Cairo, or Ankara, where many spend much of their time anyway. But those now part of the Danab or Gorgor special forces could face retribution from emboldened jihadists. Al-Shabaab has repeatedly shown a propensity to target retired or former political officials. While such violence could be partially ameliorated if it comes to power– it could also be quietly redirected towards those it views as puppets of foreign powers.

Of course, none of this is set in stone, but it is all worth considering. It is not fear-mongering but a serious reminder of what is currently at stake. There is a sense that Mogadishu has, in a way, given up; and with security so bleak, calls for peace negotiations with Al-Shabaab could grow in the coming months. But peace at what cost?

By the Somali Wire team