South West State constitutional amendments: Will others follow suit?
The Federal Parliament is not the only legislative body in Somalia with constitutional changes on its agenda in recent weeks. On 19 February, South West State's (SWS) regional parliament abruptly amended the Federal Member State's (FMS) constitution, granting sweeping powers to SWS President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed 'Laftagareen.' Largely overshadowed by the constitutional debates in the Federal Parliament, Laftagareen's latest power grab may prove particularly contentious, including with his newer allies in Villa Somalia.
Among the key amendments to the SWS Constitution that the regional parliament passed include extending the presidential term from four to 5 years, reducing the number of vice presidents from two to one, minimising the role of traditional elders and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in elections, and even granting Laftagareen the power to declare martial law. These new powers are unprecedented for an FMS president and confirm that Laftagareen has little intention of relinquishing power through any fair election this year.
In February 2023, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) helped mediate a political settlement between Laftagareen and his opposition that granted the regional president and parliament a one-year extension alongside a commitment to hold timely state elections towards the end of the year. For several months prior, the opposition had contested the unconstitutional extension of Laftagareen's mandate after his term lapsed in December 2022.
The settlement dubbed the 'Baidoa agreement,' was a reprieve for an FMS whose population was grappling with a punishing drought and Al-Shabaab's entrenched presence in much of the region. While the opposition alliance acquiesced to the deal, many felt let down by the federal government, only agreeing after weighing the risks of clan violence erupting in SWS against their campaign for fair elections. Laftagareen had previously expertly engineered violence and crises to maintain his close grip on the presidency.
Just a few months later, though, the May 2023 National Consultative Agreement (NCC) threw the heightened political tensions into further disarray after they declared all FMS elections were to be held in November 2024. Subsequent back-and-forth meetings between Villa Somalia and regional opposition and Villa Somalia and Laftagareen in August and September 2023 led nowhere, coming to a head in early October when the opposition cancelled their trip to Baidoa at HSM's request. Villa Somalia insisted on sticking to its November 2024 timetable, reneging on the Baidoa agreement.
In recent weeks, however, sensing potential pressure from Villa Somalia, Laftagareen moved decisively to protect his position. Laftagareen instructed his parliament, which term has expired, to amend the constitution and grant him more powers. These changes have now significantly strengthened Laftagareen's hand in the expectation that the regional president will call elections on his own timetable and well before November 2024.
SWS opposition has rounded on what they have labelled an "attempt by the current administration to manipulate the upcoming elections." Neither the opposition nor communities in SWS were consulted before the regional parliament ripped up the checks and balances on Laftagareen's power. The regional opposition has further criticised the move as self-serving and a threat to SWS stability, highlighting how Laftagareen's previous attempt to cling to power led to bloodshed in Baidoa in December 2022.
Despite their frustrations, the regional opposition has again turned to the FGS to try and restrain Laftagareen's power grab, calling for the condemnation of the amendments that "violate the Federal Constitution, the SWS constitution, previous political agreements, and the will of the people." They have also implored the FGS to uphold a fairer process and safeguard the rights of SWS citizens to participate in "free, fair, transparent, and violence-free elections." But support from Villa Somalia has not been forthcoming, likely aware that it is currently reliant on Laftagareen's support for the NCC agreement in the Federal Parliament and the much-heralded 'Phase II' military offensive in his FMS against Al-Shabaab.
Laftagareen is not the only FMS leader who has calculated their chances of re-election will have dwindled by November 2024 though. Others, too, have sensed that Villa Somalia is seeking to keep them onside while the controversial constitutional reform process is ongoing and thereafter pursue regime change in the periphery.
The question is, will other FMS leaders follow suit and amend their constitution to strengthen their position? While Hirshabelle and Galmudug leaders might struggle to push similar changes through their parliaments, Jubaland President Ahmed 'Madoobe' likely has sufficient sway over his regional legislators. Even though Jubaland's constitution has a two-term limit for the presidency, Madoobe will probably seek to amend the constitution to allow for a third term. If he does so and wins the subsequent election, Madoobe would become Somalia's longest-serving regional leader.
Constitutional amendments are not the only avenue FMS leaders may exploit to shore up their positions in the coming months. The collapse in relations between Mogadishu and Addis offers another route for Laftagareen and others to secure their political survival. Laftagareen, in particular, is known to favour Ethiopia and has privately implored for the FGS to remain measured in its dispute with Addis. SWS security depends on thousands of Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) soldiers in Bay and Bakool. Addis remains a potentially attractive patron for those FMS leaders unsure of Villa Somalia's trajectory.
While the FGS has not publicly commented on SWS constitutional amendments, they have privately expressed concern over the potential snowball effect of Laftagareen's move. It is somewhat ironic that Villa Somalia, who fired the starting pistol on constitutional amendments, is now concerned about regional leaders mimicking its centralisation of power at the FMS level. If left unchallenged, though, Laftagareen's move could well trigger similar amendments in other FMS, undermining the possibility of fair regional elections in November 2024 or before. And if this does happen, it too would tilt the balance of power away from the FGS and towards the FMS leaders. More immediately, though, Laftagareen's move has left his FMS vulnerable to renewed political tensions and clan violence in the coming months and all but ensures his 're-election' as the president of SWS.
By the Somali Wire team
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