Issue No. 654

Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia: The Unstable Triangle

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali arrived in Nairobi on Tuesday evening, 27 February, on an official visit aimed at resetting Kenya-Ethiopia relations. All pomp and circumstance were laid out for Abiy’s first visit since 2022, with President William Ruto warmly greeting him at Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. Back at the State House, Abiy inspected a full guard of honour in the presence of senior Kenyan officials. But the Ethiopian PM is not the only head of government in town; Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is also due in Nairobi later today. The Somali president is due to attend the ongoing 6th United Nations Environment Assembly Session that is bringing thousands of delegates and foreign officials to the Kenyan capital.

Abiy's elaborate welcome and the arrival of two adversaries in Nairobi have fed speculation President Ruto may be seeking to mediate between Hassan Sheikh and Abiy. The Ethiopian premier previously revealed that he had reached out to the presidents of both Djibouti and Kenya to intercede in the diplomatic crisis sparked by the New Year Day Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Addis and Hargeisa. Mogadishu, on the other hand, has continued to reject any calls for reconciliation or negotiations between the two capitals until the MoU is taken off the table.
 
The Kenyan government remains tight-lipped about the convergence of the two leaders in Nairobi today, which cannot be coincidental. It is almost certain Kenya will attempt some close-quarter shuttle diplomacy if it fails to bring the two men to a face-to-face meeting.
 
President Hassan Sheikh has staked his reputation on a full retraction of the MoU before any talks with Ethiopia. It is highly likely he will rebuff any calls for a meeting or a photo op with Abiy before that happens, previously rejecting calls for them to meet in Rome in January at the Africa-Italy Summit. But it is not inconceivable that the two may meet in secret. While Nairobi has leverage over both Mogadishu and Addis, it is uncertain whether Kenya wields enough clout to broker a quick deal at this stage. The existential framing of the MoU has badly limited the space for political manoeuvrability, particularly Mogadishu's. Still, what could probably be achieved with a fair bit of luck is to reduce the heat generated by the MoU and steer the two leaders to move towards a negotiated settlement.

It is very much in the Kenyan interest to soothe the inflamed tensions from the MoU. For Kenya, the first, and likely the most acute, implication of the MoU is that it will result in Ethiopia's disinvestment from the Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project. Much of the rationale behind Nairobi's construction of Lamu Port and the road, rail, and air infrastructure tied to it lay in the expectation that Ethiopia would divert trade from the Port of Djibouti. Since the construction of the first berth in Lamu Port in 2019, though, Addis has been reluctant to commit itself to LAPSSET. While it has not entirely dismissed the prospect of using it, its ambiguity has caused frustration in Nairobi.
 
In bilateral meetings today, it is almost certain the topic of Lamu will loom large and that Kenyan officials will seek some form of recommitment to Lamu. Nairobi will also try to convince Abiy that endorsing former Kenyan Prime Minister and long-serving opposition leader Raila Odinga for the post of African Union Chairperson is positive for their alliance. Addis is known not to favour Odinga for Chair, but it is possible that a grander bargain could be struck between Addis and Nairobi-- support for Odinga in return for Nairobi softening its stance on the MoU.

Since the bombshell announcement on 1 January, Kenya has neither publicly criticised the MoU nor voiced strong support for Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This has been interpreted by many as mild support for the Ethiopia-Somaliland position. Kenya's relationship with Somaliland is a historically sympathetic one. A significant Isaaq minority with family ties to Somaliland reside in Kenya's central and southern regions and wields influence in local politics. Senior Kenyan politicians, including Raila Odinga and Kenya's Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi, are also known or believed to favour recognising Somaliland as a sovereign state.
 
But Nairobi is aware of how emotive and potentially explosive the issue is. Kenyan policymakers would prefer a general African consensus on Somaliland rather than a fraught bilateral recognition pathway as favoured by Addis. There is further alarm in the Kenyan capital about the resurgence of Somali irredentism and nationalist rhetoric in the wake of the MoU and what this portends for stability in its northern districts, already rendered insecure by Al-Shabaab.

In the Horn, Kenya and Ethiopia have long been considered the historical anchor states whose mutual defence pact and enforcement of the so-called 'cooperative hegemony' helped to stabilise the region. But in recent years, Nairobi has faced pressure to end this mutual defence treaty with Ethiopia and more aggressively strike out and pursue its own self-interest. In one recent debate on Kenyan TV, the prominent political commentator Peter Kagwanja explicitly called on Kenya to end its defence pact with Ethiopia, citing Addis's "erratic" and impulsive foreign policy under Abiy.
 
The partnership between Addis and Nairobi is certainly frayed. Yet there is still room to mend rifts and rebuild the historical alliance that has underpinned regional stability. In a post on X, formerly Twitter, Kenyan President William Ruto wrote that "the long-standing relations between Kenya and Ethiopia is the bedrock of our shared prosperity and regional stability." President Ruto is right. Amid the destructive war in Sudan and the collapse of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, now is the time for Ethiopia and Kenya to rebuild their alliance and restore some calmer politics to the Horn.

By the Somali Wire team