Issue No. 653

The Mustafajiraad and IEDs in Somalia

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a principal weapon of choice by insurgents in asymmetric warfare. Their utility lies not just in potentially inflicting large numbers of casualties but also in dealing psychological blows to both soldiers and civilians. Sudden explosions from a truck next to a hotel or on a rural roadside saps morale and instils fear while allowing an armed group to strike beyond its territory. Al-Shabaab (AS) is no different, and in the last decade, it has become one of the world's most regular users of IEDs. Since 2014, AS IED attacks have increased in both scale and deadliness, as seen in horrific attacks like the October 2017 Mogadishu truck bombings that killed over 500 people.
 
Since the beginning of 2024, Al-Shabaab has continued to wield IEDs to deadly effect. On 24 January, jihadist fighters overran and killed dozens of Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers encamped near Aad, an assault that began with a suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED). The SNA's operational tempo in central Somalia has not yet recovered. But the militant group has also planted IEDs targeting civilians, including at a popular market in Mogadishu, in response to protests over the militant group's 'taxtortion.'
 
In 2023, 689 IEDs were either detonated or discovered and disarmed in Somalia– the highest number on record and an 8% rise from 2022. Month-on-month variation was significant, with February, March and July all recording over 80 incidents in which IEDs were either detonated or discovered and disarmed. October and November, though, saw just 31 and 24 IEDs recorded, respectively, due to the hampered movement of jihadists and government forces alike as a result of the El Nino-induced flooding. Despite the overall rise in the use of IEDs, related casualties decreased from 2,316 in 2022 to 1,942 in 2023, largely due to a decline in casualty numbers from VBIEDs.
 
Al-Shabaab's history of IED use reflects the trajectory of the militant group, from one in which foreign Al-Qaeda fighters played a central role to the predominantly Somali group it is today. Individuals such as Ma'alim Qasim, a former mujahid in the Soviet-Afghan War, were central in the establishment of Al-Shabaab's IED programme in the early 2010s. The department responsible for IEDs, 'Mustafajiraad,' serves under the auspices of the Amniyaat, the AS secret service; it is responsible for most explosive, suicide and complex attacks. While foreign expertise and explosives parts have been sourced from abroad, particularly from Yemen from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), AS has also displayed sophistication in the domestic preparation of IEDs. AS also continues to train large numbers of explosive specialists.
 
Within the Mustafajiraad are the sub-departments of 'tasniic' (manufacture) and 'tajkiiz' (preparation). Explosives manufacturing often occurs in unregistered local garages dotting Somalia, including in Mogadishu. Over the years, materiel captured from the SNA and African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) have been routinely re-purposed to make IEDs. One IED assessment conducted in 2017 revealed that some 60% of Al-Shabaab's explosive attacks along the Kenyan border were sourced from raids on African Union forces or scavenged unexploded munition.
 
Since then, Al-Shabaab's explosives supply chains have become more internalised, and local expertise has grown. Without clear import regulations or adequate border checks, the jihadist group can source necessary materiel for bomb-making from local Somali markets, be it fertiliser, batteries or rebar. Typical triggers for IEDs-- such as motorbike alarms and cell phones-- can be easily bought from markets in Mogadishu. Criminal and terror networks may supply more specialised equipment, such as detonating cords from Yemen. And sulphuric acid and other chemicals have been smuggled through the Port of Mogadishu, where, in a single episode in 2020, 79 tonnes of sulphuric acid were seized by authorities.
 
Below tasniic and tajkiiz is the sub-department of 'takhzjin' (storage). Here, women play a role in transporting and storing AS IEDs before use. The Mustafajiraad uses a variety of methods to smuggle explosives, hiding them in jerry cans or under other goods, often depending on their size and purpose. But SVBIEDs are nearly always prepared close to their targets, to avoid checkpoints and other heavy security. With men expected to maintain a respectful distance from women in Somali culture, searching the vehicles and homes of individual women is extremely rare. Female AS operatives can therefore navigate Mogadishu's myriad checkpoints and store explosives with relative ease.
 
Since the establishment of IED training programmes, Al-Shabaab's tactical deployment of IEDs has become more sophisticated. On the asymmetric battlefield, jihadists lay pressure-plate IEDs on supply routes before ambushing convoys in a designated 'kill zone.' SVBIEDs and VBIEDs are routinely used in the opening salvoes of assaults on FOBs to penetrate security barriers before fighters rush in. When withdrawing from villages and towns, AS often rigs houses, wells and infrastructure with explosives to injure and kill advancing SNA forces or returning civilians. The potency of IEDs often lies in maiming, not killing. A wounded or disabled soldier costs far more to support when factoring in medical resources, psychological impacts, and caregiving, as well as the income strain on their family.
 
The militant group uses IEDs to target civilians for a variety of reasons. After a lull in attacks on Mogadishu in early 2023, AS increasingly targeted businesses that defied its commands. Three businesses in Mogadishu's popular Bakara Market were targeted in December 2023 following their compliance with a federal government order to install CCTV cameras. The market was targeted again on 6 February 2024, killing over 10 people, in response to a nearby protest against AS 'taxtortion' practices. IEDs remain a powerful tool in compelling civilian populations to obey orders by inciting fear.
 
In the coming months, as the ATMIS draw-down continues, we can reasonably expect an increase in Al-Shabaab's deployment and detonation of IEDs. Last year, 86 devices were cleared by ATMIS forces, 5 more than were cleared by the SNA. Identifying and clearing IEDs is no simple task, and African Union forces with plenty of frontline experience have appeared particularly competent in this.
 
Choking AS IED production and use is critical for the federal government's military ambitions against the jihadist group. Several steps could be taken to limit proliferation, which will be vital if the SNA hopes to hold onto territory as ATMIS withdraws in 2024. Employing more women in Somalia's security forces to better infiltrate and detect the transport and storage of AS explosives would be a good start. Al-Shabaab is a savvy supply chain operator, so more transparent control of imports into Mogadishu is needed to thwart the transport of chemical precursors, including sulphuric acid. But no matter these steps, which would necessitate a more effective whole-of-government approach that we have seen before, we still expect to see a significant number of destructive IED attacks in the months and years to come.

By the Somali Wire team