The Battle for Airspace Control
"It's a sad situation the government uses the management of the air space as a political weapon that can have a serious ramification on the political stability and the unity of the country."
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, September 2019
A new and potentially dangerous front is opening in the escalating dispute between Somalia and Somaliland. Aircraft flying through Somali airspace have, in recent days, reported brief interference in their radio communications and competing sets of instructions from multiple air traffic control stations. One aviation watchdog has revealed that there have been 10 documented incidents of 'broadcast overlaps,' a sanitised word for jamming, on High Frequencies (HF) used by pilots. And, on the weekend, Israel's national carrier EL AL reported that one of their flights received conflicting instructions while overflying Somaliland, with one set requesting the pilots adjust the aircraft's altitude and descend. Thankfully the pilots defied the order, and the plane continued on without further incident.
A week ago, the Somali Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) leaked a statement to the media accusing Somaliland of deploying "jamming" devices to "disrupt" radio communication between the Mogadishu Air Traffic Control Centre and pilots transiting Somalia's airspace. The statement was undated and unsigned-- but contained highly detailed information. The statement was later disowned as 'fake news' by the SCAA, almost certainly because of suggestions this was proof that Mogadishu could not secure the integrity of ground-to-air radio signal transmissions and, by extension, could not guarantee the safety of Somalia’s airspace.
On Monday, 19 February, the SCAA released another statement similar to the one it had retracted, this time warning that the government would take "drastic" measures against Somaliland. The Authority also alleged that unidentified "foreign hands" were behind the jamming operation, clearly alluding to Ethiopian interference. Somaliland's administration has not officially confirmed or denied these reports. But independent media in Somaliland and commentators on X, formerly Twitter, have widely reported the arrival of new equipment at the Eggal International Airport in Hargeisa to enable Somaliland to “reclaim its airspace.”
The manner of the reported jamming is old-school and familiar across the Horn. It requires decent transmission equipment; it simply involves swamping a targeted HF radio with alternative broadcasts or noise. So far, it would seem the intent is to irritate more than to cause any type of catastrophic harm.
But the calibrated jamming of pilots' radios is a high-risk, low-reward tactic. It has done more than irritate Mogadishu amidst the recent collapse in Somalia-Somaliland relations; complaints by airlines have also risen. One possible rationale is that radio communications interference and HF channel disruptions are grounds to downgrade Somalia's airspace, which was awarded a Class A certification by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in January 2023. If disruptions continue, international air regulatory bodies may be compelled to step in. But the risks of further disruptions for Somaliland are also high; something could go catastrophically wrong. A major accident over Somalia’s airspace resulting from radio communications disruption could badly damage Somaliland's credibility and further stall its quest for international recognition.
Aviation and airspace control remain sore topics and have long been wielded as potent wedge issues in negotiations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. In this light, they are not new issues but rather ones inflamed by the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 1 January 2024.
For much of the last three decades, Somalia's airspace was managed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) from its regional offices in Nairobi. However, following the election of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo as President of Somalia in February 2017, Villa Somalia sought the return of management of Somalia’s airspace control to Mogadishu, and this was granted in December 2017. Hargeisa initially consented to the arrangement, having been promised a share of overflight fees. ICAO and Somalia also agreed that Hargeisa would host the first Air Traffic Control Board office, a joint supervisory and oversight body to ensure aviation did not become 'politicised.'
But the Farmaajo government, dominated by hard-line nationalists and unionists opposed to Somaliland's secession, soon dismantled the latter agreement. No aviation management office was ever established in Hargeisa. And USD tens of millions from overflight fees managed by ICAO and meant for Somaliland was blocked by Mogadishu. Equipment donated to upgrade the airport in Hargeisa was never delivered. Since the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU was signed at the beginning of this year, a number of flights between Hargeisa and Addis have also been cancelled. According to Somaliland officials, in one instance, the SCAA cancelled an air ambulance hired to deliver a patient from Hargeisa to a hospital in Addis. The politicisation of aviation has returned.
The suspicious death of Abdinasir Muse Dahable, an aviation official affiliated with the SCAA, is further roiling tensions between Somalia and Somaliland. On 19 February, police arrested 6 individuals in connection to the apparent murder of the 32-year-old who had previously worked in Somaliland aviation. Somaliland's interior minister has suggested that Hargeisa suspects the involvement of Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in Dahable’s death. Police are investigating the case, but online conspiracy theories and speculation abound over a potential motive.
This most recent aviation dispute is certainly part of a broader crisis between Somalia and Somaliland. Flashpoints, like aviation, are back despite the high risks accompanying them. Only a return to serious dialogue and a fresh commitment to honour past aviation agreements will resolve the immediate crisis, but there appears to be little appetite for backing down from heightened rhetoric and escalating tactics, on either side.
By the Somali Wire team
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