The Battle for Airspace Control
"It's a sad situation the government uses the management of the air space as a political weapon that can have a serious ramification on the political stability and the unity of the country."
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, September 2019
A new and potentially dangerous front is opening in the escalating dispute between Somalia and Somaliland. Aircraft flying through Somali airspace have, in recent days, reported brief interference in their radio communications and competing sets of instructions from multiple air traffic control stations. One aviation watchdog has revealed that there have been 10 documented incidents of 'broadcast overlaps,' a sanitised word for jamming, on High Frequencies (HF) used by pilots. And, on the weekend, Israel's national carrier EL AL reported that one of their flights received conflicting instructions while overflying Somaliland, with one set requesting the pilots adjust the aircraft's altitude and descend. Thankfully the pilots defied the order, and the plane continued on without further incident.
A week ago, the Somali Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) leaked a statement to the media accusing Somaliland of deploying "jamming" devices to "disrupt" radio communication between the Mogadishu Air Traffic Control Centre and pilots transiting Somalia's airspace. The statement was undated and unsigned-- but contained highly detailed information. The statement was later disowned as 'fake news' by the SCAA, almost certainly because of suggestions this was proof that Mogadishu could not secure the integrity of ground-to-air radio signal transmissions and, by extension, could not guarantee the safety of Somalia’s airspace.
On Monday, 19 February, the SCAA released another statement similar to the one it had retracted, this time warning that the government would take "drastic" measures against Somaliland. The Authority also alleged that unidentified "foreign hands" were behind the jamming operation, clearly alluding to Ethiopian interference. Somaliland's administration has not officially confirmed or denied these reports. But independent media in Somaliland and commentators on X, formerly Twitter, have widely reported the arrival of new equipment at the Eggal International Airport in Hargeisa to enable Somaliland to “reclaim its airspace.”
The manner of the reported jamming is old-school and familiar across the Horn. It requires decent transmission equipment; it simply involves swamping a targeted HF radio with alternative broadcasts or noise. So far, it would seem the intent is to irritate more than to cause any type of catastrophic harm.
But the calibrated jamming of pilots' radios is a high-risk, low-reward tactic. It has done more than irritate Mogadishu amidst the recent collapse in Somalia-Somaliland relations; complaints by airlines have also risen. One possible rationale is that radio communications interference and HF channel disruptions are grounds to downgrade Somalia's airspace, which was awarded a Class A certification by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in January 2023. If disruptions continue, international air regulatory bodies may be compelled to step in. But the risks of further disruptions for Somaliland are also high; something could go catastrophically wrong. A major accident over Somalia’s airspace resulting from radio communications disruption could badly damage Somaliland's credibility and further stall its quest for international recognition.
Aviation and airspace control remain sore topics and have long been wielded as potent wedge issues in negotiations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. In this light, they are not new issues but rather ones inflamed by the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 1 January 2024.
For much of the last three decades, Somalia's airspace was managed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) from its regional offices in Nairobi. However, following the election of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo as President of Somalia in February 2017, Villa Somalia sought the return of management of Somalia’s airspace control to Mogadishu, and this was granted in December 2017. Hargeisa initially consented to the arrangement, having been promised a share of overflight fees. ICAO and Somalia also agreed that Hargeisa would host the first Air Traffic Control Board office, a joint supervisory and oversight body to ensure aviation did not become 'politicised.'
But the Farmaajo government, dominated by hard-line nationalists and unionists opposed to Somaliland's secession, soon dismantled the latter agreement. No aviation management office was ever established in Hargeisa. And USD tens of millions from overflight fees managed by ICAO and meant for Somaliland was blocked by Mogadishu. Equipment donated to upgrade the airport in Hargeisa was never delivered. Since the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU was signed at the beginning of this year, a number of flights between Hargeisa and Addis have also been cancelled. According to Somaliland officials, in one instance, the SCAA cancelled an air ambulance hired to deliver a patient from Hargeisa to a hospital in Addis. The politicisation of aviation has returned.
The suspicious death of Abdinasir Muse Dahable, an aviation official affiliated with the SCAA, is further roiling tensions between Somalia and Somaliland. On 19 February, police arrested 6 individuals in connection to the apparent murder of the 32-year-old who had previously worked in Somaliland aviation. Somaliland's interior minister has suggested that Hargeisa suspects the involvement of Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in Dahable’s death. Police are investigating the case, but online conspiracy theories and speculation abound over a potential motive.
This most recent aviation dispute is certainly part of a broader crisis between Somalia and Somaliland. Flashpoints, like aviation, are back despite the high risks accompanying them. Only a return to serious dialogue and a fresh commitment to honour past aviation agreements will resolve the immediate crisis, but there appears to be little appetite for backing down from heightened rhetoric and escalating tactics, on either side.
By the Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
I stand before you today with profound respect and appreciation for the sacrifices the sons and daughters of your countries have made in the AMISOM/ATMIS/AUSSOM missions to help their African brothers and sisters in Somalia fight the scourge of Al-Shabaab, open and maintain critical trade routes, and help in the state-building process of Somalia.
Somalia’s opposition - frustrated by months of stagnant dialogue - has for the first time proposed a transitional mechanism to break the country's protracted political deadlock. In an open letter addressed to a crucial extraordinary summit of African Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TPCCs) which opened on Wednesday in Kampala, the Somali Future Council (SFC) said that a new transitional governance arrangement was vital and necessary and is hoping the initiative will gain traction among regional actors who have boots on the ground and share a vested interest in a durable political settlement.
In a significant symbolic blow to Somali unionism, Fahiima Yusuf Quuje - a prominent Dhulbahante activist from the Jama Siyaad sub-clan who was instrumental in mobilising grassroots support for the armed insurrection in Laas Anood - late last week declared she was repudiating Somali unionism and the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology, tendering her resignation from her regional assembly seat in the fledgling, Mogadishu-backed Northeastern State of Somalia (NES) and would be returning to Somaliland. A day after the announcement, Quuje landed at Egal International Airport in Hargeisa, where she was greeted by high-ranking dignitaries, garlanded in the Somaliland flag, and serenaded with patriotic anthems.
Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.
The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.
For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).
A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.