Issue No. 649

Published 16 Feb 2024

Islam and State: The Elephant Not in the Room

Published on 16 Feb 2024 14:32 min

Islam and State: The Elephant Not in the Room

___________________________ 

"The future state should be democratic, with citizens' rights defended, but the state will have to embrace Islam or Somalia will continue to be unstable."
 Abdirahman Baadiyow, June, 2012
    ___________________________ 

For much of the last two decades, close-knit and secretive 'moderate' Islamist political factions have dominated Somalia's tortured state-building process. These factions have wielded immense influence across society and maintained the levers of power across four successive federal administrations since 2009. They remain the country's most organised political force and, in large part through well-established Gulf and Middle Eastern patronage networks, have accumulated vast material wealth.
 
Islamists will continue to shape Somalia's political destiny for the foreseeable future. Considering the modern history of Islam in Somalia as the 'veil lightly worn,' it is extraordinary that it is now inconceivable that a federal administration might be secular, yet no organised secular movement or parties exist today. Other political movements, particularly the ultra-nationalist section of Somali politics, have a habit of making common cause with the country's Islamists.
 
Fifteen years of covert state capture and an exercise of political power by stealth have now given way to an openly self-confident and assertive brand of Islamism. Under the incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, 'moderate' Islamism appears both confident and ambitious, as well as consolidating its political hold on the country through sweeping constitutional amendments. The moderate Islamist brand has certainly demonstrated its longevity and potency in Somalia. What it has not yet done is to define the end state - what a 'moderate Islamist' state would look like. More importantly, the politics of moderate Islamism has become murkier and hard to untangle.
 
2009 proved to be a seminal year in the rise of Somalia's Islamist parties. In late 2008, the weak Transitional National Government (TNG) President, Colonel Abdullah Yusuf, was forced to resign under intense pressure. Abandoned by Ethiopia, his closest ally, he was also hemmed in by a deadly insurgency and a regime deeply riven by power struggles and rendered non-functional. His resignation ended Somalia's brief experiment at charting a non-Islamist path towards state-building.

The former president was a strong federalist. While he did not articulate a secular vision for Somalia, he undoubtedly favoured a non-confessional state. Yusuf actively loathed Islamists and Islamism, responsible for waging war against the first armed Islamist movement in Somalia-- Al-Ittihad al Islamiyah in the early 1990s with Ethiopia's support.
 
But in 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a conservative Islamist cleric, assumed the presidency of Somalia. The decision to elect him was based on a calculation that empowering the 'moderates' would undermine support for the violent extremism promoted by Al-Shabaab. Islamists have not left power since. Since then, power has rotated between an array of factions closely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood; prominent among them are Al-Islah, Dam ul-Jadid, Aala Sheikh, and Daljir. The Salafist hardline group Al-I'tisaam remains an ideological competitor to these coalitions and tasted power under former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. Fahad Yasin, the former National Intelligence and Security Agency director-general, actively promoted the group within the government as its treasurer.
 
In May 2022, Hassan Sheikh and his Dam al-Jadid faction returned to power. The president immediately shared the spoils of victory with Daljir, an allied Islamist party that backed his campaign. He appointed his mentor and friend, Abdirahman Baadiyow, a prominent leader of the Al-Islah movement, Somalia's oldest Islamist group inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, to spearhead a rewrite of the constitution. It is all but certain that Baadiyow was one of the key architects of the controversial and radical proposals that now seek to overhaul Somalia's political system by the National Consultative Council (NCC) in May 2023.
 
Islamists in Somalia have long favoured a strong centralised state and leader, and the NCC proposals do precisely that. Many of the changes that are currently being debated in Somalia's federal parliament are essentially ideological in nature, including abolishing the post of prime minister. It appears that older Islamists like Baadiyow and Hassan Sheikh spied an opening to push through a more ambitious Islamist shaping of the country's constitution. The now-tabled proposals have set the stage for a powerful leader unrestrained by traditional Somali checks and balances.
 
The notion that moderate Islamists are pushing through a seemingly authoritarian state-building agenda poses dilemmas for the international community that has embraced them as dependable partners in advancing democracy in Somalia. If Somalia had ever embarked upon a liberal state-building project, that project has now stalled, and an alternative Islamist state is now underway.
 
Recent events highlight the fraught nature of moderate Islamism. The speed and ease with which moderate Islamists have embraced the rhetoric of militancy in the wake of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) crisis with Ethiopia makes the term 'moderates' look dubious. And the spectacle of senior politicians within the federal government casually embracing Hamas as 'freedom fighters' and deploying anti-Semitic tropes to demonise Jews and Israel raises fundamental questions about what moderates actually stand for.
 
For decades, Somali moderate Islamists framed their politics and ideology as the antithesis of Al-Shabaab. Moderation needed not to define itself as long as what constituted extremism was clear and encapsulated by the militant group. Many uncritically understood the country's moderates as the counterweight to Al-Shabaab. But since the MoU, federal officials and Al-Shabaab leaders have increasingly echoed one another's talking points of Ethiopia as a 'historical enemy' and Somalia's sacrosanct 'territorial integrity.' Senior federal officials have even begun publicly referring to Al-Shabaab as a potential ally. In this light, it is extraordinary to consider that Al-Shabaab's extremism has been allowed to define moderation. 
 
The time has come for Somalis, and the rest of the world, to subject moderate Islamism to greater scrutiny. The sudden speed at which the NCC proposals have been tabled and are now being debated should be of immense alarm. A years-long process has been transformed into a matter of weeks as the federal government ploughs on with its centralising agenda. It has become increasingly clear that moderate Islamism is not inoculated against all forms of militancy; rather, they are highly vulnerable.

By the Somali Wire team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 129
Centring North Eastern Kenya - The Rise Of Kenya's Ethnic Somalis
The Horn Edition

A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.


28:45 min read 26 Jun
Issue No. 962
Somaliland’s Recognition Angst
The Somali Wire

Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.


22:37 min read 24 Jun
Issue No. 961
Deciphering Al-Shabaab's Radio Silence
The Somali Wire

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.


20 min read 17 Jun
Issue No. 960
The Galmudug Vote – The Next Powder Keg
The Somali Wire

While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.


7:13 min read 10 Jun
Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Issue No. 958
Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu
The Somali Wire

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.


8:08 min read 03 Jun
Issue No. 128
The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma
The Horn Edition

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.


34:56 min read 29 May
Issue No. 957
How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
The Somali Wire

On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.


17:12 min read 27 May
Issue No. 956
The Perils of a Grey Transition
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.


0 min read 20 May
Scroll