Issue No. 648

Possible Scenarios: Where Might the MoU Lead?

The diplomatic row over the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland rumbles on. Last week, ahead of the African Union summit, Villa Somalia urged members of the United Nations and African Union to reject Ethiopia's "unwarranted aggression" and take a firm stance against it. Mogadishu's rhetoric, though, has so far failed to compel either Hargeisa or Addis to withdraw from their positions. And though over a month has now passed since the signing of the secretive MoU, behind the scenes, Somaliland and Ethiopian officials are actively working on the deal that will likely see Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland in return for the leasing of a naval base on the Bab al-Mandab Straight. Still, with so much uncertainty, it is worth considering three scenarios that could follow from the current deadlock.
 
The first, and most likely, is Ethiopia's recognition of Somaliland as a new sovereign independent state in exchange for sea access, as stipulated in the MoU. While it would signal immense progress in Somaliland's quest for sovereign independence, it would not necessitate universal international recognition. A small number of African countries would likely follow Ethiopia's lead, but others, including many Arab governments, such as Egypt, would surely resist. Other nations, including most Western governments, would likely adopt the position of the African Union, potentially stranding Somaliland in limbo diplomatically and legally-- at least for some time to come.
 
With this uncertainty, Mogadishu and Hargeisa might be convinced to return to the negotiating table for contrasting reasons. Somalia may spy a chance to stall Somaliland's pursuit of broader international recognition. Somaliland, on the other hand, stuck in a destabilising hiatus, could be persuaded if the talks are sufficiently unrestricted to allow for Somalia to recognise its independence. The complicated internal reaction within Somaliland since the New Year to the MoU suggests how fine a line Hargeisa is treading.
 
Re-opening negotiations in better faith and with international recognition of Somaliland on the table might yield more productive results than the stop-start decade of talks. Moreover, the lengthy and complex negotiations could allow Villa Somalia to refocus on the offensive against Al-Shabaab in a post-African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) security dynamic.
 
Another feasible scenario, and Mogadishu's preferred outcome, would be the collapse of the MoU. If Somalia can raise the political costs of the MoU beyond what Addis can stomach, the Ethiopian government might yet withdraw. More likely, though, is a breakdown in negotiations between Hargeisa and Addis, possibly due to contrasting timelines for recognition and naval access. While the MoU's collapse may be a diplomatic 'win' for Mogadishu, it would likely imperil Ethiopia-Somalia relations further and prove disastrous for Somaliland.
 
Domestically, Bihi's administration would face immense internal pressure, particularly in constituencies that have agitated against the MoU. Leaving aside the Laas Aanood conflict in 2022-2023, Somaliland has managed to establish a largely stable democracy as well as a bulwark against extremist threats, particularly Al-Shabaab. Any erosion of this stability would have severe security implications for the wider region. And though the Federal Government of Somalia may possess the tools to destabilise Somaliland, perhaps through supporting unitarists in Awdal and Sool, it still lacks the capacity to assume responsibility for Somaliland's politics and security.
 
The third scenario is the outside possibility that talks restart between Hargeisa and Mogadishu in the immediate future. Multiple rounds of negotiations since 2012 and the recognition of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government have led nowhere, largely due to Mogadishu's refusal to seriously consider the possibility of Somaliland's sovereign independence. The latest set of talks in December 2023 followed this pattern, with Villa Somalia again seeking to draw major concessions from Hargeisa without recognition of the latter's political demands.
 
One possible model for renewed negotiations could be the open framework that eventually led to the independence of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011. Over several years, all options were left on the table, including varying shades of unity and separation, before a final referendum was held in January 2011. This model, however, would necessitate Mogadishu to accept the realities of Somaliland's exercise of self-determination. Major political concessions on either side would also need to be countenanced, and Somalia would be required to make unity 'attractive,' something it has thus far failed to do. New constitutional, political, and economic frameworks would need to be offered, bringing its own risks for Villa Somalia. From the outset of the talks, if Somaliland remained unenticed with the prospect of unity, Somalia would be required to recognise it as a sovereign state. Immense amounts of goodwill and trust would be needed on each side, as well as possible concessions that could prove fatal to the ambitions of politicians in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. The current climate is far from conducive for complex, lengthy negotiations, to say the least.
 
At this moment in time, Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland as an independent sovereign state appears to be the most likely outcome. Though Mogadishu's rhetoric has framed this in extreme terms, it would herald another period of international and internal hesitation over Somaliland's status. From here, Hargeisa and Mogadishu could perhaps be brought into negotiations with concerted international pressure and oversight. But that is where the real work would begin. Over a decade of fruitless talks has led to the crisis today, and with trust at an all-time low, the prospects of sober and productive negotiations are slim.

By the Somali Wire team