Infiltration and 'defectors' in the General Gordon attack
In the early evening of 10 February, after prayers, in Mogadishu's General Gordon military base, a Somali National Army (SNA) recruit opened fire with a PK machine gun on his Emirati trainers, killing three. The recruit was immediately shot dead by his compatriots, but not before four people were left dead, including a Bahraini military officer. Al-Shabaab quickly claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming it was carried out by its 'Inghimasi', 'commando unit,' against the Emirati "apostates."
The incident has thrown up several uncomfortable questions, not least regarding the continued infiltration of Somalia's institutions by Al-Shabaab amidst the withdrawal of thousands of African Union forces. The man responsible for the attack is believed to have defected from Al-Shabaab in 2021 through Somalia's defector programme. Like many other defectors, he had joined the country's security forces before being assigned to the 28th Battalion and receiving military training in Uganda. But to be accepted into the heavily fortified General Gordon base for training, each recruit must provide a guarantor, often a high-ranking politician or military official. That the culprit had seemingly passed through several supposedly complex layers of training and vetting is immensely alarming.
This is not the first time an individual associated with Somalia's defector programme has gone on to commit acts of terror on behalf of Al-Shabaab. Begun in 2014, it has brought significant defections, including former Al-Shaabab leader Mukhtar Robow, among others. But it has also seen accusations of co-opting by the militant group itself, who have used the programme to plant operatives within the security forces. The former National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) head, Fahad Yasin, oversaw a corrosive infiltration and cross-contamination between the intelligence agency and Al-Shabaab. The man formerly responsible for Al-Shabaab's assassinations in the capital was even elevated to the senior levels of the spy agency, and other dubious 'defectors' were placed in other key posts. While the controversial spy chief has since departed, the programme remains contested and in need of significant reform.
Even without Amniyat or Inghimasi operatives within Somalia's security forces, Al-Shabaab has been able to find willing military officials and soldiers to aid them in more complex attacks. In late July 2023, a suicide bomber killed dozens of recruits as they lined up for breakfast at Mogadishu's Jaalle Siyaad Military Academy. Details for how the bomber, clad in a military uniform, was able to infiltrate the supposedly secure military base have not been disclosed. However, 14 military officers were subsequently arrested in connection with the bombing.
More broadly, Saturday's episode encapsulates how deep Al-Shabaab's infiltration of Somalia's state institutions runs. Sleeper cells and operatives are believed to be dotted throughout the country's organs and civic institutions, carrying out a number of tasks. Some collect ship manifests that assist in determining Al-Shabaab's taxes for goods entering Mogadishu and Kismaayo, while others operate within the private sector, such as banks and telecom companies. The scale of Al-Shabaab's penetration is hard to ascertain, but that a 'defector' waited three years before being activated hints at its scale-- and their patient, deliberate approach.
In another example, last week, after months of speculation surrounding his disappearance, the poet and university lecturer Nageye Ali Khalif appeared on Alfurqaan, an Al-Shabaab-affiliated media outlet. The well-known public intellectual professed his allegiance to the jihadist group, claiming to have been sympathetic to Al-Shabaab since 2017. Some have since speculated that he may have been in the employ of the jihadists well before his 'disappearance.'
The shooting also comes against a backdrop of a resurgent anti-Emirati sentiment among elements of Somalia's political class. While MP Abdirahman Abdishakur unequivocally condemned the "terrorist act" and offered his condolences, another MP, Abdullahi Aden Kulane, criticised the presence of Emirati forces in the first place. A close ally of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Fahad Yasin, Kulane remains firmly opposed to any Emirati involvement in Somalia in favour of Qatar. Other social media accounts on X, formerly Twitter, have also celebrated the death of the UAE colonel killed in the attack, Mohamed Mubarak.
Despite the promises that Al-Shabaab is facing defeat and talk of a 'final offensive' by African Union force commanders, the latest attack reveals just how potent the jihadist group remains. As the withdrawal of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces continues, the burden on countries like Turkey, which recently signed a defence pact with Mogadishu, and the UAE to support Somalia's security will likely grow. But there are limits to the scale of support the UAE can and is willing to provide, particularly with the political wind blowing in Doha's direction.
Security reform is needed urgently, with Saturday's attack just the latest in a long line that has seen security forces carrying out or aiding Al-Shabaab's attacks. With these forces set to assume responsibility for the nation's security in the coming months, the need for deeper reform to the country's defector programme and the corruption that allows Al-Shabaab to infiltrate cannot wait.
By the Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Apathy pervades the Djiboutian population. A week tomorrow, on April 10, the country will head to the polls, with President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh seeking a 6th— essentially uncontested — term in office. With his coronation inevitable, his family's dynastic rule over this rentier city-state will be extended once more. But in a region wracked by armed conflict and geopolitical contestation, the ageing Guelleh's capacity to manage the familial, ethnic, and regional fractures within and without grows ever more complicated. And Djibouti's apparent stability is no product of institutional strength, but rather an increasingly fractious balance of external rents and coercive control-- underpinned by geopolitical relevance.
In the 17th century, the Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi penned 'The Gift to the Great on Naval Campaigns', a great tome that analysed the history of Ottoman naval warfare at a moment when Constantinople sought to reclaim maritime supremacy over European powers.
Why have one mega-dam when you can have three more? Details are scarce, but Ethiopia has unveiled plans to build three more dams on the Blue Nile, just a few months after the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was completed.
Villa Somalia has prevailed in Baidoa. After weeks of ratcheting tensions, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen proved a paper tiger this morning, unable to resist the massed forces backed by Mogadishu. After several hours of fighting, Somali National Army (SNA) forces and allied Rahanweyne militias now control most of Baidoa and, thus, the future of South West. In turn, Laftagareen is believed to have retreated to the protection of the Ethiopian military at Baidoa's airport, with the bilateral forces having avoided the conflict today.
Last October, Al-Shabaab Inqimasin (suicide assault infantry) overran a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) base in Mogadishu, freeing several high-ranking jihadist detainees and destroying substantial quantities of intel. A highly choreographed attack, the Inqimasin had disguised their vehicle in official NISA daub, weaving easily through the heavily guarded checkpoints dotting the capital to reach the Godka Jilicow compound before blowing open the gates with a suicide car bomb. In the months since, Al-Shabaab's prodigious media arm-- Al-Kataib Media Foundation-- has drip-fed images and videos drawn from the Godka Jilicow attack, revelling in their infiltration of Mogadishu as well as the dark history of the prison itself. And in a chilling propaganda video broadcast at Eid al-Fitr last week, it was revealed that among the Inqimasin's number was none other than the son of Al-Shabaab's spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage, better known as Ali Dheere.
In early 1987, the commander of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), John Garang, is reported to have issued a radio order, instructing his field officers to gather children to be dispatched to Ethiopia for military training. Garang's command conveyed the rebels' institutionalisation of a well-established practice of child soldiering; a dynamic that has been reproduced by virtually every major armed actor in Sudan-- and later South Sudan-- since independence. Today, as war has continued to ravage and metastasise across Sudan, few communities and children have been left untouched by the ruinous violence.
The Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) did not emerge from a shir (conference) in October 1995 to defend a government, nor to overthrow it. Rather, the militia —whose name was even explicit in its defence of a unified Digil-Mirifle identity —arose from the ruin of Bay and Bakool in the years prior, and decades of structural inequalities.
War has been averted in Tigray-- for now. In early February, tens of thousands of Ethiopian federal soldiers and heavy artillery streamed northwards, readying themselves on the edges of the northernmost region for seemingly imminent conflict.
The battle for South West—and Somalia's political future—continues apace. With the brittle alliance between South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud having broken down spectacularly, the federal government is pouring in arms and forces to oust the Digil-Mirifle leader. Staring down the barrel of the formal opposition holding three Federal Member States and, with it, greater territory, population, and clan, Villa Somalia is looking to exploit intra-Digil-Mirifle grievances—and convince Addis—to keep its monopolistic electoral agenda alive. But this morning, Laftagareen announced a 9-member electoral committee to hastily steer his re-election, bringing the formal bifurcation of the Somali state ever closer.