Somalia's gender-based violence crisis
Last week, three women were killed in Somalia, all reportedly murdered by their husbands. One mother-of-6 was murdered in Mogadishu, while two more women were killed in Lower Shabelle. And on Sunday, 4 February, another man was arrested in Afgooye town carrying gasoline and a matchbox following reports that he was intending to set his family alight. The condemnation of this spate of killings has been widespread, with protests erupting in several places across Somalia. Somalia's MPs have further demanded rapid justice and the arrests of those responsible.
But while the horrors of the past few days have stirred a strong reaction, there remains a tendency to downplay or overlook the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Somalia. It remains a taboo subject -- with the vast majority of SGBV going unreported in Somalia's patriarchal society. Support for women remains extremely limited, particularly regarding legal recourse and healthcare.
Precise data on the scale of SGBV in Somalia is hard to ascertain. But in 2021, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) reported an alarming 80% year-on-year rise in GBV cases in the country. Women and children were the overwhelming victims, making up 93% of those who reported such incidents, with more than 90% of the perpetrators male. Already prevalent violence surged during the COVID-19 pandemic amid a global economic downturn and a punishing drought in Somalia. However, rather than subside, cases have remained shockingly high and actually increased into 2023.
The majority of victims are women and girls sheltering in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Data gathered in 2021 in several IDP camps indicated that 52% had experienced some form of SGBV, particularly physical assault, rape, and other forms of sexual violence. They face specific vulnerabilities in these poorly policed sites, including being forced to travel to access humanitarian aid, firewood, or water. Many are also from marginalised sub-clans without equal access to resources or influence.
SGBV thrives in the kind of social, economic, and political insecurity that has long been prevalent in Somalia. At the end of January 2024, the Somali Disaster Management Agency Commissioner Mohamud Moallim said that of the nearly four million people displaced in Somalia, over 80% are women and children. Yet, too often, women's rights and protection are treated as an afterthought rather than a priority. At times of crisis, initiatives are understandably focused on providing immediate humanitarian aid, such as food and shelter. But inadvertently, establishing these massive IDP camps that may be effective at distributing large quantities of assistance can create unsafe spaces for women and children.
The outcry by Somalia's MPs and other officials is hard to take seriously, considering that the federal parliament has yet to pass the United Nations-backed Sexual Offences Bill from 2018. The bill criminalised rape but was shelved after coming up against stiff opposition. Despite the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) being recognised nearly 12 years ago, there are still no federal laws that explicitly criminalise spousal abuse or assault. And when it comes to traditional justice mechanisms, women can only access it through their male relative, be it a husband, brother, or father. With women not considered 'responsible' in Somalia's patriarchal society, those who do seek legal or traditional recourse independently are stigmatised.
In the rare instances that cases do come to court, prosecutors use the outdated penal code from the 1970s to charge suspects. The code is not strict enough for crimes of sexual violence or domestic abuse, however, and is not fit for purpose in the 21st century. A whole host of sexual offences are not covered in these codes, including marital rape.
While some regions, including Puntland, have passed legislation prohibiting rape, federal initiatives have partly failed because of ingrained social resistance and religious objections. The Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Sadia Yasin Samatar, the highest-ranking elected female politician in Somalia, publicly supported legislation criminalising rape and other sexual offences. But following intense backlash and threats, she was forced to walk back her comments, instead welcoming religious scholars who "have the country's interest at heart" to amend the law. Numerous Somali legislators remain opposed to codifying secular punishments for sexual violence in the belief that it contradicts Sharia law. But with this refusal, victims and survivors have ended up with the worst of both worlds, where the law is unclear and applied unevenly.
Legislative action can only be part of the urgent reform, however. Domestic violence is widespread and tolerated, and women cannot access support to escape from abusive relationships. If the essential legal and social support was in place to protect women, then the tragedies of the last week might have been avoided. Any outrage should be capitalised on and draw further attention to the structural discrimination facing Somali women. If MPs want to see real change, they can begin by reviving the 2018 Sexual Offences Bill and pass comprehensive legislation to start to tackle these entrenched crimes.
By the Somali Wire team
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