Somalia's toxic political discourse
The polarised and toxic political discourse that took place during the tenure of former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo appears to be creeping back. Since the New Year’s Memorandum (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, online debate has been flooded with extreme positions, and rhetoric directed at those viewed as insufficiently patriotic or supportive of Somalia’s ‘unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.’ Constructive criticism and nuance are increasingly perceived as threats to national well-being and the country's supposedly rosy trajectory.
The online polarisation of recent years began to seep into political discourse with the arrival of Farmaajo in Villa Somalia in 2017. His campaign for president had relied heavily on whipping up nationalist fervour amongst youth, to counteract his relatively weak position as leader of the Tayo Political Party. Once in power, Farmaajo retained his social media team and turned to ‘bot farms’ to burnish his administration's image and target his critics. Those supportive of the ruling Nabad and Nolol coalition, the 'CBB's,' an ultra-nationalist online group of commentators, would routinely unleash waves of abuse on those who questioned Farmaajo’s authoritarian tendencies. A term was coined to denote the scale of administration cooptation of the media for its own agenda, 'igu sawir' ('photo opportunity’).
The whipping up of the online mobs was combined with instinctive populist tactics that sought to distract from the important stories. When former Al-Shabaab leader Mukhtar Robow was arrested in December 2018 by Ethiopian forces assigned to the African Union, mass protests broke out in Baidoa. Local police killed over a dozen people, but when the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Nicholas Haysom raised legitimate concerns, he was declared persona non grata. Villa Somalia, aided by CBB supporters, shifted the narrative from co-opting Ethiopian forces to the arrest of a former jihadist, and brutal policing to a story about a UN official undermining Somalia's 'territorial integrity.'
The bruising divisions in Somalia under Farmaajo and the torrents of misinformation and disinformation emanating from the presidential palace took a heavy toll on the country's politics. In that context, the current president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, assumed power, with many hoping he would restore sober and sane politics to Somalia.
During his first term in office, the phrase 'Mogadishu Rising' came to be associated with Hassan Sheikh’s administration, denoting a general feeling that Somalia's trajectory was blindingly bright. There is certainly nothing inherently wrong with a national message that seeks to bring a country along with a positive vision. Indeed, in effectively countering terrorism, ideology must play a central role, as the current administration has realised-- appointing Mukhtar Robow as Minister of Religion in a bid to push back against extremism.
But at some indiscernible moment, amid the constant messaging of victories against Al-Shabaab and photo-ops of senior Somali officials in military garb, the 'Mogadishu Rising' narrative got twisted. Populism appears to be creeping back into Mogadishu, and with it, open debate and meaningful reflection have shut down.
The defeat of two Somali National Army (SNA) brigades in August 2023 in Osweyne that triggered the collapse of the frontline in Galmudug was not met by sober, clear-headed reactions. Rather, it was initially denied, before Villa Somalia was forced to scramble to delay the withdrawal of 3,000 African Union soldiers in the following months. Federal and military officials continue to obfuscate realities on the ground on the battlefields, falsely claiming to have repulsed recent Al-Shabaab attacks in Aad. It is nearly impossible to learn from repeated military setbacks-- such as continuing SNA shortages of food, fuel and ammunition, without analysing when things go wrong.
Genuinely optimistic sentiments have slowly faded in Somalia, as promised deadlines for defeating Al-Shabaab, liberating swathes of the country, and restoring stability have passed quietly by. In their place, a new nationalist tone has emerged, particularly online, as defenders of Villa Somalia seek to brand anyone even vaguely critical of the current administration disloyal. Ethnic Somalis are called 'un-Somali' or treacherous, while foreign commentators are told the situation simply doesn’t concern them. The platitude 'African solutions for African problems' is again wheeled out to deflect criticism, however legitimate.
Nearly all politicians in every culture will seek to burnish their credentials and highlight progress they and their supporters have made. But when this actively undermines an administration's stated ambitions, such as defeating Al-Shabaab, it will come back to haunt them. The promises of Somali security forces assuming responsibility from African Union soldiers in 2024 will come up against the harsh reality that they are simply not prepared to do so. Populist promises may offer a short-term fix when under domestic and international pressure, but they are no substitute for sober, clear-minded politics on which Somalia’s current president built his reputation.
By the Somali Wire team
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