The First Days of Deni’s Second Term
In Puntland, recent animosity during months of intense campaigning for the position of regional president has now largely dissipated. In the immediate aftermath of Said Abdullahi Deni's re-election on 8 January 2024, most former contenders recognised his victory and offered their support for his second 5-year term. Deni, too, has reached out to the defeated candidates, hosting a conciliatory lunch in Garowe's Presidential Palace in mid-January. And former and current Puntland politicians have released a joint statement announcing that they would work together in the interest of the Federal Member State (FMS), a strong signal that, for the first time in many months, Puntland politicians are presenting a generally united front. Typical post-election jockeying, though, remains in full swing as both Deni supporters and those outside his tent seek recompense or an official seat in his second term. This will need to be addressed, as rumours continue that Puntland’s coffers are empty after the costly re-election campaign.
Particularly visible have been the opposition-aligned Araan Jaan militia, also known as ‘Puntland's Danab,'- no affiliation with US-trained special forces. In the days after Deni’s re-election, militia forces decamped to the streets of Garowe. The Araan Jaan remained there until earlier this week, when their leader, Colonel Jim'aale Takar, came to an agreement with Deni, brokered by Puntland Senator Abdirahman Farole. The militia will now be absorbed into Puntland's security forces, with military benefits restored. The resolution of bloody divisions that plagued Puntland for many months is undoubtedly welcome, and will hopefully lessen the potential for sporadic violence as seen in 2023. Other Puntland politicians seeking positions in Deni’s cabinet have been made to wait for an expected reshuffle.
The formation of Deni's cabinet and his administration's subsequent direction will likely become clearer following the Gogol Soomalliyeed ‘Forum for Somalis' meeting in Garowe. Perhaps a snub to Somalia’s National Consultative Council (NCC), from which Deni withdrew over a year ago, the summit will bring together regional leaders as well as federal President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in an attempt to thrash out the constitutional reform deadlock. Deni has been an outspoken critic of the sweeping NCC reforms, and his strengthened position following re-election places him in a solid position to seek significant concessions.
After days of speculation, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud attended Deni's inauguration in Garowe on 25 January, sitting beside him in a public display of reconciliation. But Hassan Sheikh’s speech at the inauguration, which promised finalisation of the Provisional Constitution, and parliamentary passage of procedural changes intended to help pave the way for constitutional amendments, affirmed that the two politicians are still far apart in their vision for Somalia. Other speakers at the inauguration, including former Somalia Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, criticised the NCC proposals and related parliamentary action.
Puntland also faces several immediate dilemmas that this FMS administration may be forced to contend with. The first is a rather sudden surge in piracy along Somalia's coast, amid Houthi rebels' naval blockade of the Red Sea in response to Israel's invasion of Gaza. The rapid destabilisation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, which Puntland straddles, has gone largely unmentioned by Garowe, more concerned with potential internal destabilisation from the traditional regional presidential election and subsequent inauguration. At least three naval vessels in the past month alone are reported to have been seized by Somali pirates, though respective Indian and Seychelles navies have since rescued two.
This instability is also affecting remote and impoverished fishing communities along Puntland's coast, where the hand of the regional government has minimal reach. In addition, Puntland alone and Somalia as a whole have yet to curb unregulated foreign trawling off the coast, which has proven both economically and ecologically devastating. Earlier this week, Bosasso Fishermen's Association Chairman Muse Ali Muse said that around 2,500 fishermen have been forced to abandon their livelihoods in recent months after foreign vessels destroyed their expensive equipment and sometimes fired at them. In fact, many Somali pirates are simply destitute former fishermen and, as Muse warned, others may also turn to a resurgent pirate economy.
Deni's administration is treading another fine line as well, caught between Villa Somalia set on frustrating the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland and close ties to the UAE. But Deni has once again proven himself to be a highly competent operator, as he has navigated many balancing acts in the past. But no matter how competent, the prospects of constitutional change, the MoU, and resurgent pirate activity off the Puntland coast would challenge any politician. For now, after Deni’s smooth re-election, all eyes are on Gogol Soomalliyeed and how relations between Garowe and Mogadishu play out.
By the Somali Wire team
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