Issue No. 641

The Struggles of Somalia-Somaliland Talks

The collapse of yet another round of Somalia-Somaliland talks in Djibouti in late December 2023 came as little surprise. Years of stop-start dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa have remained fraught, with repeated reneging on promises and backsliding on progress made. Even drawing the two to the table is complex, with successive administrations in both capitals aware of the significant domestic political risks. The New Year's controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland to lease a 20km stretch of the Bab el-Mandeb Straight, in exchange for Addis's likely recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state, is in large part a consequence of the 'wait-and-see' attitude of the international community towards the question of Somali unity. The Horn is now mired in yet another preventable crisis it can little afford.
 
Today's crises, both between Addis-Mogadishu and Hargeisa-Mogadishu, partially stem from the far-reaching consequences of the international recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012. This recognition pre-empted any genuine Somali dialogue on the 'unity question' before it had truly begun for several reasons. It tacitly acknowledged Mogadishu's claims to authority over Somaliland, privileging a degree of union rather than divorce. By doing so, it allowed Mogadishu to monopolise international relations with foreign powers and frame Hargeisa as a separatist enclave dominated by the Isaaq rather than as a possible partner for regional peace and stability. Recognition handed Mogadishu leverage to wield de jure sovereignty over Somaliland, ranging from control of airspace to accessing aid and security assistance.
 
Across 10 rounds of negotiations in four countries, Mogadishu has had little incentive to deal with Hargeisa in good faith and compromise its trump cards of sovereignty and juridical recognition. It has done little, if anything to make the prospect of federation or re-unification attractive, nor has it seriously acknowledged the possibility of Somaliland's independence. With juridical recognition in hand, Mogadishu has instead sought to quash any formal negotiations over Somaliland’s demands and strike independence from the table. This has naturally proven deeply unpalatable for Somaliland politicians, who have long considered their polity as irrevocably severed from Somalia. Hargeisa has struggled to frame any Somalia-Somaliland talks as between two sovereign states, with Somaliland's recognised independence as the preferred, if not inevitable, outcome.
 
Somalia-Somaliland relations and the hopes of any prospective negotiations plummeted following the ascension of Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo to power in February 2017. His attempts to centralise power in Mogadishu encompassed Somaliland, co-opting members of Hargeisa’s opposition parties and enlisting the support of foreign governments to Somaliland's disadvantage. During his term, in 2018, Mogadishu rolled back the arrangement that allowed international assistance to be received by Somaliland directly, and in 2019, Somalia assumed control of Somaliland's airspace from the International Civil Aviation Organisation – violating several agreements previously achieved during the course of dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland.
 
The relative weakness of consecutive federal administrations in Somalia has also compromised the potential for successful negotiations. With substantial pan-Somali support in Somalia, any Mogadishu politician runs the risk of political suicide if they open talks with Somaliland's independence on the table. Instead, Somalia's populist politicians have preferred to wield unionist rhetoric rather than countenance unpopular concessions. Others have also worried that any negotiations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa could unbalance the federal system away from the south. It has proven easier to spike negotiations than offer the sweeping demands that any Somaliland leaders would likely seek to begin talks about con-federal association or unity.
 
Somaliland, on the other hand, has faced two disagreeable choices-- negotiate with Mogadishu from a weakened position or continue seeking independence unilterally. Any Somaliland government that moves towards dialogue with the possibility of unification is certain to face a tidal wave of domestic opposition. Subsequently, over the years, the prospects of a breakthrough have also waned as Hargeisa's administration has become less willing to sacrifice political capital with a negotiating partner that is viewed as unreliable.
 
Somaliland now appears to be on the cusp of achieving the sovereign recognition it has long sought. Though Mogadishu has vehemently opposed the controversial MoU, even a handful of states recognising Somaliland would surely alter the prospect of negotiations between the two. Mogadishu, which has recently sought to reframe Somaliland’s independence bid as a bilateral dispute with Ethiopia, would have no choice but to accept substantive dialogue with Hargeisa. Somaliland would be even more set in its position that independence, now with some degree of international recognition, must be on the table in any future negotiations between two sovereign states. Returning Hargeisa and Mogadishu to the table will be an immense challenge, particularly with Somaliland tired of fruitless dialogue and Mogadishu wedded to an empirically abstract notion of ‘sovereignty.’ But positive incentives are still feasible on both sides, and while the prospect of substantive negotiations is unpalatable for many, it is far better than any alternative.​

By the Somali Wire team