The New Pivot to Egypt: Does it Matter?
Somalia and Ethiopia are now engaged in a battle of wills. The raging diplomatic crisis triggered by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa on access to the Red Sea continues to escalate. Both sides have doubled down on their positions; the softening of language in Addis Ababa in recent days does not, in itself, signal a shift. Meanwhile, Mogadishu has remained defiant and in no mood for de-escalation, rebuffing calls for negotiations. Villa Somalia continues to insist that only a full retraction of the MoU can lead to dialogue. And nationalist sentiment abounds as calls for Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Somali soil increase.
Somalia's newer allies have also seized upon the nationalist talking points of territorial sovereignty and hints of war. In the days after the MoU's announcement, Cairo capitalised on the furore to withdraw from stagnant trilateral negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) operations, and to invite Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to Egypt. On 20 January, the Somali president arrived in Cairo in a bid to maximise pressure on Ethiopia and secure vocal support from Addis' perennial frustrator.
In a press conference with the Somali president, his Egyptian counterpart Abdal Fattah el-Sisi offered abundant verbal support, waxing poetic on long ties between Somalia and Egypt while issuing veiled threats to Ethiopia. President Hassan Sheikh was further praised for standing firm in the face of ‘Ethiopian aggression’ and for protecting Somalia's unity and territorial integrity.
Yet despite the charged rhetoric and sabre rattling by el-Sisi, Egypt made no concrete offers of military support. Indeed, prospects of armed conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia are distinctly remote for several reasons. First, Cairo is preoccupied with the humanitarian and political crisis in Gaza on its eastern border. Over a million Palestinians are crowded onto the strip of land that connects Gaza to Egypt, known as the Philadephie Route, with Egypt reluctant to admit them. Domestic unrest over the indiscriminate bombing of Gaza continues to grow as Cairo attempts to balance close ties with Israel with public opinion. To the south of the country, Egpyt's allies, the Sudanese Armed Forces, are on the back foot, having lost swathes of central Sudan to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in recent weeks. Spiralling inflation is also contributing to overall uneasiness that has consumed Egypt in recent months.
El-Sisi is no deluded autocrat; he is well aware that Egypt's military lacks the capacity to fight any long-range war on foreign soil. While it has a significant army, with over 300,000 personnel, and it is relatively better equipped than Ethiopia, it lacks long-range expeditionary capabilities. Finally, Egypt is the third-largest recipient of US military aid; only Israel and Ukraine receive more. Any substantial military intervention in Somalia or Somaliland would surely require US backing, which is very unlikely considering US statements on the MoU row. El-Sisi's bellicose rhetoric was a low-cost, effective way to appease Mogadishu and increase pressure on Addis.
Addis' public response to Cairo's sabre-rattling was largely muted, if frustrated. Ethiopia's National Security Advisor, Redwan Hussein, deliberately avoided any reference to Egypt in a series of comments on X, formerly Twitter, made while President Hassan Sheikh was in Cairo. He did, however, fault Mogadishu for its "statements, posturing and rhetoric that unnecessarily ratchet up tension."
El-Sisi's rhetoric falls firmly into Egypt's traditional counter-Addis policy, which relies almost exclusively on 'encirclement,' seeking military cooperation and engagement with Ethiopia's neighbouring states. Since the New Year alone, Cairo has signed a new military cooperation treaty with South Sudan and dispatched its Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry to Asmara. The South Sudan-Egypt agreement and similar pacts are largely symbolic in nature, primarily focused on military training and little else.
The Egyptian-Eritrean relationship, on the other hand, has rapidly grown closer in recent months, amid escalating conflict in Sudan and Ethiopia's desire for Red Sea access. While their relations have been prone to periodic setbacks and instability, Cairo and Asmara's current interest in denying Ethiopia sea access aligns.
Not all nations are neatly falling into the Somalia camp, however. This week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud travelled from Cairo to the Gulf to continue seeking international opposition to the MoU. His visit to Qatar was unsurprising considering Villa Somalia prioritising the wealthy Gulf state in recent months, though former Somali President Farmaajo appeared there at the same time. Saudi Arabia, an increasingly important ally of Egypt, has only offered a boilerplate statement about protecting Somalia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. With vast commercial and agricultural interests in Ethiopia, Riyadh is seemingly disinclined to spike its relations with Addis. The UAE, meanwhile, remains a close ally of both Ethiopia and Somaliland and is likely to prioritise these relations over its complicated ties with Somalia.
Ethiopia's population, abundant water resources, and agricultural potential often trump sentiments of brotherly affinity with Somalia for interested governments. Considering these interests alongside the normative Arab framework of upholding Somalia's unity and territorial sovereignty is a fine balancing act. If Egypt veers too far and heads into a direct or proxy conflict with Ethiopia, it will likely harm its relations with Gulf states with interests in Ethiopia.
Many Somalis like the symbolism of a powerful Arab state coming to their aid, but opinion is likely to change if Egypt deploys troops to Somalia, as some have called for. Housing Ethiopian and Egyptian forces in Somalia simultaneously would surely be a recipe for disaster. So far, we remain in the realm of threats, rhetoric and symbolism. Let’s hope we stay there.
By the Somali Wire team
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