Can the International Community assist Somalia in meeting its 5 greatest challenges?
Since his inauguration, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Somali federal government have been praised—and rightfully so—by international partners for several significant accomplishments. In 2023 alone, Mogadishu secured Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) status, was invited into the East African Community, held an international security conference in New York, and saw the conclusion of the long-standing UN arms embargo on Somalia. Certainly, these successes must be well acknowledged. But the greatest challenges still facing Somalia are yet to be proven domitable.
First is the pernicious presence and influence of Al-Shabaab (AS) jihadists across most of South Central Somalia. Despite the enormous efforts of the federal administration to dislodge AS from central Somalia, including President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's decamping to the frontlines, progress has largely stalled since early 2023. This is in no small part due to the collapse of 'Operation Black Lion,' the much-heralded arrival of Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Djiboutian forces to support Somali National Army (SNA) operations. Nevertheless, with African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces fully withdrawing in 2024 and Somali forces poised to assume full responsibility for the country's security for the first time in years, an opportunity for security sector reform presents itself, if AS does not fill the vacuum. But to realise these aspirations, far more support for institution-building and military planning will be needed from Somalia's neighbours and the wider international community. Continued support for Villa Somalia's prioritisation of inclusive politics and Islamic moderation as a counter weight to the militancy of Al-Shabaab and Da'esh is also necessary. And a plan for additional foreign troops as part of more than a post-ATMIS guard force, including holding forces, will have to be developed.
A second area where Somalia's international partners might support the federal government is the development of the National Consultative Council (NCC) proposals put forward in May 2023. The scope of the proposals has triggered significant debate, so much so that they are still yet to be tabled in the federal parliament. They contain some important reforms, not least a transition to one-person, one-vote (OPOV) elections, a long-held aspiration for many Somalis, and an effort to synchronise the timing of state-level presidential elections. But these proposals are so important they can't and shouldn't be rushed and have inadvertently become a challenge to the federal government, rather than the success they could ultimately be. Could the international community provide Mogadishu with more nuanced assistance in clarifying, carrying out, and finally completing the still provisional Constitution?
Third, the federal project has been suffering blow after blow. Since Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni removed the Federal Member State from the NCC in January 2023, Somalia has been left a confederal rather than a federal state and fundamentally incomplete. With Puntland's self-imposed exile stretching into its second year and Deni having won re-election by a significant margin on 8 January, there is little sign of the federal project regaining its footing in the coming months. Meanwhile, Villa Somalia also faces challenges in Jubaland and South West State, where regional leaders have significant political aspirations, as well as imminent, likely contested, elections in Galmudug.
Fourth, perhaps with the largest overall impact on Somalia's population, is the devastating consequences of climate change across much of the country. Extreme drought veering to extreme flooding has displaced millions internally, uprooting entire communities seeking to secure their lives and livelihoods. While President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has raised the disproportionate burden of climate change on the international stage and prioritised domestic response through several key appointments, Somalia still lacks the capacity to deal with these monumental humanitarian crises alone.
Fifth, the recent Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland has stirred up a great deal of ill will, distracting critical attention from Somalia's pressing domestic challenges. Could a small group of creative and committed international partners—who can see and understand both sides of the Mogadishu-Hargeisa divide—still facilitate respectful dialogue instead of verbal attacks? Drawing Ethiopia and Somalia back from the brink should surely be the priority of Mogadishu's foreign backers.
It is not for lack of trying that the current federal government of Somalia has continued to struggle. Its noted successes are evidence of its efforts. What has been most lacking is coordinated, evidence-based planning, and military and development assistance on the part of the international community in the Horn of Africa. It behoves all of us as international partners to stop reacting and start planning the best means to support a secure, prosperous Somalia, within the context of a region long fraught with political and armed strife.
By the Somali Wire team
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