Galmudug elections gather steam
Amid the bellicose rhetoric of some senior Somali politicians, preparations for presidential elections in Galmudug continue apace. To date, four candidates are preparing to throw their hats into the ring-- incumbent Ahmed Abdi Karie' QoorQoor,' Mohamed Aden Kofi, Liban Ahmed Hassan, aka Liban Shuluq, and the current Director-General of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), Mahad Salad.
The likely competitive Galmudug election will test the unofficial pact to rotate the regional presidency between the dominant Hawiye/ Habar Gidir/ Sa'ad, Suleiman, and Ayr sub-clans. Ayr, to which Mahad Salad belongs, is the next sub-clan in this pact. Salad is expected to resign as NISA director-general this week to begin publicly campaigning for the presidency. Behind closed doors, he has been positioning himself for the position for several months after decamping to Dhusamareb in August 2023 for several weeks. Like his predecessors, the NISA director has heavily recruited from his sub-clan, the Ayr, building up a force of several hundred men in Galmudug, largely based near Gaalka'yo. Though these NISA recruits have made little discernible impact on the battlefield, they have badly riled QoorQoor. Relations between QoorQoor and Salad broke down entirely following a failed assassination attempt on the Galmudug president in early November 2023, triggering accusations that the NISA director had prior knowledge of the plot. The NISA director has largely avoided Dhusamareb since.
Aware of the strength of his competition, in an apparent bid to secure re-election, QoorQoor has moved the site of the traditional vote from the regional capital of Dhusamareb to Adaado. Forces loyal to QoorQoor have moved into Adaado in recent days, ahead of the expected election. Elected under dubious circumstances in February 2020 with the backing of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, QoorQoor is not looking to take any chances against a strong field.
Unlike Puntland's presidential election, Galmudug's election carries less weight for the Federal Member State (FMS), and for the country. Mogadishu still plays an out-sized role in Galmudug, as witnessed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's presence in the regional capital for several months in 2023. QoorQoor was essentially relegated to bit-player as federal and regional politicians travelled to the frontlines to meet with Somalia's president. More broadly, Galmudug depends heavily on the federal government for budgetary support and security assistance; it has no independent Darawiish forces to speak of. However, while its election might not tip the balance of FGS-FMS relations or affect the constitutional framework, it should not be dismissed for several reasons.
First, it has significant implications for the dormant constitutional and related changes proposed by the National Consultative Council (NCC) in May 2023. QoorQoor has actively campaigned for these proposals, travelling to Mogadishu in November to rally parliamentary support to 're-centralise' the country's political architecture, and transition Somalia to a one-person, one-vote (OPOV) system. But after weeks of speculation that President Hassan Sheikh would table the NCC proposals in parliament, they appear to have lost steam. The relevant parliamentary oversight committee is reportedly reviewing the proposals, which have been essentially on hold, until the political picture between Mogadishu and Puntland clears or Villa Somalia can drum up sufficient support, potentially on the back of its diplomatic spat with Ethiopia.
Galmudug's importance also lies in the large number of federal MPs representing the FMS in Mogadishu. During federal elections, the regional president, QoorQoor or otherwise, has been able to help sway these MPs for their preferred candidate.
While far less polarised than Puntland, Galmudug's elections might strike another blow to Villa Somalia's constitutional ambitions, particularly if Salad is not elected. Mogadishu was caught unaware by the re-election of Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni, as it was under the impression that significant funds and backing to competing candidates would carry the day. In Galmudug, Salad is expected to be the sole candidate of Damul Jadiid, the influential Muslim Brotherhood faction in Somalia to which President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud belongs. The Nabad and Nolol coalition, led by former President Farmaajo, has not yet thrown its weight behind any particular candidate, though it is believed to be weighing up support for Liban Shuluq. QoorQoor, though, remains a wily political operator who, having been a close ally of Farmaajo's, has since become an ally of the HSM administration.
Holding a traditional vote in Galmudug in the coming weeks rather than in November 2024 would further tarnish the NCC proposals. It would contradict the unrealistic OPOV electoral timetable, which would see regional presidential votes conducted towards the end of the year. One of the key justifications of the NCC proposals was aligning FMS presidential elections, but with Puntland already having held a vote on 8 January, and now Galmudug elections moving forward, the rationale for delaying elections in South West State, Jubaland, and Hirshabelle is waning. Though internal opposition pressure on Jubaland President Ahmed 'Madoobe' to move elections forward has eased somewhat, the opposition from South West State has continued to meet in Nairobi in anticipation of SWS elections.
Since Puntland has excluded itself from the drafting of massive constitutional change, much of the fate of the NCC proposals ironically rests with Deni. His re-election has strengthened his hand, and he now commands support from most of Puntland's political elite. Deni appears intent on wielding this position to force significant concessions from Villa Somalia. A public statement from the Puntland administration just days after the election warned Mogadishu not to pursue unilateral change without the finalisation of the Provisional Constitution. His inauguration, scheduled for 23 January, will likely provide greater insight into Deni's position towards the NCC proposals, Villa Somalia, and also the Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding.
Transition to an OPOV electoral model was hoped to end back-room manoeuvring and political interference in regional elections. But just three weeks into 2024, Puntland and Galmudug both appear set on elections that will likely lead to a national tussle over the fate of Somalia's Constitution after once again playing out behind closed doors. The limbo that Somalia finds itself in, masked by ongoing diplomatic spats, cannot last forever, as the unachievable NCC timeline continues to ebb away.
By the Somali Wire team
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