Somaliland's Energy Transition
Today's editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Abdusamed Artan.
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Despite significant strides in development, Somaliland's energy infrastructure and consumption remain deeply constrained. Without a reliable power infrastructure, communities primarily rely on traditional forms of energy, mainly burning charcoal and wood for light and heat. But these unsustainable fuel sources, while cheap, come with high environmental and health costs. Driven by tree felling for charcoal production, accelerating desertification in Somaliland and Ethiopia, where much of Somaliland's charcoal originates from, poses a clear danger on several fronts, not least accentuating the impacts of an increasingly extreme climate.
Late colonisation-era technology provided Somaliland's previous power grid systems, but most were destroyed during the Somali Civil War. The few generators available post-civil war supplied enough power to build up local, informal grids and, in turn, purchase more generators to increase electricity distribution to the population. But only a small group, typically affluent urban residents, can afford to purchase diesel-powered energy from nearby generators.
Somaliland's energy transition faces several major challenges. Most significant is the lack of qualified personnel at all levels, limited energy infrastructure, and minimal government participation. Historic clan dynamics and tensions also hinder Somaliland's energy development. While they typically do not restrict personnel movement, communities understandably want a say in their area's infrastructure projects. When outside companies fail to consult with clans before developing infrastructure, it often fails to reflect community needs.
Meanwhile, virtually all materials for building, scaling, and maintaining Somaliland's energy needs must be imported. And with its natural resources not fully surveyed, energy sources will need to be imported in the immediate future. This problem is further compounded when considering that few ports can serve as import hubs, with Berbera port the major exception.
Past foreign intervention has repeatedly prioritised donor objectives over those of Somalilanders. International investment has failed to break the private monopoly on the energy market, which has stunted fresh investment. Private control of transmission lines into major urban areas has limited the ability of energy companies to lay new lines to respond to Somaliland's growing energy demands. According to the Somaliland government, the expansion of the energy sector has also been constrained by inadequate financing. A handful of grants, loans, and technical assistance from the World Bank, USAID, European Union, and EU/United Nations Industrial Development Organisation currently provide some support for energy in Somalia. Still, it is unclear how this funding specifically affects energy development in Somaliland.
While other forms of fuel, such as kerosene, require import, charcoal is relatively cheap but comes at a steep environmental price. Charcoal producers fell an estimated 8 million trees annually for Somaliland's charcoal use, not including the firewood rural families use. And despite the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2036 banning charcoal export from Somalia, current estimates indicate that up to 40,000 tonnes of charcoal are illegally exported every year.
Nearly all households use some amount of firewood, regardless of whether they are rural or urban. Only 17% of households purchase firewood from vendors, as most families collect their own firewood to save money. Both charcoal and firewood have severe health impacts from indoor air pollution, particularly on women who are also burdened with collecting charcoal and firewood.
Another challenge facing Somaliland's energy transition stems from familiarity with charcoal and firewood use. Neighbouring Djibouti, however, offers a valuable model for adopting kerosene stoves since over 90% of the country uses them for cooking. The shared border could allow for cross-cultural pollination of kerosene use, perhaps through a public information campaign to educate communities about their benefits. Kerosene poses another set of health hazards, though, including potential poisoning if consumed. And despite the Somaliland government's encouragement, kerosene remains little used. When surveyed, households cite perceived dangers, perceived unhealthiness, and the expense of both kerosene and stoves to explain their reluctance to transition.
Moreover, replacing charcoal with kerosene would take around 500 litres per tonne of charcoal. If the estimated 8 million trees cut for charcoal each year were immediately replaced with kerosene, Somaliland would need to import around 175,00 tonnes. Without tax incentives, it would place an even greater financial burden on households for energy, even before accounting for transport and storage costs for remote areas.
Leaving aside the major diplomatic row it has triggered, the recent Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland over sea access might yet offer investment in the latter's renewable energy infrastructure. Current estimates from Somaliland's Ministry of Energy suggest that roughly 1/3 of charcoal sold in Hargeisa originates in Ethiopia; by investing in sustainable energy, Addis could burnish its renewable credentials and lessen the trade deficit between Somaliland and Ethiopia.
Renewable energy offers a more attractive alternative to Somaliland's energy requirements, particularly with its massive wind and solar potential. Over 50% of Somaliland has consistent 6-meters per second or higher wind speeds, just below what qualifies as a low-cost region for energy. Wind turbines installed near Hargeisa, Boroma, and Burao to pump water have dramatically lowered agricultural costs, far cheaper than the previous diesel generator model.
Somaliland also has exceptional solar and photovoltaic (PV) potential, with more than 310 sunny days a year and a potential energy range from 5 to 7 kilowatt-hours per square meter. Sicily, one of Europe's best solar energy zones, can only boast up to 150 days of sunshine annually. Even with the power provider costs of generation, maintenance, and profits, overall energy expenses should drop with renewable energy investment.
Implementing renewable energy smart microgrids is clearly the fastest and most cost-effective step to solving Somaliland's energy shortage. They offer small-scale projects that can be implemented quickly and provide rapid results. Remote communities worldwide are finding them more effective, faster, and affordable than traditional grid networks, which require massive infrastructure investment and maintenance. Solar panels and wind turbines are increasingly connected to smart microgrids, with diesel generators serving as backup.
Smart microgrids have the added benefit of accounting for future community expansion. As cities and energy infrastructure expand, microgrids can easily hook up to each other or macrogrids – offering immediate power and future scalability. These small grids further offer community control and a sense of ownership over resources, energy empowerment, and manoeuvrability to changing needs. Somaliland's renewable credentials have immense potential but require investment and support to realise them. The sooner the transition can begin, the better, particularly in our ever-warming world.
Abdusamed Artan is a lecturer at the Engineering Department at the University of Nairobi. He has worked in the worked in the energy sector for over 10 years.
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