Operations resume in central Somalia
Phase I is back underway. Military operations, largely dormant in the last quarter of 2023, have re-started with the continued goal of clearing Al-Shabaab from central Somalia. From mid-December, Somali National Army (SNA) units, along with elite Danab and re-constituted Gorgor forces, have targeted the militant group's control of rural areas in Mudug and Lower Shabelle. The anticipated resumption, however, has been almost entirely overshadowed by the ongoing diplomatic row between Somalia and Ethiopia.
The offensive stalled in late August 2023 following the overrunning of two SNA units in Osweyne that triggered withdrawals from several key towns in central Somalia. The federal government subsequently requested an immediate delay in the withdrawal of 3,000 African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) soldiers in September. Torrential rains during Somalia's 'deyr' season further limited the offensive capabilities of the SNA in late 2023, particularly in the flooded Juba and Shabelle valleys. The 'technical pause' and the ATMIS draw-down delay were largely intended to facilitate the development of a centralised operational plan, consolidate the SNA's tenuous hold on liberated areas, and prioritise clan engagement. Though the latter has seen some successes following the appointment of Ali Osman Jeyte as the 'ma'awiisley' co-ordinator, a broader operational plan has been missing for months.
The renewed operations have yielded both successes and challenges for the SNA. In southern Galgaduud, federal forces briefly captured the strategic village of Masagaway, previously seized in May 2023. But Al-Shabaab claimed to have quickly retaken Masagaway, preventing SNA units from pressing on towards El Dheer. Meanwhile, in southern Mudug, SNA and allied clan militia have sought to advance from Wisil and Ba'adweyne, clearing some rural areas and small villages of Al-Shabaab forces.
Al-Shabaab has put up stiff resistance, aware of the consequences of losing Mudug for its hold on central Somalia. Rather than allowing the SNA to advance before striking their exposed positions as in August 2023, the militant group has appeared more reticent to cede territory. Fierce clashes have resulted in heavy casualties for the SNA, including the death of Gorgor 18th Battalion Commander, Major Abdi Mohamed Sulnuuge, near Aad town in Mudug in early January. Al-Shabaab has also struck government forces, ambushing a convoy carrying a National Intelligence and Security Agency commander, Osman Hassan Abdi, in Lower Shabelle.
The next day, in a tragic misstep, a UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) helicopter was forced to make an emergency landing in rural Al-Shabaab-held territory. A brief firefight saw at least one person killed and several others, a mixture of Somali and foreign nationals, abducted by militants. The helicopter was also reportedly carrying supplies being transported to Wisil, now in the hands of Al-Shabaab. An attempt to free the hostages is ongoing, but the loss of a crucial medivac helicopter and personnel are painful.
Al-Shabaab has suffered notable personnel losses as well. In December, the federal government announced the death of the Al-Shabaab leader Moalim Ayman, known for his command of a Jaysh Ayman unit responsible for the 2020 Manda Bay attack that killed a US soldier and two contractors. An increase in airstrikes conducted by Somalia's international partners, including the US, is further providing critical support to the SNA's advances.
The renewed offensive comes amid continued talk of a reshuffle of key defence posts by Villa Somalia. Reports had suggested that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud would shake up his cabinet following the major conference on Somalia's security in New York in mid-December. But it appears to have been delayed, again, by the diplomatic fallout from the Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding over port access on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Mogadishu may also have been waiting for the results of the Puntland presidential election, decisively won by Said Abdullahi Deni on Monday.
Deni's strengthened hand in the negotiations that are likely to follow between Puntland and the federal administration may force major concessions from Villa Somalia, including over the makeup of the country's military leadership. Constant rumour and talk of a reshuffle have proven corrosive, particularly with trust in senior military leadership still low within the SNA rank-and-file. Phase I resumed in December without a clear offensive plan, still absent despite several months of frontline stasis. Re-starting operations without stabilisation plans was perhaps foolhardy, considering the sudden collapse of the frontline in Galmudug in August.
This may have begun to change, however, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's visit to the SNA headquarters on Wednesday. Several senior military officials, including the SNA Chief Major-General Ibrahim Sheikh Muhudin, reportedly presented the president with more detailed plans for clearing Al-Shabaab from South-Central Somalia. While details of these plans are still scarce, effective stabilisation will certainly be the key to pushing on into South West State and Jubaland in the coming months. While the SNA has proven capable of seizing territory, particularly when working with allied clan militia, its capacity to hold liberated areas, such as Masagaway, has remained limited.
Retaining cleared territory may also be complicated by the SNA's apparent decision to prioritise dislodging Al-Shabaab from rural areas rather than the key towns it controls in Mudug, such as Eel Buur. Nevertheless, the southern Mudug axis presents an opportunity to retake much of the territory lost in August and September 2023 if the sequencing can be clarified and operational tempo can be maintained.
Though it is early days and the wider political fallout from the Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU cannot yet be fully assessed, there is legitimate cause for alarm over its impact on operations for several reasons. First, it offers Al-Shabaab opportunities to exploit its historical manipulation of pan-Somali rhetoric. Second, the several thousand Ethiopian National Defence Force soldiers serve as crucial 'holding forces,' particularly in South West State. With Somalia facing a growing personnel vacuum due to the ongoing African Union Transition Mission in Somalia draw-down, any withdrawal of experienced forces would stretch the SNA further.
Villa Somalia should not lose sight of its military ambitions in 2023 amid the frenzy of public opinion. There are real gains to be claimed in central Somalia if the SNA can align its sequencing and stabilisation plans effectively with support from clan militia and international partners. But the sooner it can clarify these, as well as any potential senior reshuffle, the better-insulated operations can be from the current maelstrom of Somali politics.
By the Somali Wire team
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