Issue No 630

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Ethiopia and Somaliland: The Risks and Opportunities

On New Year’s Day, Ethiopia and Somaliland initialled a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that would allow the landlocked Horn state to build a military outpost and a commercial port on the Somaliland coast. Somalia termed this illegal and an “act of aggression” and recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa. The row has now deepened Somali anger and nationalistic fervour, and relations between Addis and Mogadishu have plummeted to an all-time low. In a speech at an emergency session of parliament, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud warned that Al-Shabaab would exploit the deal to radicalise and recruit, as it did in 2006 when Ethiopia invaded Somalia to dislodge the Union of Islamic Courts.

The full content of the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland has not yet been disclosed, so there is still ambiguity surrounding the document. But under the terms of the provisional agreement, as officially reported, Ethiopia will lease a 20-km strip along Somaliland’s coast for military basing and, quite possibly, commercial purposes. In return, Somaliland would be given a stake in Ethiopian Airlines; the exact percentage was not divulged. 

Though the MoU makes no direct reference to formal recognition of Somaliland, at a news conference following the signing ceremony, Somaliland President Muse Bihi Ahmed, flanked by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, said Ethiopia would recognise Somaliland. He also said the lease granted to Ethiopia would last 50 years.

Speaking a day after the accord, Redwan Hussein, Ethiopia’s powerful National Security Advisor, declined to comment on the issue of recognition, but promised that more content from the MoU would be made available to the media in the coming days. He also added a twist – that Somaliland may be granted a stake in the Ethiopian firm EthioTel, and not necessarily in Ethiopian Airlines. The same day, Ethiopia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Misganu Arga, was quoted by the BBC as confirming his government’s intention to recognise Somaliland.

PM Abiy is certainly not risk adverse and is likely calculating that Ethiopia can withstand regional and international fall-out regarding the MOU in the long-term, and that its benefits outweigh its risks. But his gamble on Somaliland could become complicated. The scale of the backlash in Somalia and initial boilerplate criticism from the European Union may discourage him from moving briskly on recognition. 

In Somaliland, the MOU has been warmly welcomed; excited crowds took to the streets on 2 January in a spontaneous show of support for the government. Muse Bihi likely views the deal as a ticket to re-election. But there are multiple complications. According to informed sources, one possible site identified for leasing is Bulaxaar in Lughaya District in the Awdal Region, a restive part of Somaliland. The area had previously been scouted by the Egyptians in 2019. Awdal is predominantly inhabited by the Gadabursi, a non-Isaaq clan that has unstable relationship with Hargeisa, and the Habr Awal, Muse Bihi’s sub-clan. It is conceivable that the MOU could surge discontent and roil politics in Awdal.

Addis Ababa likely views the MOU as a strategic victory commensurate with its global importance; Ethiopia has just become a member of the influential BRICS group of nations and could now gain a foothold on the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait, through which nearly 12% of world trade transits. Abiy and his strategists may wish to use this future outpost to rebuild Ethiopia’s navy, along with its ‘blue water’ capabilities. This could also be a way of increasing Addis’ regional leverage and strengthening its bargaining power with Gulf countries – as well as its perennial rival, Egypt. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the driving logic behind the deal is largely framed in terms of strategic security.

For much of the last year, officials in Addis have been grumbling about growing Egyptian influence in Somalia. Reports of an emerging security and military partnership between Cairo and Mogadishu have gathered apace; the latest are claims that Egypt is establishing an airbase in the Middle Shabelle Region to rebuild the defunct Somali Air Force. Ethiopian policy in relation to the Red Sea has primarily been driven by a sense of vulnerability, and apprehension about perceived Egyptian ‘encirclement.’ Yesterday evening, Somali President Hassan Sheikh reached out to Egypt to appeal for its support. Claims that the UAE may have helped to facilitate the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU could also contribute to potentially destabilising geopolitical competition in the Horn. 

Mogadishu appears furious at the deal, and nationalist forces seem keen to capitalise on the ferment. But since there is little Somalia can do to obstruct the MOU beyond diplomatic posturing, it is possible that the UAE – with unique access to and leverage with all parties to the current dispute – may calm tensions and suggest a modus vivendi for everyone.

Somaliland is wearied by serial talks with Somalia; a dozen previous rounds of talks have yielded a series of stillborn agreements, dishonoured by Mogadishu. Hargeisa now sees formal bilateral state recognition as the only viable route to achieve its goals. If Mogadishu truly wants Hargeysa to return to political dialogue, then it will need to offer a genuine political pathway to determination of Somaliland’s final status. But for now, at least, Villa Somalia seems inclined towards jingoism and histrionics. It is to be fervently hoped that cooler heads will prevail.

By the Somali Wire team