The Arms Embargo is Lifted, but Somalia's Sanctions Regime Still Matters
Earlier this month, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted to lift the "general and complete arms embargo" that it had imposed on Somalia more than 31 years earlier. Somalia's federal government has long feted the moment, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) quickly declaring that his government is "now free to purchase any weapons needed," and that "friendly nations and allies" can now "provide us with the necessary weapons without any limitations or restrictions." But lifting the arms embargo represents a concession to Somali national pride rather than a concrete contribution to peace and security. While the arrival of coveted heavy weaponry from donors may be imminent, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) should embrace the remaining features of the UN sanctions regime and weaponise them in its war against Al-Shabaab.
According to Somalia's leaders, the lifting of the arms embargo will assist Somalia in strengthening its capacity to the point that it can assume full responsibility for domestic security by 2024's end, in time for the departure of the African Union security mission that has been operating in the country since 2007. For the better part of a decade, Mogadishu has aggressively lobbied international partners with the argument that even the term "arms embargo" carried a stigma that hampered its efforts to modernise its armed forces. UNSC resolution 2714(2023) therefore obligingly emphasises "for the avoidance of doubt, that there is no arms embargo on the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia."
In practice, there is no prima facie reason to believe that lifting the embargo will lead to any appreciable improvement of Somalia's security forces. The FGS has been able to purchase and receive foreign arms and ammunition since the 'partial lift' of the arms embargo in 2013. But the government has limited funds to procure new arms or equipment-- almost two-thirds of the recently passed one-billion-dollar budget is financed by foreign assistance. And the ineffectiveness of the Somali security establishment has much more to do with command and control, erratic payment of wages, shoddy logistics, and the lack of a coherent strategy than the need for fancy new arms and equipment. Rumours of Egypt building an air base for Somalia abound, but there should be no delusion that this could decisively tip the war.
Notwithstanding the removal of the complete arms embargo, Somalia still needs the UN sanctions regime, the most important elements of which remain intact. Since the passage of UNSC resolution 1844(2008), the focus of sanctions has been extended to the targeting of any actors or entities that pose a threat to security and stability in Somalia – most notably Al-Shabaab. In this month's resolution 2713(2023), the UNSC underscores the Council's intention to assist Somalia in curbing the jihadists' access to arms and illicit trade, degrade its use of improvised explosive devices, and disrupt its financing and networks.
A key component of sanctions enforcement involves referring those that threaten peace and security to the UNSC for possible listing. This expanded scope has enabled international investigations, not only of terrorists, but also of pirates, war profiteers, violators of human rights and international humanitarian law, and even egregiously corrupt federal officials. These can result in the imposition of targeted measures, including an assets freeze, a travel ban, and a specific arms embargo.
In the past, the task of proposing designations was left to a UN monitoring team and permanent UNSC members, with Somali authorities exhibiting studied indifference. In 2016-17, IGAD Member States, including Somalia, briefly adopted a more proactive approach, reporting directly to the UNSC instead of relying on the UN Panel of Experts. But this initiative was abandoned by the Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo administration, which instead favoured clandestine engagement with Al-Shabaab. Today, considering HSM's renewed determination to tackle Al-Shabaab's embedded insurgency, targeted sanctions represent an indispensable weapon in Villa Somalia's arsenal.
The UN sanctions regime also assigns significant reporting requirements to the FGS. These include "a description of Somalia's security and police institutions, and the status of regional and militia forces, as well as the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, and any capacity building requirements in this regard." Somali National Army arms and bullets routinely end up on the open market, and the vast majority of weapons in Somalia remain unregistered.
Resolutions 2713 and 2714 place special emphasis on weapons and ammunition management systems, reflecting the UNSC's concern that government arms and equipment could end up in unauthorised hands. Similar weight is also given to the need for investigations and actions to counter the financing of terrorism. Based on past experience, the FGS may be tempted to shrug off such obligations as onerous and unnecessary instead of incorporating them in a whole of government approach to security and stabilisation.
Despite triumphalist bluster, the war against Al-Shabaab is badly flagging. In September, chaotic setbacks in the development and deployment of Somali security forces prompted a 3-month pause in the draw-down of 3,000 African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) soldiers. The mission is still scheduled to fully withdraw by the end of 2024 – barely a year before Somalia is supposed to conduct its first multi-party, country-wide elections in decades. An ambitious security conference in New York last week has done little to boost international confidence that the FGS will be ready to assume responsibility for Somalia's security any time soon. Proposals are already being mooted for a "post-ATMIS" international security force to secure major towns and installations – although this would in no way guarantee sufficient security for high-stakes one-person, one-vote elections.
Restoring peace and security to Somalia is a vast and complex undertaking, of which the UN sanctions regime is just one small part. But sanctions provide the FGS and its allies with extraordinary and extraterritorial means to combat Al-Shabaab on a regional and global scale – especially where the militant group's financial, logistical, and ideological networks may be vulnerable. While attempts last year to target Al-Shabaab's well-established financial systems and amassed wealth stalled, the sanctions regime offers an opportunity to restart its previous ambitions.
At this precarious phase in Somalia's recovery, and with the ATMIS withdrawal already underway, the FGS can ill-afford to dismiss any of the tools at its disposal. With the ambit of the arms embargo now resolved, Villa Somalia should take ownership of the remaining elements of the sanctions regime and deploy them against Al-Shabaab and those who would seek to undermine Somalia.
By the Somali Wire team
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