Issue No 628

China in Somalia: A Panda or Dragon?

This week, the Chinese Embassy in Somalia marked 63 years of continued Sino-Somali relations, and with it came a flurry of expansive rhetoric about the longevity of their bilateral relationship. The Chinese Embassy in Somalia proclaimed that ties between the two nations, "which date back to 1,000 years, will endure for 1,000 more." There is certainly a long historical connection between Chinese and Somali communities dating back to the maritime Silk Road, but the Embassy's comments conveniently forget recent years of non-engagement between the two nations.  

Beijing's blitz of media messaging, increased humanitarian aid, and the growing educational, cultural, and sporting links with Somalia have elicited mixed commentaries and speculation. Leaving the Embassy's hyperbole aside, the re-engagement of a leading major global power with Somalia is certainly worthy of attention.

Despite domestic economic troubles and the waning of the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese geopolitical and financial interest in the Horn of Africa remains strong. Chinese mining companies are now the only foreign extractors in Eritrea, replacing the Canadian presence to exploit the secretive country's vast potash mines. Djibouti was the site of China's first overseas naval base, and senior Beijing officials have repeatedly courted Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. 

Engagement with a country wracked by political instability and armed conflict is not the typical modus operandi of China. But Somalia's position on the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden elevates its importance for the Asian nation. In 1964, Premier Zhou En Lai visited Somalia on his maiden tour of Africa, partly in recognition of Somalia's geostrategic significance. Maintaining a toehold in Somalia and the littoral states of the Red Sea is, from Beijing's perspective, essential to project power and protect its diverse interests. 

During the Cold War, China built strategic ties with Somalia and contributed to developing the country's nascent infrastructure. Chinese labourers built many arterial roads and bridges that have since fallen into disrepair. The National Stadium in Mogadishu and the Banaadir Hospital are just some of the developmental legacies of the early Sino-Somali cooperation. But, following the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, the relationship fell away. 

Like much of the world, cheap Chinese goods have inundated Somalia's markets from Mogadishu to Bosaaso since the turn of the century. Low-priced electronics, textiles, and footwear, among others, are commonplace in the country, though their quality is often dubious. Somalia's growing trade with Turkey is slowly upstaging Chinese manufacturing though; by 2021, Turkey was exporting over USD 340 million in goods. Somalia, on the other hand, exports minimally to China, largely animal products, including seafood and leather. 

Chinese investment, and more general foreign engagement, in Somalia's fisheries remain controversial, however. The environmental impact of dredging the ocean floor by Iranian and Yemeni vessels in the 2000s and continued overfishing have badly impacted Somalia's coastal fishing communities. Today, foreign companies still routinely underpay for access to Somalia's bountiful waters, buying cheap licences from corrupt officials. 

Trawling is not the only maritime economic interest China holds in Somalia, though. In 2007, following the fall of the Islamic Courts Union, China's state oil firm COOP won a bid to explore and extract offshore oil. The project was quickly aborted after the Abdullahi Yusuf government failed to pacify the country and resigned in 2008. China is believed to be still interested in Somalia's offshore oil and gas but is likely wary of heavily investing in what would be an attractive target for Al-Shabaab.

China is also yet to fully engage as a security player in Somalia. Its contribution to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) has been largely symbolic and non-lethal- often office equipment, computers, and tents. A recent donation of trucks to the Somali National Army (SNA) may be read as a signal that Beijing is seeking to cultivate closer ties with the SNA. But there is little indication that it is seeking to invest heavily in an army beset by numerous problems, particularly considering that the war against Al-Shabaab does not chime with any ideological foreign policy objectives of China, unlike the US's 'War on Terror.' Somalia's neighbours like Ethiopia, which have a more fraught relationship with and are less dependent on the West, are more easily pliable.

But in the transition to a multi-polar world, it may be geostrategic interest, not ideological, that tips Chinese engagement with Somalia into military support. Beijing offers professional military education (PME) to African armies on a vast scale, often targeted at mid-low ranking officers. Military hardware and establishing bases rarely come into the equation, though the 'Wolf Warrior Diplomacy' and assertive rhetoric of Xi Jinping is certainly upping the rhetoric. 

It is conceivable that such courses may be offered to Somalia, though their usefulness may be questionable. Chinese PME courses, like all military training, reflect the country's ideological makeup but do so more explicitly than other nations. 'The party controls the gun' remains a central tenet of Chinese PME, sub-ordinating armies to the ruling elite. 

Under the current West-dependent administration, Somalia is not about to suddenly pivot to a satellite state of China. Beijing is seemingly aware of this, and the Embassy's comments also signal that the capital thinks and plans on a far longer timescale than the frequently veering foreign policies of Western democracies. The Asian country can afford to wait, maintaining lowkey and symbolic ties with Somalia until the West tires or the country stabilises. It would be a mistake, however, for Villa Somalia to think that its salvation lies eastwards in a neutral China; the days of Deng Xiaoping's 'keep a low profile' foreign policy are long gone.