Issue No 626

Published 11 Dec 2023

Deni backs down

Published on 11 Dec 2023 14:58 min
Deni backs down

Last week, after months of political wrangling, corrosive divisions, and sporadic outbreaks of deadly violence, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni abandoned his plan to conduct controversial one-person, one-vote (OPOV) regional elections in February 2024. Mounting pressure from different corners of the northern Federal Member State (FMS) proved too much for the regional president, and lengthy negotiations, led by clan elders from Puntland and areas controlled by SSC-Khaatumo, eventually brokered a deal. Further violence has been adverted, and the near-resolution to important elections just weeks away is positive. Indirect traditional elections will now take place on 8 January 2024, with 66 parliamentary clan representatives selecting the regional president.
 
Deni and the regional opposition, including political associations like Mideeye and Horseed, have been at each other's throats for most of a year. Blood has been repeatedly spilt between Puntland regional forces and Araan Jaan militia loyal to the opposition. In June, two dozen people were killed in front of the regional parliament, and in November, the UAE-backed and heavily armed Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) decamped to Garowe, causing hundreds to flee the regional capital amid escalating tensions.
 
The regional president had come under increasing pressure to negotiate from outside Puntland in recent weeks, including from UN Special Representative Catriona Laing during a visit to Garowe on 12 November. Clan leaders and civil society were also increasingly agitating against the repeated clashes and looming competing electoral timelines. The opposition had argued that Deni was seeking to use a direct electoral model to extend his term, and alleged voting irregularities in May's OPOV district council elections, including that a percentage of registered voters were underage.
 
The SSC-Khaatumo and Puntland elders proposed an amalgamation of an indirect election, whereby the current regional MPs elect the president in early January 2024 rather than the typical new set of lawmakers. Deni, however, while grudgingly accepting the return of the status quo elections, dismissed using the same batch of MPs, many of whom remain deeply opposed to his premiership. Instead, he called on clan elders to begin selecting their representatives ahead of the fresh poll in January 2024.
 
Despite this, the next day, 7 December, Puntland's parliament voted to give itself a year's term extension. Deni and the regional opposition have both vehemently opposed this move. Puntland's Information Minister Mohamud Aydid Dirir said the extension has no legal foundation and said the Puntland administration would seek to prosecute those who attempted to extend their terms. The regional opposition was always likely to oppose any unconstitutional parliamentary extension, considering their stance that Deni's OPOV system was intended to rig the polls. Voting to arbitrarily extend your term is also hardly a good look when, just a few weeks ago, the parliament descended into an ugly brawl with MPs grappling in the debating chamber. Thankfully, the Constitutional Court of Puntland has woken from its stupor and declared parliament's move null and void.
 
The resolution to Puntland's electoral crisis has been widely welcomed from across the political spectrum and Somalia. Former Somali Foreign Minister and Puntland Presidential candidate Ahmed Awad thanked Deni for a "brave and wise decision." Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud congratulated Puntland and praised Deni, saying that what was good for Puntland was good for Somalia. However, the resolution to the electoral crisis in the FMS presents an interesting dilemma to the potential reconciliation between Deni and Villa Somalia. Deni has boycotted the last three National Consultative Council (NCC) meetings, compromising support for the significant electoral changes proposed by the executive body earlier this year. And as Deni agreed to hold traditional elections, Jubaland President Ahmed 'Madoobe' came out strongly supporting the transition to a presidential model.
 
One of the central elements of the NCC proposals was syncing the FMS presidential elections for late 2024 with an OPOV system. Though the federal parliament may not ratify the NCC proposals, the likelihood that Puntland and the other FMS run on radically different electoral timelines and methods has just increased. The federal government, though, is now reported to be reluctant to bring Deni back into the NCC, frustrated by the regional president's posturing in 2023.
 
The dust has not yet settled in Puntland either. There are just 5 weeks between now and the scheduled vote, and lots of ground to recover. Barring parliament's extension move, the question of what happens with the inclusion of Sool-representing MPs lingers. Seventeen of the 66 Puntland MPs are meant to represent the Sool region, and SSC-Khaatumo administration leader Abdiqadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' has previously voiced his displeasure with the inclusion of representatives in Puntland's parliaments.
 
The administration controlling Laas Aanood and its environs seeks to be included as an FMS in Somalia in its own right, or at least see the Dhulbahante increase their representation and leverage within Puntland. But according to Deni, just 17 MPs will continue representing these areas as before. Any change to the number of MPs in Puntland would have to be changed within the regional Constitution, another potential tinderbox. The limbo of representation of Sool and Laas Aanood in Somalia will persist.
 
Further violence was highly likely in Garowe if common ground could not be hammered out between Deni, the opposition, and traditional elders. Clan militia mobilised by the regional opposition were camped on the city's outskirts, and regional forces loyal to Deni, including the PMPF, have shown a repeated willingness to flex their armoured vehicles. The past months have been caustic, and the divisions within Puntland's security architecture remain deeply concerning. Nevertheless, while some questions remain, the reconciliation between the regional administration and the opposition has come at the right moment for Puntland. This should not spell the end to the democratic ambitions of the FMS, but the prospect of OPOV February 2024 elections were more likely to destabilise Puntland than usher in democracy. The reconcilitation now offers the opportunity for Puntland to move towards a democratic electoral model together.
 
By the Somali Wire team

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