Deja Vu: The ATMIS Withdrawal
Almost in the blink of an eye, the 3-month delay or 'technical pause' in the withdrawal of 3,000 African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) soldiers is over. On 2 December, the resumption of the draw-down of ATMIS forces was announced, just a day after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) lifted the remaining components of its long-standing arms embargo on Somalia's government. Somalia’s government and army have been released from the albatross of an arms embargo; they are now free to assume full responsibility for Somalia’s security by the close of 2024, so the argument goes.
Three thousand more ATMIS soldiers will now withdraw from Somalia by the end of December 2023, handing over 8 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to the SNA. ATMIS forces had already drawn down from two bases in Bio'adale and Raga'eel in September and October. The rationale behind the delay of the draw-down in September was sound if not hasty and poorly communicated to the African Union. The SNA was on the back foot, having lost a swathe of towns in quick succession to Al-Shabaab in Galgaduud. The continued presence of ATMIS forces was intended to allow the SNA and its allied clan militia to consolidate their dubious hold on recently liberated areas in central Somalia, stabilise the frontline, and look to retake the territory recently lost.
However, Somalia has not yet recovered from the major operational setbacks triggered by the overrunning of SNA units in Osweyne, which it suffered in August 2023. While Ma'awiisley and SNA forces have defended their positions from Al-Shabaab along the Adan Yabal, Mahaas, Dhusamareb, and Bahdo lines, there is little suggestion that a retaking of Osweyne, Budbud or Gal'ad is imminent. It is frankly quite extraordinary that months after the total collapse of SNA units in Galgaduud, there is still no clear plan on how to dislodge Al-Shabaab from central Somalia.
In fact, rather than stabilising, the overall security situation in Somalia appears to have deteriorated since September. Security in Mogadishu remains compromised, with increasingly routine bombings by Al-Shabaab, in part due to the federal government's recent initiative requiring businesses to install CCTV cameras at their locations. A deadly suicide bombing that targeted Gorgor recruits at the TurkSom military base several days ago has raised further alarms ahead of the resumed draw-down.
A vacuum of several thousand well-trained soldiers now appears inevitable with the ongoing withdrawal of ATMIS forces. A dearth of effective 'holding forces' has plagued the SNA, with sufficient force generation continuing to elude them. While foreign governments may be able to 'train' enough Somali soldiers in pure numbers, ATMIS soldiers spent years in a brutal, asymmetric conflict. Their experience cannot be replicated overnight.
Though the SNA currently has an estimated total of 34,000 personnel, a third are estimated to be inactive, and though the SNA generated and equipped 15,000 personnel in 2022-2023, the quality of these soldiers and their training is dubious. Since September, over 5,000 Somali soldiers have returned from training in Eritrea, but their quality and their commitment have been considered wanting to date. Extraordinarily, many Eritrea-trained Somali soldiers have reportedly defected to Al-Shabaab upon their return.
Al-Shabaab has repeatedly targeted new SNA recruits in an attempt to intimidate and inflict maximum casualties on the army. The Somali method of warfare has inadvertently played into this tactic, often throwing newly trained and inexperienced brigades into the most intense frontlines, such as Osweyne in August.
Further, Somalia's international partners beyond its immediate neighbours have not filled its void in security personnel. Turkey continues to train Gorgor special forces and provide drones, but Qatar and other Gulf states are yet to send personnel support. It may again come down to Somalia's close neighbours to step up in some form with the withdrawal of ATMIS, if only to protect their own security. There are thousands of non-ATMIS Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) soldiers currently stationed in Somalia, particularly in Jubaland and South West State. The insurgencies in Oromia and Amhara have greatly limited the role Ethiopia has played in recent months. This week, however, Somalia and Ethiopia inked a new bilateral defence cooperation agreement that will likely involve greater training for the SNA and potential ENDF deployments in Somalia. This may prove to be the roadmap for post-ATMIS Ethiopian military engagement in Somalia. Despite this, there can be no genuine substitute for locally trained and developed forces, especially in Somalia, with its complex clan system.
The unfortunate manner by which the federal government requested a delay in the ATMIS withdrawal has not been forgotten since September. Rather than direct its request to the African Union, from which ATMIS originates, Mogadishu made its request to the UNSC, which caused inadvertent offence and a run-around with the multilateral institutions. The withdrawal was already underway when the 'technical pause' was requested, frustrating ATMIS soldiers in need of rest and recuperation, as well as attempts to dismantle FOBs.
The souring of relations between Mogadishu and the AU has also led to disagreements over the unfilled role of ATMIS deputy chief. Somalia reportedly supports Djibouti’s Mouktar Osman Karie, partly in recognition of Djibouti’s ATMIS force contributions. AU Chair Moussa Faki, on the other hand, reportedly backs the South African diplomat Sivyuile Bam. No matter who assumes this post, Somalia is in the same position now as in September 2023, again facing the prospect of a security vacuum in its fragile offensive in central Somalia.
The federal government’s repeated insistence that the military situation in Somalia is all but rosy jars with the reality on the ground. But the ATMIS withdrawal has already been delayed twice; with no willing funders to step in, it seems inevitable that 3,000 soldiers will withdraw within weeks. Even if there is no immediate calamitous battle or rout of SNA forces in response, the absence of critical ATMIS holding forces will make continuing operations against Al-Shabaab in south central Somalia immensely more complex.
By the Somali Wire team
