Issue No 624

Published 06 Dec 2023

Piracy in Puntland

Published on 06 Dec 2023 13:56 min
Piracy in Puntland 
 
At the beginning of 2023, the International Maritime Bureau lifted its designation of the Indian Ocean as a High-Risk Area. Several years had passed with minimal piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, and the threat of Somali pirates appeared to be nullified. Yet on 22 November 2023, an Iranian-flagged fishing vessel off the Ras Hufun Peninsula was seized by suspected Somali pirates armed with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. A week later, on 29 November, another fishing dhow, also Iranian, was boarded by several armed men off the coast of Qandala in Puntland; again the pirates were armed with AK-47 rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.
 
Somali-based piracy is not the only extra-judicial maritime activity to rapidly escalate in the region in recent weeks, however. Since the Hamas massacres of Israeli civilians on 7 October and the subsequent Israeli military invasion of Gaza, Yemen-based, Iran-aligned Houthi rebels have sought to target Israeli-connected vessels. On 19 November, Houthis seized the Israeli-linked' Galaxy Leader' cargo ship, and on 3 December, the US military said that a further three commercial vessels had been attacked in the southern Red Sea, accusing Iran of "enabl[ing]" the Houthis.
 
Every day, roughly a third of the world's total shipping passes the northeast tip of Africa, and there are palpable concerns that an uptick in piracy and hijackings could undermine global trade. The maritime intelligence company Ambrey has further warned merchant shipping to avoid travelling through Puntland's territorial waters and the Socotra Gap, the archipelago off the edge of Somalia.
 
It is important not to conflate Somali piracy and Houthi targeting of Israeli-linked vessels, though. One is borne from economic incentives rather than any overarching political agenda, while Houthis are explicit in their anti-Israel stance and extremism. Indeed, the very manner in which Houthi rebels filmed the attack on the Galaxy Leader was designed to attract maximum attention, using a helicopter draped with a Palestinian flag to land on board the ship.
 
The resurgent maritime crisis off Puntland's coast could not come at a worse time for the once-stable Federal Member State (FMS). Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and regional opposition remain embroiled in an ugly conflict over FMS elections in early 2024, with attempts to bring the two sides to the negotiating table getting nowhere. Mediation by clan elders and SSC-Khaatumo representatives failed in November 2023, and violence briefly erupted in Garowe between Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) units and Aran Jaan clan militia allied to the opposition. Ironically, the UAE-supported PMPF had travelled in dozens of armoured vehicles from Bosaaso to the regional capital in an attempt to intimidate political opposition, while they were supposed to be guarding the FMS coastline.
 
Part of the problem is that the Puntland administration often treats governance and security along its coastline as an afterthought. Bosaaso, Garowe, and Galka'yo have long been outsized in the attention they draw from Puntland's regional government to the detriment of impoverished coastal communities. But no one is insisting that Puntland, including President Deni, take any accountability for the re-occurrence of piracy. The FMS has proudly pressed its independence from Mogadishu within the federal system, but responsibility for tackling the roots of piracy appears to be disregarded.

PMPF Commander Abdullahi Mohamed Ahmed has since announced a doubling of patrols in the Gulf of Aden on 24-hour rotations in a bid to deter any further piracy. He complained, however, that his forces have not received any fresh support from the "African Union Mission in Somalia, the European Union or any international assistance." But while the PMPF may not have received any new funding, it remains one of the best-armed forces in Somalia. Moreover, Somalia's allies may also be wary of providing fresh support for the PMPF just a couple of weeks after their attempt at intimidation in Garowe. And the politicisation of a heavily armed force now loyal to a regional president is another reason to be wary of the lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia.
 
While piracy off the Somali coast has undoubtedly declined-- the last successful hijacking having taken place in 2017-- the PMPF cannot claim to have quelled illegal fishing. Chinese, Yemini, and Iranian vessels in particular routinely violate Somalia's international waters, hauling in large numbers of tuna and other pelagic fish. Somalia loses as much as USD 300 million in revenue every year due to illicit and unregulated fishing, to the frustration and destitution of coastal communities. The Somali pirates that seized the Al-Meraj I on 22 November also appear to have partly targeted the Iranian vessel due to its illegal fishing. On social media, some have further defended the capture of foreign fishing vessels in response to regional and federal government's inability to control their territorial waters.
 
Somali piracy has been long misrepresented. Years of lazy clichés and Hollywood blockbusters like Captain Phillips have pushed a depiction of Somali pirates as rampant and violent. But in reality, even during its heyday in the early 2010s, Somali piracy was often a business-oriented venture funded by some wealthy diaspora Somalis who realised that a few Kalashnikovs and a fast boat offered a far better return on investment than fishing. 'Old' piracy was essentially a mafia problem in Puntland's major cities. American and international warships only helped to end the earlier scourge of piracy in the Red Sea; it was also the threat of seizing diaspora passports and investments.
 
There is little suggestion that the Gulf of Aden or the Red Sea will suddenly return to the peak of piracy in 2011 when the UN recorded over 160 attacks off the coast of Somalia. The sheer number of American military vessels now in international waters should serve as a significant deterrent, and while the structural drivers of piracy, namely unemployment and illicit fishing, remain unchanged, the triggers have lessened. But as the threat of a political and security vacuum in Puntland rises, the door for a resurgence of piracy may open.

By the Somali Wire team

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