Issue No 621

Somalia's New Ambassador to Qatar
 

Earlier this month, Somalia's President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), named a new ambassador to Qatar, Mohamed Ahmed Sheikh Ali 'Doodishe.' Nearly halfway through HSM's second term of office, the appointment of Doodishe, one of the president's closest political allies and senior cabinet official, suggests a degree of unease in Villa Somalia about the direction of the nation.
 
Doodishe is a staunch HSM loyalist and a leading member of the Damul Jadiid movement– a Muslim Brotherhood faction that helped bring him to power. So close is he to the president that he was once mooted as a candidate for Prime Minister during Hassan Sheikh's first term (2012-2017). In 2012, he was nominated as ambassador to Saudi Arabia but never assumed the role. In HSM's second term, Doodishe has been serving as Somalia's Minister of Internal Security (MoIS), a critical government post focused on quelling Al-Shabaab's protracted insurgency.
 
The re-assignment of such a senior cabinet member, absent a broader reshuffle, would appear to suggest discontent with Doodishe's performance. HSM would certainly be warranted in firing his internal security minister. Notwithstanding fanciful rhetoric about Al-Shabaab's imminent defeat, the performance of the MoIS has been dismal. Al-Shabaab remains entrenched across most of southern and central Somalia, with progress against the jihadists measured in dubious body counts claimed by the Somali National Army (SNA). The government campaign has also been conspicuous for the absence of holding forces to consolidate SNA gains – a policing function for which the MoIS is chiefly responsible. Indeed, policing capacity across south and central Somalia remains abysmally poor, despite substantial support from international donors.
 
In late November, the FGS decided to fly a helicopter across Mogadishu's skyline, trailing a banner that read "Al-Shabaab is our enemy" – an unusual stunt that may have diverted some attention from its faltering military effort. But most Somalis are now too war-weary to accept propaganda in lieu of progress. The time seems ripe for the security minister to exit stage left. But Doodishe's transfer exposes the lack of a coherent federal security plan and leaves a vacuum in one of the government's most sensitive leadership portfolios. HSM has yet to nominate a replacement.
 
An alternative explanation for Doodishe's re-assignment might be Hassan Sheikh's desire to build bridges with Doha. Qatar was the patron state of HSM's predecessor, Mohamed Abdillahi Farmaajo, through his Salafi protege, Fahad Yasin, while HSM is perceived as being closer to other Gulf states. But some of Farmaajo's political appointees remain in government, constituting an embedded 'Nabad iyo Nolol' faction dedicated to HSM's failure and the return of a Doha-backed government in Mogadishu. 
 
Having suspended relations with Somalia during the Farmaajo administration, Abu Dhabi signed a defence pact with Somalia in May 2023 in a sign of confidence in HSM and has since subsidised the SNA payroll. But relations have soured as HSM has proven either unwilling or unable to secure parliamentary approval of the defence pact, and Abu Dhabi has begun to snub FGS officials seeking audience with the UAE government.
 
Recent reports from Doha indicate a growing frequency of visits by senior FGS officials, suggesting urgent but discreet outreach by Villa Somalia. In this context, Doodishe's new appointment may signal HSM's desire for a close political and senior Damul Jadiid ally to take the lead in strengthening ties with Qatar and countering the prospect of a 'Nabad iyo Nolol' resurgence.
 
Villa Somalia's strategic rationale for courting Doha is compelling. Qatar's long-standing patronage of militant Islamist movements – including various factions of the Muslim Brotherhood – has positioned the wealthy Gulf state as an indispensable broker in negotiations with such groups. Moreover, Qatar is currently playing a key role in negotiations between Israel, the US and Hamas over the conflict in Gaza. And just a few short years ago, Qatar oversaw the political dialogue that culminated in the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the collapse of the Western-backed government in Kabul, and the humiliating exit of the United States after two decades of ill-omened 'nation-building' efforts.
 
Given Qatar's past efforts to coax successive Somali governments into power-sharing deals with Al-Shabaab, HSM and his followers might also believe that it is wise to draw Doha into their camp rather than face any Qatari-negotiated compromise with Al-Shabaab. As a representative of Damul Jadiid – Somalia's most powerful faction of the Muslim Brotherhood – Doodishe may have been entrusted with this delicate task.
 
A charitable assessment of Doodhishe's transfer is that HSM aims both to salvage his security agenda and build a more constructive relationship with Qatar during the second half of his term. If so, then this mini-reshuffle will need to be accompanied by much broader and deeper strategic reforms.
 
For a start, it would be profoundly unwise for Somalia to alienate the UAE, which enjoys close relationships with Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland, as well as sections of the Mogadishu elite. If the Emiratis withdraw military funding, much of the SNA could suddenly find itself unpaid – a dangerous scenario. And Mogadishu's current relations with neighbours such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea are shaky. HSM's recent string of foreign policy successes of winning accession to the East African Community (EAC) and obtaining the imminent lifting of the UN arms embargo are no substitute for sober, lucid navigation of regional geopolitics.
 
Even more critical, and closer to home, is the potential collapse of the ill-conceived National Consultative Council (NCC) proposals for constitutional and electoral reform. The surprise bid to introduce a presidential system of government, and to limit political parties to only two, is unconstitutional and has been met with widespread suspicion and dissent. Even if they receive increasingly unlikely parliamentary approval, the NCC proposals risk triggering multiple electoral crises in 2024 and 2025, plunging much of the country into chaos. Neither EAC membership, nor Qatari political backing, will be sufficient to spare Somalia from the consequences of such reckless political stewardship.
 
Doodishe's appointment as ambassador to Qatar represents a shrewd tactical manoeuvre, whether intended to reinvigorate the FGS security agenda or woo Qatar as a potential ally. But as a strategic decision, it appears to signal drift at the heart of Somalia's federal government, less than halfway through HSM's current term. The President must embrace more consensus-driven, savvy reform as he enters the second half of his second term if he wants to put his agenda back on track.