Issue No 617

Published 17 Nov 2023

Planning for Jubaland

Published on 17 Nov 2023 14:03 min
Planning for Jubaland
 
Weeks have passed since the collapse of the frontline in Galmudug in late August, and the Somali National Army (SNA) has shown little sign of a comprehensive plan to degrade and dislodge Al-Shabaab (AS) in central and southern Somalia. Clan militias across central Somalia are still barely engaged in military operations, though this may change with Ali Osman Jeyte's recent appointment as clan militia coordinator, and the stabilisation of liberated areas remains elusive. Meanwhile, despite the sabre-rattling and speculation surrounding Phase II, there appears to be limited planning for the offensive in southern Somalia. With the heavy rains and flooding dulling offensive action, taking stock of the potential pitfalls of future operations in Jubaland is essential.
 
Executing effective and sustainable operations with SNA brigades, international support, and clan militia working in tandem has proven challenging in central Somalia. Phase II in Jubaland will present a fresh set of obstacles. Despite the ebbs and flows of territorial control in Somalia, AS remains entrenched in swathes of the Federal Member State (FMS), particularly Middle Juba, where its de facto capital, Jilib, is located. Seizing Haradheere in Mudug in January 2023 from AS with minimal clan militia support was extremely difficult - taking and stabilising Jilib and its environs would be another level of challenging.
 
For several reasons, the approach that has liberated parts of Galmudug and Hirshabelle will likely prove hard to replicate in Jubaland. First, the regional administration is reluctant to empower any clan militia, concerned that they may pose a security threat to the Federal Member State (FMS). In March 2023, Jubaland Interior Minister Yussuf Hussein Dhuumal insisted that any recruitment "will be done by the security department [of Jubaland]" and warned that the recruitment of militia is a "recipe for disaster." More recently, Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madoobe' warned that if the current offensive in central Somalia fails, AS will surely benefit from the caches of weapons it has seized. The Marehan-dominated administration is clearly reluctant to arm sub-clan leaders who might undermine their well-established dominance. Instead, the Jubaland administration prefers to rely on its regional forces, which includes many former Ras Kamboni militia, and Kenyan military support for FMS security and operations.
 
While Kismaayo opposes clan mobilisation, officials in the semi-autonomous Gedo region have sought to engage with local militias for the Phase II offensive. After several months of relative quiet, in August, AS resumed targeting officials supportive of the counter-insurgency offensive in Gedo. Access to weapons provided by the federal government is likely partially behind their vocal support for clan militia and the offensive itself. With the influence of Jubaland's administration over Gedo remaining limited, a federally organised offensive will have to navigate these dynamics carefully.
 
Equally important is the history of clan suspicion and opposition in Middle Juba towards Kismaayo and Mogadishu. In the face of Marehaan dominance, less influential clans have sought AS protection. Many feel deeply alienated from a Jubaland administration that struggles to project itself across much of the FMS. Having mostly Darood fighters liberate non-Darood clan areas under AS control could further complicate any future stabilisation efforts.
 
Critically, despite fluctuating tensions between regional opposition and the Jubaland administration over electoral delays, there is general political support for the offensive against AS. At the end of August, after weeks of ratcheting pressure, a coalition of senior opposition politicians offered their surprise support for Kismaayo to, in the words of ex-state minister Abdullahi Elmoge Hersi, "focus on the campaign to free areas controlled [by AS]." Whether this tentative reconciliation can be built upon is yet to be seen. Still, Madoobe is an adept deal-maker, and political consensus will be essential for critical buy-in during the offensive. Earlier in the year, however, while a complete reconciliation between Jubaland and Gedo politicians appeared to be forthcoming, relations have since deteriorated again.
 
More prosaically, the massive flooding in the Juba Valley has placed an indefinite pause on the prospect of any major operations. Significant areas, including much of the Luuq district in Gedo, are submerged and severed from Kismaayo. It would be a mistake to pursue large-scale military operations in deep water with bridges and roads swept away. Furthermore, nearly 500,000 people have been displaced, and with the federal and regional governments focused on an emergency response to the crisis, it is unlikely to have the capacity to fully commit to a fresh offensive. Particularly as the rains are expected to continue into January 2024.
 
The SNA has shown itself extremely limited in securing liberated territory, and while Jubaland’s regional forces are far more competent than its largely non-existent counterpart in Galmudug, the prospect of limited clan militia involvement in Phase II should be a major concern. Stop-start operations and sequencing failures have already wasted months in this offensive as political consensus diminishes and African Union forces withdraw. Consolidating and securing central Somalia should be the SNA’s priority, rather than ploughing on into South West State and Jubaland without a clear plan for reconciliation and stabilisation. Outreach to long-marginalised clans and communities in Jubaland should form the heart of this, as well as seeking reconciliation between the two major sub-clans of the Darood. This will likely be a lengthy endeavour, but should begin immediately.
 
By the Somali Wire team

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