Issue No 614

Boundaries in Somalia and Somaliland
 

On 19 October, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) issued a surprise declaration, recognising the SSC-Khaatumo administration as the "legitimate authority" of the disputed territory of the Sool region encompassing Laas Aanood. The declaration followed concerted lobbying by the SSC-K leader Abdiqadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' in Mogadishu, just a few weeks after his forces seized Somaliland's key military base in Gooja'ade. Unsurprisingly, Somaliland has firmly rejected the FGS recognition of SSC-K's authority and accused Somalia’s federal government of "hosting and acknowledging anti-Somaliland militia leaders," which "gravely jeopardise regional peace and security." While acknowledgement of the SSC-K administration does not constitute its recognition as a federal entity of Somalia, it does provoke questions about the concept of ‘legitimate authority’ and boundary demarcation in and around Somalia.
 
Somalia remains a deeply fractured nation, with political instability often expressed along its internal boundaries and regional borders. In large part, this can be viewed as a legacy of colonial self-interest and unsophisticated border demarcation. For instance, near Galk'ayo, Italian colonial administrators severed areas along the 'Tomaselli' line in a misguided response to clan violence between Darood and Hawiye. The institutionalisation of this boundary helped fuel the eruption of violence between primarily Darod and Hawiye militia after the collapse of Siad Barre's military regime in 1991. Somalia's regional borders also emerged from colonial negotiations in the late 19th and 20th centuries.
 
Somalia's current internal boundaries, with the exception of those around Puntland, began taking shape with Somalia's Provisional Constitution in 2012. Over a decade later, several internal boundary disputes pose challenges to the legitimacy and authority of nearly every Federal Member State administration (FMS) in Somalia.
 
Chapter 5 of the Provisional Constitution provides the legal underpinning for Somalia's federal system and the delineation of FMS boundaries. Implementing these provisions, however, has proven complex and contentious, necessitating the resolution of historical grievances, clan-based differences, and territorial disputes. This has been further complicated by a top-down approach to federalisation and boundary demarcation, rather than organic, local initiatives. Two principal elements of identity politics have been exacerbated by internal federal-level boundaries– territorial and clan identities.
 
Inherent contradictions within the Provisional Constitution problematised FMS formation. While Clause 1 of Article 49 says that the House of the People is responsible for the boundaries and number of FMS, Clause 6 stipulates that two or more regions can combine to form an FMS. These tensions and the vagueness over responsibility for FMS formation have persisted, despite the establishment of a number of boundary commissions.

The northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland, both of which are recognised as FMS in the Provisional Constitution, and their territorial claims pose further complications. Somaliland has functioned as a de facto state since 1991, maintaining stability, barring current armed conflict in Laas Aanood, and asserting its independence. It remains de jure unrecognised by the international community, however, obstructing the resolution of territorial disputes with Puntland, as well as the SSC-K.
 
Puntland, established in 1998 prior to the adoption of Somalia’s Provisional Constitution by 14 years, is intrinsically linked to the concept of jus sanguinis; it is perceived by most Puntlanders as a homeland for members of the Darood/Harti clans. Both Somaliland and Puntland lay claim to the Sool and Sanaag regions; the former bases its claim on territorial identity stemming from colonial boundaries, and the latter bases its claim in jus sanguinis.
 
A third FMS Galmudug's northern boundary presents another anomaly. Galmudug is delineated along the south of Puntland, and includes only one and a half regions, failing to meet the constitutional standard of two for each FMS. Puntland itself deviates from the constitution, as its boundaries are not based on administrative regions as they existed before 1991. Communities in Galk'ayo, administered by both Puntland and Galmudug, have suffered the consequences of this uneven arrangement and subsequent uneven development.
 
Despite Somalia's ethnic homogeneity, identity politics rooted in clan exert a significant influence on politics and governance. Hirshabelle, the youngest Federal Member State, is a pertinent example. Tensions surrounding its formation were largely centred around Hawadle and Abgal clan identities, and their separate interests in governance arrangements.
 
Such clan tensions remain a focal point in FMS politics today. In June, Hiiraan Governor Ali Osman Jeyte was removed from office by Hirshabelle President Ali Gudlawe Hussein. Jeyte then declared a 'Hiiraan State,' seeking to separate from Hirshabelle as its own state. In October, Hawadle elders in the Middle Shabelle region voiced opposition to the formation of a Jowhar district council, citing inequities in clan representation.
 
The development of clear boundaries and administrative arrangements demands patience, resolve, and the collective commitment of all stakeholders. Too often, local communities along Somalia's internal boundaries and external borders have been buffeted by strong, centralised political interests. But boundaries and borders transcend geographic demarcation; they are seen as the bedrock of national sovereignty, identity and security.
 
In Laas Aanood and greater Sool and Sanaag, only concerted negotiations between relevant stakeholders can return stability for local communities. Armed conflict and short-sighted politics will not resolve deep-set grievances and competing territorial claims. In the case of the Federal Government of Somalia, stable FMS boundaries established and maintained through inclusive decision-making processes could contribute to conflict resolution and much-needed healing.
 
By the Somali Wire team