Issue No 613

Published 06 Nov 2023

A positive appointment: Jeyte as Ma'wiisley commander

Published on 06 Nov 2023 14 min
A positive appointment: Jeyte as Ma'wiisley commander
 
At the end of October, the long-awaited appointment of Ali Jeyte Osman as head of coordinating the clan militia 'Ma'wiisley' in the fight against Al-Shabaab (AS) by Villa Somalia arrived. A charismatic but controversial figure, Jeyte played a central role in the mobilisation of the Hawadle uprising that dislodged AS from a swathe of territory in eastern Hiiraan in 2022. While his precise remit and influence as central commander of the Ma'wiisley is yet to be seen, Jeyte's return comes at a critical moment for Villa Somalia with the current offensive against AS stalled.
 
A former Hiiraan Governor, Jeyte has a fraught relationship with the Hirshabelle President Ali Gudlaawe Hussein, who fired him in June 2023 after their relationship deteriorated. But following the collapse of the offensive frontline in Galmudug at Osweyne, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and Jeyte began negotiations, though it has taken two months for his appointment as head of the 'Civilian Defence Forces' to be finalised. The inability of Somali National Army (SNA) forces to secure and stabilise territory liberated from AS harshly revealed the importance of clan militia in the offensive.
 
Jeyte's appointment could produce significant dividends. His reputation as an organiser is impressive, and he is well-known for mobilising young men through his powerful oratory and willingness to fight in active combat. Critically, Jeyte also belongs to the Hawadle/Ali Madahweyne sub-clan of the Hawiye, regarded as the maternal uncles of HSM. This kinship played a major role in rallying the Hawadle to the fight against AS and, conversely, compelled the HSM administration to throw its weight behind the uprising in mid-2022.
 
Jeyte's influence among the various sub-clans of the Hawadle appears to be unabated. Since the fall of Osweyne in August 2023, Jeyte has helped mobilise several meetings of clan elders in opposition to AS, eliciting critical support for the government offensive. He has also remained firm in his opposition to AS, often calling on the clans to work towards "eliminating them completely." Unlike some federal and regional politicians, there can be no doubt that Jeyte is fully behind the campaign.
 
Jeyte's appointment, however, is complicated by the tensions within Hirshabelle that have plagued the Federal Member State (FMS) since its creation. Intense clan and administrative competition continue to play out along geographical divisions. Many within the powerful clans in Hiiraan, such as the Hawadle and Galjecel, resent the dominance of the Abgaal and the Mudulood over state affairs. They have long campaigned for the seat of government to be moved from Jowhar to Beledweyne. In times of crisis, these underlying unresolved tensions and grievances often emerge. Gudlaawe's dismissal of Jeyte in June played squarely into these dynamics, and no doubt contributed to the military setbacks suffered by the Somali National Army in central Somalia.
 
In turn, the reintegration and elevation of Jeyte has been met with fury by Hirshabelle's administration. Even before the announcement, regional Vice President Yusuf Ahmed Hagar accused the federal government of undermining Hirshabelle's development. Hagar went as far as to say that Hirshabelle would end its support for Villa Somalia in the fight against AS if Mogadishu continued interfering in FMS politics.
 
Villa Somalia is caught between a rock and a hard place, with the SNA facing an uphill task in central Somalia. And the plan to launch Phase II of the offensive and extend operations to the Juba and Shabelle valleys and the Bay and Bakool regions faces even greater hurdles. The failure of regional states to commit to the so-called Operation Black Lion, poor coordination and disputes with the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) over the phased withdrawals and reluctance by some clans to raise Ma'wiisley have all contributed to the offensive stalling. Consequently, the SNA is badly stretched over a large swathe of central Somalia. Having sought to prosecute the offensive with the SNA in a commanding position, Villa Somalia has been forced to return to the Ma'wiisley and Jeyte.
 
Coalescing and professionalising the disparate clan militias in Galmudug and Hirshabelle will be an immense challenge, however. There are an estimated 8,000-10,000 forces, but there is a wide variation between the level of training and motivation between the militias. Some are clearly motivated by a hatred of AS and years of oppression, but others appear to be more motivated by resource accumulation and clan interest. Since the liberation of a significant part of Hirshabelle and Galmudug in 2022, there have been numerous instances of rogue militias establishing ad hoc checkpoints. In the longer term, major questions remain over how Somalia's security forces and militias might be knitted together into a reliable and trusted security architecture.
 
Still, Jeyte and the Ma'wiisley offer the FGS a lifeline. But all will depend on how his services are utilised, what resources are available to him, and how his mandate is defined. Progress will also depend, crucially, on how Jeyte will enforce discipline, improve training, and enhance the ma'awisley's interoperability with other regular and auxiliary forces, as well as develop a strategy for post-combat demobilisation and integration. While the implications of Jeyte's return could be far-reaching if Villa Somalia can effectively utilise his mobilising capabilities, the tensions within Hirshabelle will need to be carefully navigated.

By the Somali Wire Team

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