Issue No 609

Published 27 Oct 2023

Somalia and the Politics of Development

Published on 27 Oct 2023 16:06 min
Somalia and the Politics of Development

Today's editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Michael Higgins.
 
We would like to extend an invitation to others who may wish to contribute to the Somali Wire in the future. 
Please contact us for more information if interested.


In an environment marked by conflict, hopeful signs can sometimes get lost in the cacophony of violence. In September, something quietly happened in New York which may positively shape the direction of Somalia's future. The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Political Declaration represents an effort to rearticulate, concretise and accelerate the UN global framework for development – the 2030 Agenda. It may also prove a useful platform and catalyst for delivering a politically disinterested, and bottom-up, model of sustainable development in Somalia.
 
In Somalia, development can sometimes appear secondary to more pressing and immediate security concerns. The notion is still common in stabilisation circles of the need for a serial, step-by-step, phased approach that shifts from security to peace to development. Yet the idea that we should start prioritising development only once we've hit certain security milestones and landmarks is misplaced, particularly as issues such as youth unemployment are intrinsically tied to security. Prevailing mechanistic and technocratic approaches also conveniently forget that a key element of successful nation-building has been an accompanying climate of moral and cultural rejuvenation.
 
Development is a topic that can be abstruse and jargon-laced, but at its core, it is about fulfilling needs. While discussions of security are clearly critical, we need to recognise that security-focused discussions tend to privilege a securocratic mindset that can end up quelling the voices that are pivotal to bringing about peace and prosperity.

It has been suggested that the recent expanse of the Somali government's territorial control should be quickly followed up with the delivery of services for such gains to be maintained.

There is merit in this, but we must also be cautious to note that poorly designed service delivery efforts can be counterproductive. In Afghanistan, the financialisation of the conflict, and a flood of external money into the country, led to distortions in the political economy that ultimately benefited the Taliban. Some of the assistance programs which did prove successful in Afghanistan, however, were the community-driven development programs that responded to the direction of the local population.
 
One of the real appeals of the SDG framework is that it acts as a sort of universal language, which means that in drawing lessons, Somalia need not be confined to conflict and post-conflict settings. It becomes easier to adopt practical lessons from national development processes in other countries, be they neighbourhood regeneration programs in Chile, local governance solutions in Sierra Leone, or social protection systems in Indonesia, Brazil, or Tunisia.
 
A crucial aspect of the recast SDG agenda is that in addition to more concrete financing for development commitments, it offers a greater degree of subsidiarity and adaptability than previous development offerings. It allows for seeds of development to be sown at those local sites where there is already fertile soil – whether that be in the context of a hospital, a university, a village, a region, or a federal ministry.
 
In Somalia, a Mogadishu-focused, centralising state project is doomed to fail. It would invariably put pressure on the state beyond its capacity to bear. Latent social solidarities will invariably arise to resist efforts by a weak state to impose an agenda from above. Yet instead of seeing a complex landscape as challenging and problematic terrain to apply and fit simplistic models onto, that very complexity might be better seen as a font of strength and ingenuity.
 
Somalia offers a political, social, and cultural backdrop amenable to a politically disinterested, bottom-up development model. Being able to draw upon features such as world-renowned money transfer facilities, deliberative democratic decision-making traditions, a vibrant and engaged global diaspora, informal social accountability structures, and latent social solidarities means Somalia is endowed with and attuned to pursue such an approach.
 
In explaining the failure of Somalia's governance efforts so far, it can be tempting to point the finger at individuals, yet a more serious obstacle may be the circumstances and context in which decisions are made. In transactional political environments, can we expect that leaders who have accrued political debts in ensuring their ascent will not be subject to political creditors seeking to call in those debts?
 
For decision-makers not to see resource streams as rental incomes to divvy up among various constituencies, a certain distance from resource distribution is necessary. Yet the existing siloed donor approach to challenges like this, with a skewing of resources towards humanitarian and security arenas where they can exercise more oversight and control, creates unintentional dysfunctionalities. Somalia deserves and needs large-scale development assistance, whose prioritisation is determined by Somalis. As an SDG signatory, Somalia has already signed up to integrate the SDGs in shaping national development plans and policy frameworks.
 
Yet, how Somalia chooses to localise and support implementation is up for interpretation. Adopting an approach that sees the government's role as a light-touch and encouraging coordinator rather than heavy-handed or paternalistic approach would be advisable. Putting the tiller in the hands of local citizens and communities will also benefit political leaders by insulating them from creditor pressures.
 
Somalia's strategic location means it has been, and will always be, subject to regional and geopolitical machinations. Indeed, its present limbo status is convenient for some who would see its flourishing as a threat and its failure as a problem. However, an authentically Somali-driven development agenda will make the country more resilient from external pressures and offer a more credible environment for good faith development efforts.
 
September's Political Declaration further offers additional fiscal and policy elbow room to Somalia that was previously unavailable, through commitments such as the rechanneling of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), the exploration of future SDR allocations, and the reform of international financial institutions. Together with its renewed emphasis on peaceful, just and inclusive societies, it may just prove a boon to achieving the peace and prosperity which Somalis deserve.

Michael Higgins is an international relations and development expert on the Horn of Africa and previously served as advisor to Ireland during its tenure on the Security Council 2021-22.  

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