Issue No 608

Published 25 Oct 2023

A Pivot to Baidoa

Published on 25 Oct 2023 14:21 min
A Pivot to Baidoa
 
The ‘all-out war’ against Al-Shabaab (AS) continues. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) moved back to Villa Somalia on the 23 October, leaving behind Dhusamareb– his temporary base for over three months from which he attempted to drive the offensive in central Somalia. While the level of success of the current offensive remains contentious, HSM appears fully committed to seeing through the most substantial territorial gains against the militant group in a decade. Still, AS remains potent in many areas of central Somalia, continuing to frustrate attempts to dislodge them.
 
Though phase I of the counter-insurgency is incomplete, HSM is looking ahead to anticipated offensives in South West State (SWS) and Jubaland. As in Galmudug and Hirshabelle, HSM’s recent visit to Baidoa in SWS and Hudur in Bakool was intended to mobilise the historically reticent SWS administration and communities. This pivot to Baidoa, however, is being co-opted by SWS President Abdiaziz ‘Laftagareen,’ who is facing immense pressure from SWS political opposition to hold timely elections. For a president who has hardly shown any interest in displacing an entrenched AS presence from a large swathe of his Federal Member State (FMS), Laftagareen is suddenly a convert.
 
Laftagareen’s declaration on 7 October that phase II is “set to begin” and that “all necessary groundwork for the operation is complete” was transparent. The coalition of his political opposition had been increasing pressure on several federal officials, including HSM, to hold the regional president to the Baidoa agreement regarding the timing of elections in SWS. Laftagareen is now seeking to lower the political temperature by inviting HSM and other politicians to decamp to Baidoa. It seems that he is seeking to court HSM’s full support and stall already-delayed elections.
 
The assertion that the complex groundwork for operations in SWS is complete is highly questionable. First, there is the question of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) delayed second draw down. Grudgingly agreed to by the AU, 3,000 ATMIS soldiers and several forward operating bases (FOBs) remain in Somalia. Their extension now runs to the end of 2023, but it seems inevitable that the same concerns about force generation, Somali National Army (SNA) over-extension, and ‘holding capacity’ will emerge again.
 
Second is the now stagnant ‘Operation Black Lion’ (OBL) military support from Somalia’s neighbours in the Horn. Ethiopia, previously expected to supply the bulk of these forces, appears increasingly reluctant to commit the large numbers needed to clear AS from entrenched positions in central and southern Somalia. And without the support of Hawadle militia that proved critical to dislodging AS in central Somalia last year, the SNA could be forced to carry out the bulk of forward and holding operations largely alone.
 
Leaving aside the grim military prospects, Laftagareen’s co-opting of phase II may be the final blow to reconciliation and a negotiated settlement with the SWS political opposition. February’s Baidoa agreement, negotiated by HSM and House Speaker Aden Madobe, promised regional presidential elections in January 2024. But Laftagareen, and other regional presidents, have seized on the May National Consultative Council (NCC) proposals to push for a federally mandated term extension. This is despite significant political and public opposition to Laftagareen’s controversial presidency.
 
Laftagareen’s authoritarian moves to limit political opposition in SWS continue, attempting to intimidate anyone associated with the opposition, and instructing airlines flying to Baidoa to disallow their passage. His unpopularity will certainly have a corrosive effect on the critical phase II operations in SWS. In addition, Laftagareen’s denying his opposition their rights will only worsen political tensions and jeopardise operations against AS. If the current political impasse is not resolved, communities in SWS with historically violent and contested relationships with Mogadishu may choose to remain neutral rather than fight AS.
 
The South West State team of opposition leaders has taken a strong stand against the NCC proposals, given the prior agreement from February 2023 to hold the SWS presidential election in January 2024. They have held several meetings in Nairobi and Mogadishu over the past weeks, and met with HSM directly in Dhusamareb. But HSM’s seemingly imminent move to Baidoa suggests the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has little intention of honouring the Baidoa agreement.  Despite his best intentions, HSM’s visits to Baidoa and Hudur did not yield developments towards resolving the political impasse in SWS, or mobilising local communities to join operations against AS. Opposition leaders there, already frustrated by HSM’s support for the NCC’s proposed electoral timeline, saw the visits as a failure.
 
The political conflict in SWS has emerged at a moment of intense vulnerability for the state, as communities grapple with myriad crises, not least the displacement of over 100,000 people in Baidoa from recent flooding. Negotiations between Laftagareen and his political opposition should be facilitated by Villa Somalia immediately to chart a reasonable way forward. Moreover, while Laftagareen’s rhetoric might be outwardly supportive of phase II operations, there should be no doubt that his actions are more likely to undermine the offensive. Neither counter-insurgency operations nor NCC proposals should be used to prop up a regional president who has outstayed his elected term in office.
 
It is essential for both the South West State President and the FGS to prioritise the public interest, carry out effective state building, and stabilise the state by opting for peaceful elections. These can eventually lead to the enhancement of livelihoods and the alleviation of insecurity for the entire population of SWS. To avoid exacerbating current instability, the FGS and its international partners should ensure inclusive dispute resolution by actively involving traditional elders, Somali intellectuals, local civil society representatives, political opposition leaders and business leaders to end the current disruptive political conflict.

By the Somali Wire team

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