Issue No 608

Published 25 Oct 2023

A Pivot to Baidoa

Published on 25 Oct 2023 14:21 min
A Pivot to Baidoa
 
The ‘all-out war’ against Al-Shabaab (AS) continues. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) moved back to Villa Somalia on the 23 October, leaving behind Dhusamareb– his temporary base for over three months from which he attempted to drive the offensive in central Somalia. While the level of success of the current offensive remains contentious, HSM appears fully committed to seeing through the most substantial territorial gains against the militant group in a decade. Still, AS remains potent in many areas of central Somalia, continuing to frustrate attempts to dislodge them.
 
Though phase I of the counter-insurgency is incomplete, HSM is looking ahead to anticipated offensives in South West State (SWS) and Jubaland. As in Galmudug and Hirshabelle, HSM’s recent visit to Baidoa in SWS and Hudur in Bakool was intended to mobilise the historically reticent SWS administration and communities. This pivot to Baidoa, however, is being co-opted by SWS President Abdiaziz ‘Laftagareen,’ who is facing immense pressure from SWS political opposition to hold timely elections. For a president who has hardly shown any interest in displacing an entrenched AS presence from a large swathe of his Federal Member State (FMS), Laftagareen is suddenly a convert.
 
Laftagareen’s declaration on 7 October that phase II is “set to begin” and that “all necessary groundwork for the operation is complete” was transparent. The coalition of his political opposition had been increasing pressure on several federal officials, including HSM, to hold the regional president to the Baidoa agreement regarding the timing of elections in SWS. Laftagareen is now seeking to lower the political temperature by inviting HSM and other politicians to decamp to Baidoa. It seems that he is seeking to court HSM’s full support and stall already-delayed elections.
 
The assertion that the complex groundwork for operations in SWS is complete is highly questionable. First, there is the question of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) delayed second draw down. Grudgingly agreed to by the AU, 3,000 ATMIS soldiers and several forward operating bases (FOBs) remain in Somalia. Their extension now runs to the end of 2023, but it seems inevitable that the same concerns about force generation, Somali National Army (SNA) over-extension, and ‘holding capacity’ will emerge again.
 
Second is the now stagnant ‘Operation Black Lion’ (OBL) military support from Somalia’s neighbours in the Horn. Ethiopia, previously expected to supply the bulk of these forces, appears increasingly reluctant to commit the large numbers needed to clear AS from entrenched positions in central and southern Somalia. And without the support of Hawadle militia that proved critical to dislodging AS in central Somalia last year, the SNA could be forced to carry out the bulk of forward and holding operations largely alone.
 
Leaving aside the grim military prospects, Laftagareen’s co-opting of phase II may be the final blow to reconciliation and a negotiated settlement with the SWS political opposition. February’s Baidoa agreement, negotiated by HSM and House Speaker Aden Madobe, promised regional presidential elections in January 2024. But Laftagareen, and other regional presidents, have seized on the May National Consultative Council (NCC) proposals to push for a federally mandated term extension. This is despite significant political and public opposition to Laftagareen’s controversial presidency.
 
Laftagareen’s authoritarian moves to limit political opposition in SWS continue, attempting to intimidate anyone associated with the opposition, and instructing airlines flying to Baidoa to disallow their passage. His unpopularity will certainly have a corrosive effect on the critical phase II operations in SWS. In addition, Laftagareen’s denying his opposition their rights will only worsen political tensions and jeopardise operations against AS. If the current political impasse is not resolved, communities in SWS with historically violent and contested relationships with Mogadishu may choose to remain neutral rather than fight AS.
 
The South West State team of opposition leaders has taken a strong stand against the NCC proposals, given the prior agreement from February 2023 to hold the SWS presidential election in January 2024. They have held several meetings in Nairobi and Mogadishu over the past weeks, and met with HSM directly in Dhusamareb. But HSM’s seemingly imminent move to Baidoa suggests the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has little intention of honouring the Baidoa agreement.  Despite his best intentions, HSM’s visits to Baidoa and Hudur did not yield developments towards resolving the political impasse in SWS, or mobilising local communities to join operations against AS. Opposition leaders there, already frustrated by HSM’s support for the NCC’s proposed electoral timeline, saw the visits as a failure.
 
The political conflict in SWS has emerged at a moment of intense vulnerability for the state, as communities grapple with myriad crises, not least the displacement of over 100,000 people in Baidoa from recent flooding. Negotiations between Laftagareen and his political opposition should be facilitated by Villa Somalia immediately to chart a reasonable way forward. Moreover, while Laftagareen’s rhetoric might be outwardly supportive of phase II operations, there should be no doubt that his actions are more likely to undermine the offensive. Neither counter-insurgency operations nor NCC proposals should be used to prop up a regional president who has outstayed his elected term in office.
 
It is essential for both the South West State President and the FGS to prioritise the public interest, carry out effective state building, and stabilise the state by opting for peaceful elections. These can eventually lead to the enhancement of livelihoods and the alleviation of insecurity for the entire population of SWS. To avoid exacerbating current instability, the FGS and its international partners should ensure inclusive dispute resolution by actively involving traditional elders, Somali intellectuals, local civil society representatives, political opposition leaders and business leaders to end the current disruptive political conflict.

By the Somali Wire team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 959
Mogadishu on the Edge: The Danger Has Not Passed
The Somali Wire

Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.


10:12 min read 08 Jun
Issue No. 958
Deni and the Tough Road Back to Mogadishu
The Somali Wire

Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.


8:08 min read 03 Jun
Issue No. 128
The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma
The Horn Edition

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.


34:56 min read 29 May
Issue No. 957
How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
The Somali Wire

On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.


17:12 min read 27 May
Issue No. 956
The Perils of a Grey Transition
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.


0 min read 20 May
Issue No. 955
Averting Disorder: The Case for External Mediation in Somalia
The Somali Wire

Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.


0 min read 14 May
Issue No. 127
Total War in the Horn of Africa
The Horn Edition

'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.


27:16 min read 30 Apr
Issue No. 954
The Malian Mirror
The Somali Wire

A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.


10:18 min read 29 Apr
Issue No. 329
Washington eyes Asmara
The Ethiopian Cable

Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.


0 min read 28 Apr
Scroll