Issue No 607

Covering over the cracks: reaching towards Galmudug elections
 

Galmudug's electoral timetable, like every Federal Member State (FMS) in Somalia, is uncertain. Regional President Ahmed Abdi Karie 'QoorQoor,' a signatory to May's National Consultative Council (NCC) proposals, seems likely to delay the Galmudug regional presidential elections to the end of 2024, as others like South West State President Abdiaziz 'Laftagareen' also intend.
 
Discussions of elections in Galmudug, unlike those in South West State or Puntland, have been relegated to the back burner, however. The current offensive against Al-Shabaab (AS), which has ebbed and flowed in the FMS, is choking the electoral process for several reasons.
 
First, the securitisation of discourse in Galmudug has sidelined its internal politics. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has explicitly dismissed talk of elections and 'politics' while presenting the image of a unified federal military front wearing combat fatigues. This image and its accompanying rhetoric are reinforced by the deluge of federal and regional politicians that have decamped to Dhusamareb, travelled to meet with HSM there, or journeyed to the frontlines in 2023. Their actions have in turn squeezed political space in the regional capital, forcing QoorQoor to defer to HSM, and regional politicians to limit any talk of elections.
 
Second is the military offensive itself. With territorial control volatile, despite some fresh successes by the Somali National Army (SNA) in recent weeks, it is unlikely that a safe and stable regional presidential election could be carried off in the near future.
 
Third is the currently outsized presence of federal forces in Galmudug, accentuating the already acute dependence of the FMS on the federal government. With Galmudug struggling to generate sufficient internal revenue to fund basic services for its people and security forces, a minimal Darawish presence has been counter-balanced by significant numbers of SNA forces and clan militia. This has particularly limited the influence of the regional administration in the offensive, again squeezing the region’s politics.
 
HSM has now returned to Villa Somalia following his latest trip to Eritrea, and while the offensive rumbles on, so does the perennial intra-elite competition in Galmudug. Indeed, HSM was forced to divert significant time and resources to navigating regional power struggles while based there. Most significant are tensions stemming from the presence of National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) Director Mahad Salad, who is widely believed to be seeking the Galmudug presidency. The deployment of several hundred NISA recruits to Galkayo, though apparently largely ineffective in the military campaign, has proved grating on QoorQoor.
 
The relationship between QoorQoor and Salad further suffered following the failed Al-Shabaab (AS) assassination attempt on the FMS president on 15 September. Only the sacrifice of a young soldier saved QoorQoor and his entourage from a suicide attack using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Las Ga'amey village. Salad had left for Mogadishu the day before the attack, and QoorQoor has accused the NISA director of having prior knowledge that it would occur.
 
While such political tensions have remained largely below the surface, a poorly managed and divisive regional election could destabilise the crucial FMS-FGS relationship in the midst of military operations. Galmudug’s level of dependence has made it particularly vulnerable to the political influence of Villa Somalia; ignoring the tensions below the surface risks plunging Galmudug into violence during a yet-to-be-determined electoral cycle. The region’s election will also test the unofficial rotation of Saad, Ayr, and Suleiman sub-clans in the presidency.
 
The fragility of inter-clan relationships in Galmudug makes the possibility of future electoral disputes triggering clan clashes very real. At the beginning of October, the Farta Cadagyga area of Mudug saw a deadly flare-up between Saad and Lelkase militia. At least 20 people were killed and dozens more injured in clashes over long-standing claims to land ownership. Puntland’s Minister of Planning Said Faroole called it the onset of the third war in Galkayo between Puntland and Galmudug, and accused HSM of stoking violence.
 
Another threat of clan violence stems from the process of district formation, tied to the liberation of some areas of Galmudug over the past 14 months. Many districts now need significant investment and other support; they have complex, contested relationships with neighbouring communities and clans. Reconciliation between them must be a priority, sequenced with stabilisation to protect against a dangerous political vacuum. Decreasing potential competition could include decoupling district formation from the uncertain electoral cycle.
 
As Somalia inches closer to regional presidential elections, and with uncertainty still swirling around May’s NCC proposals, tensions that HSM has so far managed will intensify. While his deal-making in Galmudug has been admirable, the legacy of Mogadishu’s interventionist tradition in Galmudug remains. It would be a mistake for Villa Somalia to attempt to sway its presidential election, whenever it’s held.
 
Somalia's nascent federal system needs space and support to reach its potential. Each intervention from Villa Somalia sets back Galmudug’s political development, as seen under former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. The current offensive and related military rhetoric should not mean side-lining complex tensions that risk flaring further in 2024.

By the Somali Wire team