Issue No 606

A Decade of Uncertainty: Finalising Somalia's Constitution
 

Over a decade has passed since the adoption of Somalia's Provisional Constitution in 2012, and the nation's political elite appear to have lost sight of the critical need to finalise this document. Instead of moving toward stable, democratic governance, Somalia remains ensnared in a state of transition characterised by political self-preservation and stagnation. The Provisional Constitution was meant to be a transformative milestone in Somalia's quest for stability, peace, and democratic governance. Yet, it appears to be hanging precariously.
 
The Provisional Constitution's fate was thrown into fresh contention this year with the proposed radical overhaul to Somalia's governance system by the National Consultative Committee (NCC) in May. The proposals range from introducing one-person, one-vote elections to scrapping the post of Prime Minister for a purely presidential system. They are a radical departure from the controversial clan-based '4.5' formula, which allocates political power to four major clans and a minority clan. Ideally, the NCC proposals should have sparked a sense of urgency to address the completion of the Constitution. Progress, however, appears to have partially stalled.
 
A strange limbo has descended on the NCC proposals and Provisional Constitution. Without ratification from Somalia's federal parliament, they remain just proposals, with an unclear and contradictory relationship with the Provisional Constitution. But if they are passed when the Federal Parliament convenes again, it will upend a significant portion of the Constitution. Completing the Constitution and clarifying Somalia's governance system would help to partially alleviate the perennial discontent surrounding elections at both the federal and regional levels.
 
On 28 August, Somalia's parliamentarians yet again debated the Constitution's finalisation, and quickly became caught in the well-heeled arguments that have held up its resolution for years, particularly on defining relations with Somaliland. Some are reticent to finalise the Consitution without the participation of Somaliland representatives, while others oppose even the mention of 'Somaliland' in the Constitution. Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni's continued absence from the NCC further raised concerns about major constitutional changes without the input of Somalia's oldest Federal Member State (FMS).
 
The more prosiac issues of clan politics and the ongoing counterinsurgency against Al-Shabaab in central Somalia may be perceived as obstacles to finalising the Provisional Constitution; but they could, instead, serve as catalysts for its completion. At the heart of Somalia's constitutional challenge is the interplay between traditional and modern governance systems. But clan politics also has merits, particularly its capacity to promote representation in a divided society. The 4.5 governance system, however, has arguably only enshrined clan division and corruption in Somalia. Still, skillfully managed clan politics could yet act as a bridge toward greater civic participation in the realisation of constitutional democracy.
 
Al-Shabaab's corrosive effects on Somalia's political stability have also repeatedly delayed attempts to finalise the Constitution. But as the current offensive gradually claws back territory from Al-Shabaab, it offers the possibility of transforming the constitutional review process from a purely elite-driven into a genuinely inclusive mechanism. It would be complicated, but synchronising constitutional development with stabilisation initiatives and reconciliation would be profound.
 
The rollout of constitutional engagement could follow the liberation of Al-Shabaab-held areas, with education and outreach on the Provisional Constitution and constitutional democracy. Generating buy-in for a governance system that supersedes deep historical fissures amongst clans and communities is undoubtedly complex, but may prove reconciliatory. Local governance structures and traditional leaders could help facilitate this constitutional dialogue and education. This would require comprehensive stabilisation and securing of liberated areas, which the current offensive has found elusive.
 
Despite its unfinished nature, Somalia's Provisional Constitution incorporates important principles concerning inclusivity, equitable division of power, and the protection of minorities. Importantly, President Hassan Sheik Mohamud's administration enjoys stronger support from the Federal Parliament and Member States, barring Puntland, than his predecessors. Several elite political agreements concerning resource sharing, as well as the security sector, will likely need to be renegotiated due to the presence of new FMS presidents who have voiced their dissatisfaction with them. There is some hope that the Constitution will be finally adopted before April 2026, when the administration's mandate ends.
 
Somalia's political elite must address these challenges and prioritise the Provisional Constitution's completion. A combination of elite consensus and support from communities across Somalia should form the bedrock for the document. The nation cannot afford to remain in indefinite transition, and its finalisation is crucial to supporting Somalia's divided political and security landscape. Most Somalis long for permanent, democratic, and enduring governance. It's time to put aside self-preservation and work for the nation's future. Only then can Somalia progress towards a more stable, democratic, and peaceful future.