The coalition’s published communique released on 11 October lays out several stinging criticisms of Deni, ranging from political oppression to security collapse. It argues that the current administration oversees an “unbalanced” power distribution, and that criticism against the administration has been repeatedly met with violence. Most significant, however, is its unilateral rejection of the controversial amendments to Puntland’s Constitution approved last August, and the prospect of one-person, one-vote (OPOV) in the upcoming Federal Member State (FMS) elections. Instead, the coalition expressed support for the election of Puntland’s Members of Parliament and its President through the traditional elder-based system.
On 4 October, Puntland Minister of Information Mohamud Aydid Dirir reaffirmed that the regional presidential election, slated for 8 January 2024, will be OPOV. He insisted that necessary preparations have been made. But several opposition politicians have asserted that there is insufficient time to properly implement a complex OPOV system by January.
The implementation of last May’s local district elections, which used an OPOV system, is now stuck. Disregarding significant opposition to those votes themselves, in Bosaaso, the 33 elected representatives have already split, electing two chairmen and two vice presidents in one city. And elections are yet to even be held in three districts, including Puntland’s capital of Garowe, the opposition’s main base.
These electoral divisions should have been mediated by Puntland’s Constitutional Court and its Electoral Commission (PEC), but these bodies have been missing in action. Court Chairman Hassan Yusuf Noor is still convalescing in Norway, having left Puntland in August following reported pressure from Deni’s administration to vacate his position. For more than four months now, several cases, including those of Puntland’s Political Forum and Mideeye, have sat unheard on the court docket. And in recent weeks, fresh controversy has emerged over the perceived stacking of the 9-member PEC in favour of Deni.
Another recent twist in the electoral saga of Puntland came in the form of SSC-Khaatumo leader Abdiqadir Firdhiye’s visit to Mogadishu. The armed movement now seeks to unite its contested areas, including Laas Aanood, with Somalia to form a 6th FMS. On this basis, Firdhiye has insisted that SSC-K no longer requires representation in the Puntland Parliament. And he has questioned the feasibility of holding OPOV elections in an area without a registered electorate.
There is little likelihood, however, that Puntland will amend its Constitution and wilfully slash the number of MPs in its regional parliament. Despite having no administrative control of Laas Aanood, Puntland MPs representing the SSC-K are still likely to run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Mohamed Musadaq, Puntland Deputy Minister of Interior Affairs, called Firdhiye’s comments premature.
The impasse between the Puntland Opposition Council and Deni’s administration leaves Puntland’s democratic future in turmoil. Deni seems all but certain to plough on and to try and extend his term beyond January 2024, either through contested OPOV elections or delaying the vote. If the OPOV vote proceeds, fierce opposition would be inevitable, and there is real danger that Somalia’s historically most stable FMS will be plunged into protracted violence. In June, over two dozen people were killed in Garowe when opposition militia clashed with regional security forces. Recent comments of Mideeye leader Asad Osman, that Deni should be “arrested and brought to court” if he fails to hold elections, leave no doubt about what is at stake.
Still, maintaining traditional elder-based elections is undoubtedly disappointing when so many Puntlanders yearn for a more democratic system. The sight of people in Puntland, young and old, lining up to express their democratic rights in May was inspiring, even if since tainted.
The implosion of Deni’s attempted electoral reform in recent months represents a lost opportunity for Puntland. Negotiations between Deni and his opposition are now urgently needed to chart a course to address the concerns of the Puntland Opposition Council, while avoiding enshrining an alternative and undemocratic electoral model.
By the Somali Wire team
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