The coalition’s published communique released on 11 October lays out several stinging criticisms of Deni, ranging from political oppression to security collapse. It argues that the current administration oversees an “unbalanced” power distribution, and that criticism against the administration has been repeatedly met with violence. Most significant, however, is its unilateral rejection of the controversial amendments to Puntland’s Constitution approved last August, and the prospect of one-person, one-vote (OPOV) in the upcoming Federal Member State (FMS) elections. Instead, the coalition expressed support for the election of Puntland’s Members of Parliament and its President through the traditional elder-based system.
On 4 October, Puntland Minister of Information Mohamud Aydid Dirir reaffirmed that the regional presidential election, slated for 8 January 2024, will be OPOV. He insisted that necessary preparations have been made. But several opposition politicians have asserted that there is insufficient time to properly implement a complex OPOV system by January.
The implementation of last May’s local district elections, which used an OPOV system, is now stuck. Disregarding significant opposition to those votes themselves, in Bosaaso, the 33 elected representatives have already split, electing two chairmen and two vice presidents in one city. And elections are yet to even be held in three districts, including Puntland’s capital of Garowe, the opposition’s main base.
These electoral divisions should have been mediated by Puntland’s Constitutional Court and its Electoral Commission (PEC), but these bodies have been missing in action. Court Chairman Hassan Yusuf Noor is still convalescing in Norway, having left Puntland in August following reported pressure from Deni’s administration to vacate his position. For more than four months now, several cases, including those of Puntland’s Political Forum and Mideeye, have sat unheard on the court docket. And in recent weeks, fresh controversy has emerged over the perceived stacking of the 9-member PEC in favour of Deni.
Another recent twist in the electoral saga of Puntland came in the form of SSC-Khaatumo leader Abdiqadir Firdhiye’s visit to Mogadishu. The armed movement now seeks to unite its contested areas, including Laas Aanood, with Somalia to form a 6th FMS. On this basis, Firdhiye has insisted that SSC-K no longer requires representation in the Puntland Parliament. And he has questioned the feasibility of holding OPOV elections in an area without a registered electorate.
There is little likelihood, however, that Puntland will amend its Constitution and wilfully slash the number of MPs in its regional parliament. Despite having no administrative control of Laas Aanood, Puntland MPs representing the SSC-K are still likely to run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Mohamed Musadaq, Puntland Deputy Minister of Interior Affairs, called Firdhiye’s comments premature.
The impasse between the Puntland Opposition Council and Deni’s administration leaves Puntland’s democratic future in turmoil. Deni seems all but certain to plough on and to try and extend his term beyond January 2024, either through contested OPOV elections or delaying the vote. If the OPOV vote proceeds, fierce opposition would be inevitable, and there is real danger that Somalia’s historically most stable FMS will be plunged into protracted violence. In June, over two dozen people were killed in Garowe when opposition militia clashed with regional security forces. Recent comments of Mideeye leader Asad Osman, that Deni should be “arrested and brought to court” if he fails to hold elections, leave no doubt about what is at stake.
Still, maintaining traditional elder-based elections is undoubtedly disappointing when so many Puntlanders yearn for a more democratic system. The sight of people in Puntland, young and old, lining up to express their democratic rights in May was inspiring, even if since tainted.
The implosion of Deni’s attempted electoral reform in recent months represents a lost opportunity for Puntland. Negotiations between Deni and his opposition are now urgently needed to chart a course to address the concerns of the Puntland Opposition Council, while avoiding enshrining an alternative and undemocratic electoral model.
By the Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.
On Tuesday, 14 April, the four-year term of Somalia's federal parliament ended, or rather, it didn't. Villa Somalia's (un)constitutional coup of a year-long term extension for the parliament and president in March remains in effect, leaving the institution in a kind of lingering zombie statehood. It is perhaps a fitting denouement for the 11th parliament, whose degeneration has been so thorough that its formal expiration means little in practice.
Yesterday, 15 April, marked three years of brutal, grinding warfare between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Wholly neglected by a fading international community, many grim landmarks have been passed; another genocide in Darfur, the weaponisation of rape and starvation, another famine, or the desecration of Khartoum, El Fasher, and other major cities. And with no ceasefire or settlement in sight, the war has continued to swell, drawing in each neighbouring African country as tussling Middle Eastern powers grapple for the upper hand-- leaving Sudan in tatters.
As global energy markets reel from the partial shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz and war insurance premiums skyrocket by nearly 4,000%, an unlikely maritime security provider is emerging as a critical stabiliser in one of the world's most vital shipping corridors. The Somaliland Coast Guard, operating from the port city of Berbera, has quietly begun providing maritime escort services, seeking to reduce shipping insurance costs—and consequently, the price of commodities and energy for consumers across the Horn of Africa and beyond.
Most nights in a number of dimly lit bars in Addis Ababa, one can hear a vibraphone hum over a syncopated bassline. The sprightly rhythm is unmistakably jazz, but the scales are Ethiopian; pentatonic, looping and melodic. Five decades after its pioneering by visionary musician Mulatu Astatke, Ethio-jazz remains in full swing, with its renaissance from the late 1990s persevering despite tough political and cultural conditions.