A cancelled trip to Baidoa
The simmering tensions over competing electoral timelines appeared to be coming to a head in South West State (SWS) this week. Concerted pressure from a coalition of regional opposition politicians had been building for weeks before their expected arrival in Baidoa today, 6 October. The unpredictability of the SWS President, and his minimal qualms about using force against his political opponents, had raised concerns of potential violence in the already unstable Federal Member State (FMS).
The SWS opposition, led by three former parliamentary speakers, Mohamed Osman Jawari, Sharif Hassan, and Mohamed Mursal, however, agreed to postpone their trip at the request of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). While the opposition has not travelled to Baidoa to intensify pressure on incumbent SWS President Abiaziz Hassan Mohamed 'Laftagareen,' there is little sign of the tensions easing.
Following his meeting with the SWS opposition, HSM summoned Laftagareen to Dhusamareb on Wednesday 4 October to discuss the prospect of regional presidential elections. The outcome of their discussions are still unclear, but they were reportedly heated. Opposition representatives are now expected to travel to Dhusamareb today to continue their discussions with HSM, and learn the outcome of his and Laftagareen’s talks.
Until September, the SWS opposition had been largely disregarded at the federal and regional levels. But on 10 September, several candidates vying for the SWS presidency convened in Nairobi to outline their objections to Laftagareen and their support for free and fair elections. Since then, they have applied concerted pressure on the international community in Somalia and federal Somali politicians to lobby for the implementation of the February 2023 agreement. In the last week alone, SWS opposition politicians met with US Chargé d'Affaires Shane Dixon, UK Ambassador to Somalia Mike Nithavrianakis and the African Union Envoy to Somalia, Souef Mohamed El-Amine.
Laftagareen has not been idle either. He returned to Baidoa from Nairobi last weekend, where he had convened with Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe, as well as a host of European diplomats. Both Deni and Madoobe are also facing significant internal opposition over the scheduling and nature of their presidential elections. Earlier this week, in anticipation of the arrival of the SWS opposition, Laftagareen deployed regional police to Baidoa's airport. He seemingly believes he can use force to secure his political survival in the absence of popular support, as he has done in the past.
Intermittent deadly political clashes have marked Laftagareen's chequered tenure. His rise to the SWS presidency in December 2018 was deeply controversial. Backed by former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) arrested the presidential frontrunner and former Al-Shabaab leader, Mukhtar Robow, to pave the way for Laftagareen's appointment. Civilians protesting Robow's arrest were met with violent force from local security forces allied with Laftagareen.
Already lacking legitimacy, Laftagareen has consistently targeted his opposition with little regard for reconciliation or consensus. Journalists or pro-opposition voices are routinely harassed, threatened, and arrested. In 2021, young social media influencers were arrested for criticising Laftagareen's leadership. Opposition leaders have also been blocked from travelling to Baidoa, even for personal business.
Particularly brazen was Laftagareen's ordered raid on Mohamed Ibrahim Farketi's house in December 2022, when Farketi and others contested Laftagareen's term extension. Several people were killed, and more than 20 sustained injuries in the ensuing violence. There was real concern that the arrival of the SWS opposition coalition in Baidoa today might herald similar clashes.
To prevent further conflict, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) proposed a reconciliation conference to establish a clear roadmap for SWS elections. In February 2023, under the stewardship of HSM and Parliamentary Speaker Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur 'Madobe,' an agreement was inked, with all parties agreeing to hold regional MP elections in November 2023 and presidential elections in January 2024. This signalled a significant compromise on the part of the opposition, who had endured four years of harassment from Laftagareen.
But in May 2023, the National Consultative Council (NCC) led by President HSM announced wide-ranging proposals seeking to reshape the country's political architecture. Among the major reforms was the postponement of all FMS elections to November 2024, the change of political system from parliamentary to presidential, and the restriction to only two political parties for all elections, at both state and federal levels. This new agreement, still unratified by Somalia's federal parliament, has brought significant uncertainty to regional electoral timelines. Opposition politicians from every FMS have criticised the agreement as unrealistic and framed it as a ploy to extend presidential terms.
While HSM is adamant that the current offensive in central Somalia must be the priority, he has reaffirmed his support for November 2024 regional presidential elections to the SWS opposition. But with the SWS opposition determined to challenge Laftagareen's grip on power, the FMS may yet see renewed violence if a unified position on the competing electoral timelines cannot be quickly found.
The president's focus on security is understandable, but his refusal to honour the February agreement and his emphasis on the NCC’s electoral timeline are counterintuitive. Without somewhat unified politics in SWS, phase II operations of the current military offensive in the FMS are doomed before they have even begun.
There are three likely scenarios in the coming months; a roadmap on free and fair elections can be agreed between the relevant stakeholders, Laftagareen oversees another sham election by blocking his opponents, or violence erupts in SWS. Laftagareen has invested significant time, money, and force to thwart competitors in the FMS; he will not easily vacate the SWS presidency nor offer up genuine elections.
HSM asked the regional opposition to postpone their trip, and they agreed to heed the President's call and that of Somalia's international partners. But several questions remain, particularly over what Villa Somalia might offer to the opposition and what Laftagareen could agree to regarding an electoral timeline. The onus is now on HSM; he must broker an agreement, and quickly, to safeguard the implementation of his critical security agenda and stability in SWS.
By the Somali Wire team
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