The Attack on Geriley
Last Thursday 13 July, Al-Shabaab (AS) seized control of a Somali National Army (SNA) and Jubaland Darawiish base in Geriley, near the town of El Wak in south-west Gedo. The base, just 12 kilometres from the Kenyan border, had been vacated by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) less than two weeks earlier as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) draw down. A worrying sign of Al-Shabaab strength in Jubaland, the attack has also highlighted concerns raised by several Jubaland politicians about the readiness of the SNA and regional forces to take over ATMIS security responsibilities.
The Geriley Forward Operating Base (FOB) was handed over by the KDF to the SNA on 29 June, one of 6 bases ATMIS handed over to Somalia in the past month. The KDF had manned the Geriley base for close to a decade. But a statement issued by Al-Shabaab on 13 July announced that the militant group had seized the base and the entire Geriley area, emphasising its proximity to the Kenyan border. According to AS, its fighters had already occupied the area surrounding the base days prior to the attack in which the FOB had been overrun from multiple directions. Video footage and photographs of the attack were later released by Al-Shabaab on 16 July, showing militants roaming the deserted base.
Al-Shabaab did not waste time targeting Geriley after the ATMIS withdrawal. Approximately 200 AS fighters armed with 9 technical vehicles were observed entering the area and taking control of the town on 1 July, just three days after the reported KDF exit. Additional AS fighters armed with 14 technical vehicles were deployed to Geriley on 3 July, as Al-Shabaab prepared to launch its first attack on the SNA and Jubaland Darawiish base. That attack, which happened on 4 July, was successfully repelled by Somali forces.
Al-Shabaab subsequently deployed 200 additional fighters armed with 7 technical vehicles to an area near Geriley on 7 July. A further 180 AS fighters with four technical vehicles deployed towards Geriley from a village north of Garbaharey town in Gedo on 8 July.
Despite signs that Al-Shabaab was strengthening its position in preparation for a second attack, encircling Geriley and blocking potential reinforcement routes, the FOB did not receive additional military support. When AS launched its second attack, Somali forces defended the base for several days, but they were ultimately unable to resist hundreds of AS fighters.
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