The Attack on Geriley

The Attack on Geriley

Last Thursday 13 July, Al-Shabaab (AS) seized control of a Somali National Army (SNA) and Jubaland Darawiish base in Geriley, near the town of El Wak in south-west Gedo. The base, just 12 kilometres from the Kenyan border, had been vacated by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) less than two weeks earlier as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) draw down. A worrying sign of Al-Shabaab strength in Jubaland, the attack has also highlighted concerns raised by several Jubaland politicians about the readiness of the SNA and regional forces to take over ATMIS security responsibilities.

The Geriley Forward Operating Base (FOB) was handed over by the KDF to the SNA on 29 June, one of 6 bases ATMIS handed over to Somalia in the past month. The KDF had manned the Geriley base for close to a decade. But a statement issued by Al-Shabaab on 13 July announced that the militant group had seized the base and the entire Geriley area, emphasising its proximity to the Kenyan border. According to AS, its fighters had already occupied the area surrounding the base days prior to the attack in which the FOB had been overrun from multiple directions. Video footage and photographs of the attack were later released by Al-Shabaab on 16 July, showing militants roaming the deserted base.

Al-Shabaab did not waste time targeting Geriley after the ATMIS withdrawal. Approximately 200 AS fighters armed with 9 technical vehicles were observed entering the area and taking control of the town on 1 July, just three days after the reported KDF exit. Additional AS fighters armed with 14 technical vehicles were deployed to Geriley on 3 July, as Al-Shabaab prepared to launch its first attack on the SNA and Jubaland Darawiish base. That attack, which happened on 4 July, was successfully repelled by Somali forces.

Al-Shabaab subsequently deployed 200 additional fighters armed with 7 technical vehicles to an area near Geriley on 7 July. A further 180 AS fighters with four technical vehicles deployed towards Geriley from a village north of Garbaharey town in Gedo on 8 July.

Despite signs that Al-Shabaab was strengthening its position in preparation for a second attack, encircling Geriley and blocking potential reinforcement routes, the FOB did not receive additional military support. When AS launched its second attack, Somali forces defended the base for several days, but they were ultimately unable to resist hundreds of AS fighters.

Jubaland’s Darawiish forces claimed to have retaken the base on 14 July, a narrative contested by a key member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament. On 19 July, Mursal M. Khaliif, who serves on the Defence Committee, suggested that Al-Shabaab remained in control of Geriley. Khaliif expressed alarm that Jubaland and SNA forces had received no support. He warned that if Somali security forces were not “reinforced by the international community immediately, Al-Shabaab will definitely increase their foothold along the Kenya-Somalia border.” Al-Shabaab leaders also seem confident about AS presence in Geriley. AS appointed one of its commanders as Chairman of the town on 16 July, claiming to have established full control.

Just a week before the attack on Geriley in early July, Jubaland’s Vice President Mohamed Sayid Aden had expressed concern regarding the ATMIS draw down. He said the withdrawal was premature and ill-advised, and repeated requests from the regional administration to halt the withdrawal had been overlooked. He said he believed that neither Jubaland forces nor the SNA were adequately prepared to assume control of vacated ATMIS bases, and urged a concerted effort to manage Jubaland security. This warning sadly went unheeded.

Al-Shabaab control of Geriley is likely to affect the morale of the population living in this unstable border area, as well as local support for the Kenyan and Somali governments. Having lived with the KDF and then ATMIS for nearly a decade, locals who had worked with Kenyan forces may now fear reprisals; in fact, the security of the entire local population is now at risk. A strong AS presence in Geriley not only poses risks to Kenya, it places other Somali government-controlled parts of Gedo in danger, including El Wak. On 17 July, some 200 AS fighters reportedly left Geriley, travelling towards Bardheere– an area with a meagre government presence, far removed from possible SNA or Ethiopian reinforcements. If Al-Shabaab succeeds in taking Bardheere town, or imposing a blockade like the one currently seen on Baidoa, it would be another serious blow to Jubaland security.

Having been initially repulsed at Geriley, Al-Shabaab received hundreds of reinforcements from several directions. But despite a growing number of militants in the area, and despite apparent AS control of Geriley town prior to the second attack, Somali security forces remained unprepared. There appears to have been no plan to support the federal forces in charge of the base. This lack of support is detrimental to overall force morale.

An urgent rethink of the ATMIS draw down is now required. While it is unlikely that these vital holding forces will remain for much longer, a successful FOB draw down could include a transition in which withdrawing ATMIS soldiers are present alongside Somali federal and regional forces. Intelligence-based contingency plans to support SNA-controlled FOBs in case of attacks are essential. The ATMIS transition to place ownership of Somalia’s security in the hands of Somali security forces is commendable. But a premature departure that leaves Somali forces, and civilians, unprepared will only lead to more deadly incidents like the attack on Geriley.

The Somali Wire team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Personal

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

^$ 0

Get Started

You may also be interested in

See all

Read

Issue No. 972

Baidoa’s Burgeoning Insurgency

The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) strategy to assert central authority over federal states and enforce its brand of limited plebiscite – the so-called “one-person-one-vote” (OPOV) – appears to be going awry.

22:16 min read 26 Aug

Read

Issue No. 971

Somalia’s Polycrisis – A Tipping Point?

The Somali Wire

Delegates from Somalia's influential Darood clan family are currently gathering in Nairobi, Kenya, for a crucial "pre-conference" planning session. Driven largely by clan chiefs, the meeting is designed to formulate a unified strategy and coordinate responses to ‘fundamental issues’ (arrimo masiiri ah) within Somalia, principally centre-periphery tensions and the future of federalism. The anticipated culmination of these talks is a comprehensive Pan-Darood congress in Garowe. This development represents a rare and significant intervention, serving as a clear indicator of accelerating political polarisation and fragmentation.

23:45 min read 19 Aug

Read

Issue No. 970

Somalia’s Reform-Induced Malfunction

The Somali Wire

Technicians and engineers have long been familiar with a paradoxical problem: how the repair of a specific defect often triggers a secondary malfunction. "Repair-induced malfunction" is a widely recognised dilemma across technical professions, with awareness and mitigation deeply woven into standard training.

20:51 min read 12 Aug

Read

Issue No. 969

Regional States Must Secure Inclusive Political Settlement in Somalia – IGAD Official

The Somali Wire

I stand before you today with profound respect and appreciation for the sacrifices the sons and daughters of your countries have made in the AMISOM/ATMIS/AUSSOM missions to help their African brothers and sisters in Somalia fight the scourge of Al-Shabaab, open and maintain critical trade routes, and help in the state-building process of Somalia.

16:55 min read 05 Aug

Read

Issue No. 968

Somalia: Why Transition Call Makes Sense

The Somali Wire

Somalia’s opposition - frustrated by months of stagnant dialogue - has for the first time proposed a transitional mechanism to break the country's protracted political deadlock. In an open letter addressed to a crucial extraordinary summit of African Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TPCCs) which opened on Wednesday in Kampala, the Somali Future Council (SFC) said that a new transitional governance arrangement was vital and necessary and is hoping the initiative will gain traction among regional actors who have boots on the ground and share a vested interest in a durable political settlement.

20:58 min read 30 Jul

Read

Issue No. 967

Somaliland - The Return of the Prodigal Daughter

The Somali Wire

In a significant symbolic blow to Somali unionism, Fahiima Yusuf Quuje - a prominent Dhulbahante activist from the Jama Siyaad sub-clan who was instrumental in mobilising grassroots support for the armed insurrection in Laas Anood - late last week declared she was repudiating Somali unionism and the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology, tendering her resignation from her regional assembly seat in the fledgling, Mogadishu-backed Northeastern State of Somalia (NES) and would be returning to Somaliland. A day after the announcement, Quuje landed at Egal International Airport in Hargeisa, where she was greeted by high-ranking dignitaries, garlanded in the Somaliland flag, and serenaded with patriotic anthems.

19:38 min read 22 Jul

Read

Issue No. 966

A New Spring in His Step: How HSM Engineered His Rebound

The Somali Wire

Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.

24:38 min read 16 Jul

Read

Issue No. 965

The Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU: Ethiopia Missed a Milestone While Somaliland Avoided a Historic Mistake

The Somali Wire

The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.

6:03 min read 10 Jul

Read

Issue No. 964

Part II/The Human Rights Deficit in Somalia's New Penal Code

The Somali Wire

For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.

16 min read 08 Jul

What are you looking for?

Issue No. 568