Issue No. 567

Russian Aid: A Poisoned Chalice
 

During a visit by Somalia’s Foreign Minister Abshir Omar Jama (Huruse) to Moscow in late May, his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov reportedly extended an offer of security assistance to Somalia. One unnamed Somali diplomat confirmed this to media at the time, saying, “Russia was ready to provide Somalia’s army with military supplies” in its fight against Al-Shabaab. This offer comes amidst intense geopolitical competition, but could also signal increasing Russian interest in the Horn of Africa, a region where it has little footprint. While there have been no signs of acceptance of Russia’s offer so far, it is important to consider both its potential attractiveness to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its negative ramifications. 
 
The history of Somalia and Russia’s security relationship is complex. Somali dictator Siad Barre pursued close relations with the Soviet Union, receiving USD 32 million in 1962 to modernise the Somali army. Soviet humanitarian aid helped alleviate suffering due to the 1974-75 drought in northern Somalia. The Ogaden War of 1977-78 spelt an end to the Soviet-Somali alliance, however, after the USSR backed Ethiopia. Barre expelled Soviet personnel and shifted Somalia’s allegiance to the west. Soviet military aid had enabled Somalia to build one of the largest military establishments in Africa by 1977, but this proved unsustainable following the withdrawal of Soviet support in 1978. In the 21st century, Somalia was the site of Russia’s re-engagement in global affairs after its invasion of Georgia in 2008. The deployment of the Russian naval frigate ‘Neustrashimy’ to escort ships through Somalia’s pirate-filled waters was seen by some as an attempt to win back its international standing. This year’s offer of support to Somalia is equally self-serving, again following Russia’s illegal invasion of a neighbouring state.
 
Somalia was one of the 28 African countries that voted to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations in May 2022. The country’s former President, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, had made overtures to Russia. In September 2019, Somalia’s Ambassador to Russia Abdullahi Mohamed Warsame boldly claimed that Somalis “would like to see the Russians come back.” Russia’s current Ambassador to Somalia Mikhail Golovanov said in February 2020, however, that “holding joint military exercises with Somalia to combat terrorism has not been considered.” But war in Ukraine may have changed the calculus, as Russia seeks to build international support for, or at least encourage apathy toward, the armed conflict. In 2020, Russia analyst Samuel Ramani called the country’s interest in the Horn of Africa one of “engaged opportunism,” in which Moscow seeks to “exploit opportunities as they emerge in the region.” Russia’s recent offer to Somalia may be just that.
 
Somalia is deeply reliant on economic, humanitarian and military aid from western countries, particularly the United States. But Somali leaders, past and present, have sometimes protested that this dependence on western aid, with its significant conditions, restricts Mogadishu. Some have suggested that Jama’s visit may have been intended to probe avenues of greater military support, and the freedom to use weapons however Somalia sees fit in its counter-insurgency operations against Al-Shabaab.
 
Since Russia’s initial offer in May, there has been a fresh flood of arms into Somalia, in part due to persistent lobbying by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). His National Security Advisor said in mid-July that arms including 120mm mortars, helicopters, and ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns are now in the federal government’s possession. This could make the Russian offer of arms less attractive.
 
While a Russian offer of military support could come with few conditions, it would still have negative ramifications for Somalia. Russian support for African counter-insurgencies is well-documented, largely operated through the notorious state-funded paramilitary ‘Wagner Group’ across the Sahel. If accepted in Somalia, Russian security aid could hurt diplomatic relations with western allies. Acceptance of Russian military support has seen African countries like Mali spurned by the Biden administration. Also, while Russia is interested in prising countries from western influence, its resources are now overwhelmingly focused on Ukraine. It has neither the interest nor the capacity to fill the vacuum if western countries were to withdraw their various types of support from Somalia. Finally, the model of Russian support seen in other African countries, including the Central African Republic, Mali, and Burkina Faso, is autocratic, disproportionately violent, and holds little regard for human life. The proliferation of weapons, back room deals, and resource exploitation that accompany Russian methods rewards autocrats, not democrats. There is also no reason to believe that the brutal hybrid counter-insurgency practised by the ‘Wagner Group’ would defeat Al-Shabaab. Just look at Mozambique, where it has proved ineffective against the militant group, unable to respond to local context and the country’s myriad security forces.
 
Russian military aid is a poisoned chalice. Thankfully, since the initial offer of support was made in May, talk of support has subsided. With Somalia gearing up for a fresh offensive against Al-Shabaab, the last thing it needs is haemorrhaging relations with western allies.