Issue No. 565

Al-Shabaab’s Blockade of Baidoa 
 

Since 10 July, South West’s interim capital, Baidoa, has been blockaded by Al-Shabaab (AS). The reason for this is unclear, but AS has set up checkpoints, while commanding everyone to avoid use of the critical Mogadishu– Baidoa road. Some have claimed this is AS retaliation for the arrest of business owners paying extortion money to AS in nearby areas. Others have called the blockade a reaction to South West security forces' detention of teachers travelling to Bullafulay, a village under AS control. Whatever the reason for the blockade, it is compounding a dire humanitarian situation, and it serves as a worrying reminder of AS potency beyond its deadly attacks. 
 
At least 20 trucks transporting food have so far been denied access to Baidoa near the village of Albashir. While some vehicles have been temporarily allowed into Baidoa, Al-Shabaab has warned drivers not to transport goods into the city until further notice. The militant group controls Daynuunay, a strategic town on the Mogadishu–Baidoa road, just 25km from Baidoa. The mesh of unpaved roads linking Baidoa to the surrounding districts of Berdaale, Diinsoor and Ufurow also runs through the grey zone of contested territory where AS moves freely. This control has allowed it to choke critical supplies into the city, with local and federal authorities struggling to address the situation with limited resources. Attempts to end the blockade have been slow, with relief efforts hampered by security risks posed by Al-Shabaab's presence.
 
The blockade is further compounding Baidoa’s bleak economic predicament. The price of essential commodities has sky-rocketed, with fuel prices reportedly doubling in just a few days. Baidoa residents, many of whom were already struggling to make ends meet, now find themselves grappling with scarce supplies and inflated prices. After successive failed rainy seasons, Baidoa's food security is volatile, and any break in food aid or supplies is keenly felt. The blockade has also effectively halted trade in Baidoa, with local merchants reliant on the movement of goods forced to suspend business. 
 
Situations like Al-Shabaab’s blockade of Baidoa throw Somalia’s accelerating urbanisation and displacement into sharp relief. Somalia’s growing urban and displaced populations are deeply dependent on external aid. In recent years, Baidoa’s urban population has ballooned, following a massive influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs), now estimated at nearly 600,000. Collapsing pastoralism and intensifying climate shocks have uprooted hundreds of thousands of Somalis, forcing them into urban centres. And food aid is limited, with Al-Shabaab’s ban on aid distribution in its territory making aid transportation into Baidoa extremely difficult. The areas around this city were once the heart of Somalia’s breadbasket. Today there are reports of treatable diseases, including pneumonia and measles, killing malnourished children. 
 
The situation in Baidoa further reflects the control Al-Shabaab continues to exert over much of southern and rural Somalia. With the second phase of Somalia’s offensive against AS seemingly imminent, the blockade serves as a timely reminder of how embedded the militant group is throughout much of the country. In the past, AS has strategically positioned its fighters on crucial routes to various regions and cities nationwide. Its blockades are accompanied by strict checkpoints operated by armed militants and, as in Baidoa, these often limit access to essential goods and services while disrupting travel. Last year, AS militants torched four donkey carts carrying critical food supplies to Hudur, the capital of the Bakool region, in a long-running blockade of the town. In Hiiraan, AS has repeatedly demolished water wells and burned vehicles carrying food aid. 
 
With such targeted attacks and public displays of force, Al-Shabaab instills both vulnerability and dependence, ensuring compliance from civilians and local authorities alike. For AS, blockades serve multiple purposes. First, by controlling transportation routes, it limits the flow of resources and support to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Federal Member States (FMS), and rival militias. Second, and more relevant to Baidoa, blockades assert authority over the civilian population. Imposing strict regulations showcases AS control while discouraging locals from supporting or cooperating with Somali authorities.
 
But these blockades have also proved, on occasion, damaging for Al-Shabaab. The first phase of the current offensive against AS that began in 2022 partially emerged from Hawadle anger over the blockading of critical routes into Beledweyne in Hiiraan. The FGS and clan militias subsequently united against AS, and wrested back significant areas of central Somalia.
 
The consequences of these blockades are devastating for ordinary Somalis. Families are separated, businesses struggle to operate, and access to vital services becomes increasingly limited. In Baidoa, it is unclear how the situation will develop. Al-Shabaab may soon lift the blockade, sufficiently satisfied with its display of force and intimidation. But if the blockade continues, the humanitarian situation will further deteriorate, in a city housing already immensely vulnerable people. 
 
Moving forward, better integrating Baidoa's vast IDP population into the city and supporting their needs would help lessen their dependence on humanitarian aid. Such dependence makes urban centres particularly susceptible to the kind of pressure Al-Shabaab is exerting. This is, however, a long-term problem not quickly or easily resolved. Clearing AS from its long-held positions across South West State could be the critical element in breaking its tight grip on cities like Baidoa. This is also far from straightforward. Whatever happens, the current blockade on Baido is a worrying indication of the ongoing strength of AS ahead of the next Somali military offensive.