Issue No. 564

Gedo and Jubaland: A Tentative Reconciliation
 

In a surprising turn of events, Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam, known as ‘Madoobe,’ has made significant progress in his protracted struggle to regain control of the Gedo region. The region, predominantly inhabited by the Marehan sub clan of the Darood, has long resisted the largely Ogaden regional administration. But after weeks of tensions over Madoobe’s appointment of a new Gedo governor, Abdullahi Abdi Jama, several senior Gedo politicians appear to have acquiesced to the appointment. Gedo's anti-Madoobe alliance has splintered, signalled by the arrival of Jama and his deputies in Garbarahey. 
 
Following fears of potential armed conflict between Gedo and Jubaland forces, this seemingly sudden reversal will undoubtedly come to many as a surprise. While the dust is far from settled, this realignment has wide-reaching implications for Jubaland, particularly concerning the pending offensive against Al-Shabaab.
 
The Gedo governorship, and a significant majority of the region’s district commissioners, have now abandoned their calls for independence from Jubaland. A political calculation appears to have been made in the face of apparent Ethiopian indifference, and Villa Somalia’s support for Madoobe. One particularly notable defection is that of Ahmed Bule Gared, a former governor appointed by former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo; Gared has reportedly joined Madoobe's cause.  
 
Several Gedo politicians and many residents, however, remain deeply opposed to Madoobe’s administration. Just last week, senior Gedo figures announced the formation of the Union of Presidential Candidates, to oppose Madoobe’s administration and call for timely elections in the region. Adbullahi Sheikh Ismail Fartaag, a member of the new union and former Jubaland Vice President, attacked the apparent alliance between Jubaland and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). He accused Villa Somalia of pressuring Gedo authorities to cooperate with Madoobe.
 
And there are still widespread concerns over Madoobe’s attempts to run roughshod over Jubaland’s Constitution by forcing a presidential term extension. Jubaland elections are scheduled for August 2023 and, if handled poorly, the threat of regional armed conflict might yet re-emerge. The opaque manner with which Gedo authorities have recently re-aligned with the Jubaland administration has also drawn criticism, but whether the remaining opposition will mobilise against the realignment is yet to be seen. 
 
The tumultuous relationship between the FGS, Jubaland, and Gedo pre-dates President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s current administration. Tensions also ran high during Farmaajo's term in office, (Farmaajo hails from Gedo.) Farmaajo's controversial attempt to assert federal control over Gedo triggered deadly clashes in February and March 2020 between federal and Jubaland security forces. Displacing thousands of local residents, this plunged the long-standing intra-clan divisions within the Darood to a new low. Simmering tensions and suspicions have rumbled on since.
 
Farmaajo’s electoral defeat and HSM’s simultaneous return to power in May 2022 revived Madoobe’s aspirations to reclaim authority over Gedo. Despite their initial differences and conflicting agendas, Villa Somalia and Jubaland now appear to have found common ground over Gedo with shifting political dynamics. This new-found cooperation between HSM and Madoobe has coincided with the rift between HSM and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni. Madoobe's support for sweeping proposals made by the National Consultative Council (NCC), including extensions for Federal Member State (FMS) presidents, has further cemented this alliance.   
 
But while Madoobe has finally made progress in bringing Gedo back under Jubaland authority, significant challenges remain, not least of which being the remaining opposition from many Gedo residents. Al-Shabaab is still entrenched across swathes of Jubaland, particularly Middle and Lower Juba. Madoobe has faced allegations that his administration has been largely uninterested in liberating AS-controlled territory. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the Jubaland administration does intend to participate in the long-awaited second offensive against Al-Shabaab. In recent days, two Jubaland security operations separately targeted the militant group in the village of Welmare 40km from Afmadow in Lower Juba, and in Hagar, also in Lower Juba. It is yet unclear whether these were stand-alone missions or the beginning of phase two of Somalia’s offensive. 
 
Internal foment and the threat of armed conflict in Jubaland had threatened to derail any offensive against Al-Shabaab before it began. This threat now appears to have been averted, for the time being. Still, wider questions concerning Somali National Army (SNA) and Jubaland force capacity remain, particularly as African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces draw down. Whether Somalia has generated enough resources, both human and material, to effectively tackle Al-Shabaab in its most entrenched areas, including much of Jubaland, remains to be seen.
 
Resolution of deep inter-clan and political divisions in Jubaland will not happen overnight. But if new alliances can be built on with transparency and consensus, they could help bring a semblance of stability desperately needed in Gedo, and Jubaland overall. The greater the openness and clarity that can be demonstrated by all sides of this new alliance-- in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Gedo, the better. Reaching out to other influential Gedo figures who remain opposed to Madoobe’s administration will also be central towards greater reconciliation.